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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to study three specific research questions in child health, women’s 
empowerment and children’s education from an intrahousehold perspective, using 
panel data from the Mexican Family Life Survey.  
 
The first essay (Chapter 2) aims to shed light into the problem of obesity in Mexico. 
The chapter studies the intergenerational transmission of obesity in children and 
adolescents offering quantitative measures of the parent-child link in terms of the Body 
Mass Index (BMI). Starting by following a simple Ordinary Least Squares approach, the 
analysis progresses to the use of fixed effect methodologies in order to isolate shared 
and non-shared genetic factors from the parent-child BMI relationship.  Results 
suggest a strong link between the BMI of fathers and children, which is not only 
associated to genetic elements but also to time-variant factors that could be related to 
eating and exercising habits; this relationship is highly significant and stronger for 
children living in households with a high socioeconomic status. The mother-child link, 
on the other hand, seems to be slightly weaker and almost exclusively explained by 
time-invariant factors (such as genetics) however this relationship tends to be stronger 
for children whose mothers are in paid employment.   
 
In the second essay (Chapter 3) this thesis explores the relationship between women’s 
employment and education on their level of participation on seven different aspects of 
intrahousehold decision-making. Unlike previous research papers on the matter, this 
work considers three possible results for women’s involvement in decision-making: i) 
exclusive decision-making, ii) shared decision-making with at least one other family 
member, or iii) non-participation. Results show that having one additional year of 
education will increase the likelihood of a woman sharing decision-making power with 
at least some other family member, but will reduce the probability of her being the 
exclusive decision-maker. On the other hand, being in paid employment tends to 
increase women’s likelihood of both, sharing power and becoming exclusive decision-
makers.  The analysis then goes on to explore the role of social norms on women’s 
behaviour and finds that having a higher level of education than the average in the 
community seems to decrease women’s level of intrahousehold decision-making power, 
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supporting the notion that women seem to compensate their success outside the 
household with submissive attitudes at home. 
 
Finally, the third essay (Chapter 4) studies the association between children’s cognitive 
ability and their time allocation on school, work and housework. The relationship 
between children’s endowment and the amount of resources parents allocate to them 
has been widely studied in the past; however, most of the previous research on this 
matter has only considered monetary resources as a measure of parental investments. 
Alternatively, this work considers time allocation as a more basic form of parental 
investment. Using fixed effects and instrumental variables methodologies, the chapter 
analyses the relationship between children’s IQ z-scores and a set of six variables 
indicating children’s participation or enrolment in work, housework and school, as well 
as the number of hours dedicated to each activity. Results suggest that cognitive ability 
does not seem to have a significant effect on children’s participation or time allocated 
to work; nevertheless, it does have a strong link with school enrolment, number of 
hours spent at school and participation in housework, some of these effects being 
significantly different for boys and girls.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation and Objectives 
 
The need for intrahousehold analysis in policy-oriented empirical research has been 
recently stressed in the literature. Even when the major development objectives involve 
increasing the wellbeing of a community or a country as a whole, it is essential to 
understand the motivations, relationships, decision-making processes and 
distribution of resources that happen in lower units of planning.  Knowing how 
resources are allocated and power relationships are like in the household, for instance, 
allows policy-makers to design effective development projects that are more likely to 
give the desired results (Rogers & Schlossman, 1990).  
Therefore, it is essential to initiate a discussion on the intrahousehold sources and 
mechanisms behind common socioeconomic problems. A public health issue such as 
childhood obesity, for instance, can be traced back to shared and non-shared eating 
and exercising habits mainly developed in the household. Similarly, women’s labour 
force participation can be seen as the aggregate result of many women making the 
decision of whether they should get a paid job outside the household or not, a process 
that is likely to involve not only their own wishes but also a complex negotiation process 
within the household. Likewise, children’s enrolment in school or participation in paid 
work is a decision likely made by the parents based, among other factors, on a cost-
benefit analysis. Therefore, research on these matters should not only focus on the 
final result (health, women’s participation in the work force, children’s enrolment in 
school) as an aggregate outcome, but also acknowledge the relevance of the intricate 
intrahousehold relationships and decision-making processes behind them.  This thesis 
aims to study three specific research questions about obesity, women’s empowerment 
and children’s time allocation from an intrahousehold perspective, using panel data 
from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS). 
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The first issue that this thesis aims to analyse is obesity. Mexico currently has the 
second largest obesity rate among the OECD countries, with an obesity incidence of 
32.4 per cent among adults, which is expected to rise significantly within the next 
decade (OECD, 2017). A separate research study based on micro-simulation seems to 
suggest a similar trend, concluding that by 2050 the proportion of men and women 
with normal weight will decrease, respectively, to 12 and 9 per cent, from reference 
figures of 32 and 26 per cent registered in 2010 (Rtveladze, et al., 2013). Similarly, 
Mexico has been recently ranked among the six countries with the highest rates of 
overweight and obesity among children and adolescents between 5 and 17 years old 
(OECD, 2014), with additional evidence suggesting the presence of an increasing trend 
in the incidence of childhood obesity in the last 13 years (Hernández-Cordero, et al., 
2017). Considering that many of those overweight and obese children are likely to 
become overweight and obese adults (Dietz, 1998), the rise in the incidence of this 
problem becomes even more worrying.  Furthermore, given the strong relationship 
between obesity and other chronic illnesses such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes 
and diabetes-related complications, the significant rise in the prevalence of obesity 
represents a major challenge not only in terms of social wellbeing, but also regarding 
the monetary costs associated with them, both direct (costs of treatment, 
hospitalisation) and indirect (mortality, disability, loss of productivity), which place a 
heavy burden in the Mexican social healthcare system. The direct cost of diabetes alone 
has registered an increase of more than US$717 million for outpatients and US$223 
million for inpatients in the period 1994-2006, while indirect costs have raised US$ 
177 million (Barquera, et al., 2013); both figures being expected to increase 
significantly in the future. In a different study considering 13 different obesity-related 
diseases, the authors predict an rise of the total obesity-related costs from US$ 806 
million in 2010 to US$ 1.2 billion in 2030 and US$ 1.7 billion in 2050, whilst a decrease 
of 1 per cent in Body Mass Index (BMI) across the population would virtually result in 
health-care savings up to US$ 43 million in 2030 and $85 million in 2050 (Rtveladze, 
et al., 2013).  
Even though there have been significant efforts by the government encouraging 
individuals to reduce their consumption of high-calorie foods and promoting an active 
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life style1, there is an important component that has not received enough attention: 
the intrahousehold dimension of the obesity issue. This means that obesity might not 
happen randomly in isolated occurrences, but it is likely to affect more than one person 
in the same home. In fact, there is already evidence in the literature finding that people 
sharing a household with overweight and obese individuals are also likely to be 
overweight and obese (Rodriguez Oreggia & Perez Lizaur, 2010), which suggests the 
presence of intrahousehold mechanisms facilitating the transmission of overweight 
and obesity among family members. More importantly, given that the high prevalence 
of overweight and obesity in Mexico has now spread across all age groups, including 
children and adolescents, there is a possibility that obesity might have become an 
intergenerational problem, likely to be transmitted from parents to children. Therefore, 
any attempt to design effective policy against this problem must invariably consider 
the intrahousehold relationships and parent-child transmission processes that 
contribute to intergenerational vicious cycles that might be aggravating the obesity 
epidemic in Mexico; however, previous research for the Mexican case has not studied 
this matter in depth. For this reason, the first essay in this thesis (Chapter 2), aims to 
offer quantitative measures of the father-child and mother-child links in BMI, using 
different methodologies that allow the analysis to control for certain non-variant factors 
both at the individual and household level. By contrasting the measures obtained 
under different methodologies it becomes easier to understand the components and 
sources of the transmission process, facilitating the design of appropriate policy. 
As it will be shown in Chapter 2, one secondary result from the previous analysis is 
that mothers who are in paid employment tend to transmit more of their own 
anthropometric status to their children with respect to women who do not work outside 
the household, an outcome that triggered the formulation of the second research 
question studied in this thesis. The second essay (Chapter 3) explores the relationship 
between women’s education and employment and their level of involvement in 
intrahousehold decision-making, especially regarding those decisions that directly 
involve their own lifestyle and wellbeing, as well as those of their children. The fact that 
working women tend to transmit more of their own anthropometric status to their 
children inevitably raises the question of whether paid employment may help women 
                                                          
1 Please refer to Mexico’s ‘National Strategy to the Prevention and Control of Overweight, Obesity and Diabetes’(2013). 
Available at: https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/276108/estrategia_sobrepeso_diabetes_obesidad.pdf 
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get a higher level of influence, not only regarding food choices but also more 
transcendental decisions with long term effects in family life.  The notion of women’s 
empowerment in the domestic sphere is of particular interest for the Mexican case, due 
to the particular sociocultural environment and non-written norms that, independently 
from any external influences, condition people’s behaviour and women’s involvement 
in decision-making. In a highly gender-stratified society like Mexico, the spectrum of 
decision-making aspects in which women are actively involved is not wide, due to social 
norms that have implicitly assigned women to very specific areas of family life and 
segregated them from others (Casique, 2000). So, while food preparation and child care 
are seen as especially ‘feminine’ spheres of domestic life, other crucial aspects of 
decision-making such as large expenditures and important household investments, 
are typically managed by men. Likewise, men are traditionally expected to be 
breadwinners and go to work while women stay at home with the children. Therefore, 
even when women are legally allowed to study and work if they wish to, the reality is 
that, especially in small or highly traditional communities, women are still socially 
expected to be in charge of basic domestic affairs, which inevitably restrict the amount 
of time they can dedicate to paid work. In fact, only 44.9 per cent of Mexican women 
in working age are actually employed, this figure being the one of the lowest among the 
OECD countries, far below the average of 60.1 per cent (OECD, 2017). Although there 
are several external factors that might be discouraging women from participating in 
the labour market (such as the low levels of social protection, the lack of affordable 
child care and the gender pay gap), there still is a considerable proportion of women 
who do not even get to participate in the decision-making process regarding their own 
employment status, this matter being decided by other family members2. 
Even though there is already some work on the positive effects of education and 
employment on women’s participation in decision-making, most of them consider 
general indexes to measure women’s power across several aspects of decision-making. 
Also, women’s involvement in decision-making is usually measured in dual variables 
with only two possible outcomes: participation and non-participation. However, a more 
comprehensive analysis of this matter should consider the possibility that employment 
and education might help women participate in some decision-making processes, but 
                                                          
2 According to data from the Mexican Family Life Survey analysed in Chapter 3, almost 20 per cent of women reported 
themselves as ‘non-participants’ in the decision-making process regarding their own employment status. 
13 
 
not others. Also, it is important to take into account the fact that empowering factors 
such as employment end education may increase women’s participation in 
intrahousehold decision-making but may not necessarily give them enough power to 
become exclusive decision-makers. Since the desirability of each particular level of 
power varies depending on the aspect of decision-making being studied, it is important 
to analyse the effects of employment and education separately for each decision. 
Therefore, the second empirical chapter of this thesis explores the relationship between 
women’s employment and education on their level of participation on seven different 
aspects of family life, considering three different levels of decision-making power: non-
participation, shared participation and exclusive decision-making. Just as in Chapter 
2, the analysis includes fixed effects methodologies in order to control for time-
invariant factors influencing women’s power, employment status and level of 
education. Additionally, the study examines how social norms can undermine the 
positive effect of education and employment on women’s intrahousehold decision-
making power.  
Finally, the third essay in this thesis (Chapter 4) focuses on one particular 
intrahousehold decision-making process: children’s time allocation. Every family, 
consciously or not, makes choices regarding the way in which children spend their 
time. Even though there are many different alternative activities children can dedicate 
their time to, this study focuses on three of them: work, school and housework. 
Particularly, the analysis aims to examine the role that children’s cognitive ability 
might be playing in the way their time is allocated among these three activities.  The 
study of children’s time allocation is especially relevant for the Mexican case, given the 
alarmingly high participation of children on the labour market. According to data from 
the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI, in Spanish) 3.2 million 
children and adolescents from 5 to 17 years old worked in 2017, representing a child 
labour rate of 11 per cent (INEGI, 2018). From this group, 7.1 per cent work in 
unpermitted activities that put at risk their health and development, and 4.7 per cent 
do unpaid domestic work in inadequate conditions.  
The decision to send a child to school (instead of work) can be analysed as an 
investment, not so different than any other investment a household can make. For 
each child in any particular household, a decision needs to be made with regards to 
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the use that will be made of their time. If a child goes to work, their time will translate 
into immediate income that will likely be destined to the household’s present 
consumption. On the other hand, if the child goes to school the household will need to 
absorb direct and indirect costs associated with the child’s school attendance, but this 
investment will most likely translate into a higher level of income in the future as the 
child grows to be an educated adult. An important factor to consider when making this 
decision has to do with the child’s endowments, in particular those regarding the 
child’s cognitive ability which will have an effect on their school performance and their 
future returns to education. If parents follow a reinforcement strategy that maximises 
the net present value of the household’s income as a whole, children with a higher level 
of cognitive ability will be more likely to be sent to school, whilst children with a low 
level of cognitive ability will probably be sent to work. However, if parents choose to 
follow a compensation approach where the goal is to equalise the present value of their 
children’s income, then less able children will be more likely to be sent to school in 
order to make up for their lack of ability, whilst more able children will be sent to work. 
Although some research has been already done on the relationship between ability and 
monetary investments such as school expenditures (Majid, 2012), little has been 
studied on the effect of ability in children’s time allocation, which constitutes a more 
basic form in which parental willingness to invest can be understood, especially in poor 
households where the mere decision to send a child to school means a significant 
sacrifice in terms of present consumption therefore representing a major investment.  
Understanding the factors influencing the decision-making process regarding 
children’s time allocation and the particular role that children’s cognitive ability plays 
in it could offer a better sight of the parental incentives behind the decision to send 
children to school or work and might contribute to the design of more effective policy 
against child labour. Hence, the third and last empirical chapter in this thesis aims to 
study this relationship in depth, considering data on children’s time allocation, 
including not only their participation in work or school, but also the number or hours 
dedicated to each activity. Additionally, the analysis makes use of fixed effects and 
instrumental variables methodologies in order to control for time-invariant factors and 
solve possible endogeneity coming from reverse causality issues.  
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1.2  The Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) 
 
The quantitative analyses for all three essays in this thesis are performed using data 
from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a publicly available longitudinal survey 
designed by the Iberoamerican University (UIA, in Spanish) and the Centre for 
Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE, in Spanish), with the collaboration of the 
National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI, in Spanish), the National 
Institute of Public Health (INSP, in Spanish), the University of California, Los Angeles 
(UCLA) and Duke University. The MxFLS compiles longitudinal information on a wide 
variety of aspects of family life at both the household and individual level, including 
socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, decision-making processes, time 
allocation, health status, anthropometrics and biomarkers as well as measures of 
cognitive ability. A large sample of households and individuals, which is representative 
of the Mexican population at the national, urban, rural and regional level, was studied 
over a 10-year period collecting information in three rounds: MxFLS-1 (2002), MxFLS-
2 (2005-2006) and MxFLS-3 (2009-2012). The original sample selected for the first 
round consisted on a set of 35,000 individuals (8,400 households), 90 per cent of which 
were relocated and reinterviewed for subsequent rounds3. 
The MxFLS offers some advantages over other Mexican data sets. To begin with, it is 
the first Mexican survey that gathers two useful features: longitudinality and national 
representativeness. Given the nature of the research questions addressed in this 
thesis, having multiple observations per individual and household allows to deepen the 
analysis and control for time-invariant factors that could be playing a role in the 
relationships  under study (as shown in Chapters 2 to 4). Similarly, working with a 
nationally representative data set makes the results easier to interpret, more suitable 
for international parallel analyses and more relevant for policy design.  
Furthermore, the MxFLS compiles information on an extensive variety of topics, which 
makes it possible to extend the scope of the research questions under study and offers 
extra variables that can be used to strengthen the main analyses. For instance, having 
information on the anthropometric and socioeconomic status for the same sample 
                                                          
3 More details on the sample design can be found at the official website of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) : 
http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org/english/introduccion.html 
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makes it possible to study how the intergenerational transmission of the BMI might 
differ across different levels of family income (Chapter 2). Likewise, the simultaneous 
availability of both anthropometric measures and indicators of cognitive ability 
facilitates the process of finding an appropriate instrumental variable to solve potential 
endogeneity issues coming from reverse causality (Chapter 4).  
Lastly, using the MxFLS has the essential advantage of incorporating data on very 
specific aspects of family life that are not generally available in other surveys. 
Information on intrahousehold decision-making, for example, is particularly detailed 
in this survey since it asks for the opinion of all family members, as opposed to just 
the head of the household. For each aspect of decision-making (from food choices to 
contraceptive use), every adult member of the household is asked the same question: 
‘Who make(s) the decisions?’ This feature is particularly important for the purposes of 
the research question analysed in Chapter 3, since it allows the study to compare the 
results of using the opinion of different individuals, providing some robustness for 
those findings that converge into similar conclusions. 
 
1.3  Organisation of contents 
 
The empirical chapters of this thesis are organised in the following three sections 
(Chapters 2, 3 and 4), each chapter presenting a set of subsections containing a 
literature review, data description, methodology, discussion of results (including all 
figures and tables along with the main text) as well as a final subsection for 
conclusions. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the overall conclusions of this thesis.   
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Chapter 2 
Intergenerational Transmission of the Body Mass Index (BMI) 
in Children and Adolescents: A Panel Study. 
 
Abstract 
This chapter applies pooled OLS and fixed effects methodologies using panel data from the 
Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) in order to quantify the intergenerational transmission of the 
Body Mass Index (BMI). Results suggest a strong correlation between the BMI of fathers and 
children, which seems to hold even after controlling for genetic predispositions and time-invariant 
habits, being particularly stronger for families with a high socioeconomic status and for 
households with a small number of members. On average, children of working mothers tend to 
experience a higher level of maternal transmission, with respect to children whose mothers do not 
work. Finally, results show that obese and overweight parents seem to be more prone to transmit 
their anthropometric status relative to normal weight parents, suggesting the presence of an 
intergenerational vicious cycle which might be contributing to the high prevalence of this problem. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Parents have an important influence on their children’s health. While some parents 
may transmit healthy genes to their children, others might be passing on defective 
genes that contain a predisposition for certain illnesses. Similarly, some parents might 
transmit health-enhancing behaviours whilst others (advisedly or not) may be teaching 
unhealthy habits to their children that could have repercussions on their health and 
wellbeing. Since children cannot control what kind of parents they get, having a high 
level of intergenerational transmission for health outcomes suggests that a child’s 
potential to be healthy in the present and become a healthy adult in the future is not 
the same for all individuals, which may have adverse consequences in terms of 
economic equality and social mobility (Dolton & Xiao, 2014). That is, if the 
intergenerational transmission of health is sufficiently strong there may be a group of 
people that are condemned to have poor health across generations. Consequently, the 
analysis of the intergenerational transmission of health outcomes becomes essential 
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in order to design better and more effective public policies that consider these potential 
disparities among individuals. 
In Mexico, most of the problems in terms of child health have to do with nutritional 
deficiencies, usually associated with conditions such as overweight and obesity. 
Although some policies have been designed to fight these problems, most of them rely 
on the external influences that the child might be receiving from outside the household, 
such as the availability of junk food at school (via legal prohibitions and required 
standards for the food that is sold there). However, it is quite possible that a great part 
of a child’s obesity problem could be explained by influences provided within the 
household, specifically by the parents. Although there are a few studies documenting 
the relationship between the anthropometric situation of parents and children in 
Mexico, none of them has considered the calculation of actual transmission coefficients 
for both parents considering the presence of genetic, socioeconomic and behavioural 
influences4. One of the most relevant studies in this matter is the one by Rodriguez 
Oreggia and Perez Lizaur (2010), in which the authors conclude that having obese 
individuals as family members makes people more likely to be obese as well. However, 
their estimation involves a mix of intrahousehold mechanisms and it’s hard to tell how 
much of it is due to parental transmission and how much can be explained by the 
influence of other relatives. Dolton and Xiao (2014) calculate a mother-child elasticity 
of transmission using data from urban households in Mexico, however their sample is 
not representative of the whole population. 
The main objective of this paper is to use representative data at national and regional 
level to quantify how much of a child’s anthropometric condition can be explained by 
the one of each of the parents. Specifically, the study uses panel data from the Mexican 
Family Life Survey (MxFLS) in 2002, 2005 and 2009 to estimate coefficients of 
intergenerational transmission of the Body Mass Index (BMI) for children and 
adolescents between 0 and 19 years old, employing both cross-sectional and fixed 
effects approaches. Additionally, interaction variables are used in order to find out 
whether the strength of the parental transmission varies according to the child’s age 
                                                          
4 Socioeconomic influences might include factors such as income and parental education which can potentially determine the 
household’s access to healthy meals and/or parental knowledge on what constitutes a healthy lifestyle. Behavioural influences 
refer mainly to eating and exercising habits of the parents that could be imitated by children.  
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and gender, the household socioeconomic status and the parents’ anthropometric 
situation.  
Next subsection presents a brief description of the nutritional status of children in 
Mexico and the importance of child obesity as a public health issue. Subsection 1.2 
offers a literature review on the process of intergenerational transmission and their 
applications on health outcomes and subsection 1.3 explains the objectives of this 
paper as well as its contribution to the literature. Section 2 describes the data source 
(Mexican Family Life Survey) as well as some summary statistics for the main variables 
in the study. Section 3 explains some methodological details, the model used, as well 
as the estimation strategy. Results are discussed in section 4.  Finally, conclusions are 
presented in section 5. 
 
2.1.1 The Problem of Child Obesity in Mexico. 
In 2010, 28 per cent of boys between 5 and 17 years old suffered from overweight or 
obesity5, while this figure goes up to 29 per cent for girls (OECD, 2014). According to 
data from the National Health and Nutrition Survey in 2012 (ENSANUT 20126, for its 
acronym in Spanish) the proportion of children under 5 years old suffering from these 
problems increased from 7.8 per cent in 1988 to 9.7 per cent in 2012. In 2012, more 
than 1 in 5 adolescents between 12 and 19 years old had overweight and 1 in 10 
suffered from obesity, the prevalence of these problems in adolescents having increased 
almost trice from 1988 to 2012. In fact, there is evidence suggesting the presence of a 
statistically significant positive trend on child and adolescent obesity in Mexico during, 
at least, the last 13 years (Hernández-Cordero, et al., 2017). 
Considering that a significant proportion of overweight and obese children and 
adolescents are likely to become overweight and obese adults (Biro & Wien, 2010; 
Serdula, et al., 1993), the problem of child obesity is also a matter of concern for 
policymakers, who will need to ideate a system of social security with the capacity to 
                                                          
5 The World Health Organization defines overweight and obesity as ‘abnormal or excessive fat accumulation that presents a risk 
to health’. Having a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 30 or higher generally suggests the presence of obesity, while a BMI of 25 or 
higher indicates the presence of overweight. Please refer to: https://www.who.int/topics/obesity/en/ 
6 Encuesta Nacional de Salud y Nutrición, 2012. Data publicly available at: https://ensanut.insp.mx/ 
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support an upcoming group of young adults suffering from diseases that used to affect 
old people only. Actually, Mexican government has recently recognised the fact that 
the country is going through a transition process in which obesity and overweight have 
unusually increased, affecting all sectors of the population independently of their age, 
geographical location or whether they live in rural or urban zones. In response to this 
phenomenon, in 2013 the government implemented a national strategy against 
overweight, obesity and diabetes which seeks to fight these problems via the promotion 
of healthy habits and lifestyles, the generation of public spaces dedicated to physical 
activities and the capacitation of health personnel (Latnovic & Rodriguez Cabrera, 
2013).  
Given the importance of overweight and obesity in the Mexican public health’s agenda, 
it is essential to study the key factors behind their prevalence. This chapter examines 
the phenomenon of parental transmission of anthropometric outcomes, which is likely 
to be contributing to the high persistence of these problems.  Since the definitions of 
overweight and obesity are closely related to very specific measures such as weight and 
height, it is useful to analyze the behavior of an anthropometric outcome whose 
calculation involves the use of these variables, such as the Body Mass Index (BMI). 
This concept has been used in several medical and economic research and is now a 
generalized way to measure and classify the anthropometric status of an individual. 
The popularity of the BMI as anthropometric measure lies in its simplicity of 
calculation and the way it can be easily used to determine how much a person’s body 
weight differs from what is desirable and healthy according to their height. 
 
2.2  Literature Review: The Intergenerational Transmission of 
Anthropometric Outcomes. 
 
A question that has been widely addressed in the literature is: what factors determine 
whether a child is underweight, overweight or obese? In general terms, the influences 
affecting a child’s anthropometric outcomes can be classified in two categories: those 
that are purely external and have nothing to do with any parental influence (such as 
health issues caused by random accidents or the positive effects of a government 
program aiming to improve the child’s level of health and welfare) and those influences 
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attributed to a parent-child transmission (such as genetic factors and the behavioural 
and socioeconomic environment that the parents provide). Examples of the behavioural 
and environmental components of the parental transmission are easily found in the 
literature. Currie and Moretti (2007) use a data set based on California births from 
infants born between 1989 and 2001 to study the intergenerational transmission of 
birth weight and find that family income and other indicators of parental 
socioeconomic status such as educational level may influence the child’s health by 
altering the use of prenatal care and modifying health-damaging behaviours like 
smoking. Another example has to do with the way parents allocate resources among 
household members, which might vary according to the cultural background and the 
nature of the economic incentives faced by the parents.  Some households have a 
stronger preference for their sons over their daughters and may decide to give them a 
greater portion of food and economic resources. There might also be some level of 
preference for first-borns over the rest of the offspring (Sen, 1990; Dasgupta, 1993). 
These biases are a consequence of the parents’ economic decisions and will inevitably 
affect children development. Genetics are also an important component of the 
transmission mechanism since children’s genetic information inevitably comes from 
their parents and this inherited information might contain certain predispositions for 
a particular body size, health condition or even for a chronic disease. As a general rule, 
the estimated coefficients associated with the parental transmission of health 
outcomes are inevitably a mix of both genetic and behavioural or environmental factors 
since the transmission process takes place simultaneously in these three dimensions. 
As suggested by Martin (2008), the biological influences often interact with 
environmental factors in multiple and complicated ways, therefore trying to quantify 
separately the components of the parental transmission becomes a hard (if not 
impossible) task.  
The process of intergenerational transmission of anthropometric status has been 
studied in the context of both developed and developing countries. Akbulut and Kugler 
(2007) used data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth in 1979 (NLSY79) on 
mothers and children to document the intergenerational transmission of a set of 
specific health outcomes that included weight, height, BMI, depression and asthma.  
Under the basic specification they find that 45 per cent of the variation in the child’s 
BMI is explained by the variation in the mother’s BMI, while this figure goes up to 58 
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per cent for children of immigrant mothers. Similarly, in a study for the 1958 British 
birth cohort, Li et al. (2009) use multilevel models to analyse the intergenerational 
transmission of obesity and according to their findings, a one standard deviation 
increase in maternal BMI is associated with an increase in the offspring BMI z score of 
0.23. Likewise, Bhalotra and Rawlings (2011) investigated the intergenerational 
persistence of health from mothers to children in 38 developing countries during the 
period 1970-2000 and find that a one deviation decrease in maternal BMI is associated 
with an increase of 10.8 per cent in the risk of low birth weight. Analogous effects can 
be found in Thompson (2013), where the author uses samples of adopted and biological 
children from the U.S. National Health Interview Survey for the period 1998-2011 to 
analyse the intergenerational transmission of health variables such as: self-rated 
health level, obesity, asthma and diabetes. According to his findings the 
intergenerational link associated with these health variables is significantly robust, 
genetics explaining between 20 and 30 per cent of it. However, the process driving the 
transmission of health status from parents to children has to do not only with biological 
or genetic influences but also with behavioural and communicative factors. A useful 
illustration of this is given by Rimal (2003) who used structural equation models and 
data from the Stanford Five-City Project, which collected independent cross-sectional 
data waves in 1979, 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1989, to document the dependency of 
adult and child eating behaviours on self-efficacy (defined as an individual’s ability to 
exert control over specific behaviours), knowledge and communication between adults 
and children. According to his results, adults’ dietary behaviour along with the 
children’s use of health information, knowledge and self-efficacy explain 48 per cent of 
the variance in children’s dietary behaviour. 
There is additional evidence suggesting that the strength of the parental transmission 
differs significantly across the distribution of income. Using data on individual birth 
records from California, U.S., Currie and Moretti (2007) found a strong maternal 
transmission of low birth weight, which seems to be stronger among poor households. 
Specifically, they find that children who were born in poverty are 0.040 percentage 
points more likely to have low birth weight if their mothers had low birth weight; whilst 
this estimate is 0.022 for non-poor households. Likewise, Bhalotra and Rawlings 
(2013) used a set of 38 developing countries to estimate the sensitivity of the 
intergenerational transmission of health to different socioeconomic variables. 
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According to their results, children who were conceived or born in places facing adverse 
socioeconomic conditions are more likely to suffer from maternal transmission of low 
height. Specifically, the authors find that a one standard deviation growth in the log of 
the GDP per capita is associated with a decrease in the intergenerational persistence 
of 29.6 per cent. This result is reasonable since richer countries usually have good 
public health services that can counteract the intergenerational effect for children of 
mothers with poor health. 
The size of the intergenerational persistence of anthropometric outcomes also depends 
on the level of the anthropometric outcome itself. Using the U.S. National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) and the Children and Young Adults of the NLSY79, 
Classen (2010) has estimated an intergenerational correlation of the BMI (between 
women and their children) equal to 0.35 (namely, an intergenerational elasticity of 
0.42)7. Nevertheless, this figure is not constant across the sample and the author uses 
quantile regression to document that this intergenerational persistence becomes 
higher at greater levels of the child´s BMI. For the full sample, for instance, the 
intergenerational elasticity is 0.27 for those children in the 10th per centile of the BMI 
distribution, and this figure gradually grows for higher levels of the child´s BMI, 
reaching 0.58 for children in the 90th quantile.  
Some researchers have raised the question of whether the mother’s and the father’s 
health outcomes are equally important in the determination of the children’s situation. 
Whitaker, et al. (2010) used pooled data for English families between 2001 and 2006 
to quantify the individual and joint effects of maternal and paternal overweight and 
obesity risk in children. The authors found that the mother-child associations for the 
BMI were significantly stronger than the father-child associations, independently of 
the child’s gender (correlations of 0.27 for mothers and 0.23 for fathers, even after 
adjusting for undisclosed non-paternity8). Finally, in a study for intergenerational 
correlations of height using data from Vietnam in 1993, Venkataramani (2011) found 
that there are strong parental associations that are robust to the inclusion of 
household and parental characteristics (from the general specification the author finds 
                                                          
7 The author explains that in this case the correlation is lower than the elasticity because the standard deviation of maternal BMI 
is lower than that of their children. 
8 The authors recognise that “undeclared non-paternity can result in an underestimate of the observed difference between 
maternal and paternal associations”. Consequently, they use sensitivity analyses to take this possibility into account. 
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that one standard deviation increase in parental height is associated with between 0.18 
and 0.20 standard deviation increase in child height z-scores). Also, the maternal 
relationship seems to be approximately 60 per cent higher for boys than for girls, the 
difference being significant at the 10 per cent level. Then, when the author uses the 
conditions faced by parents in early life as instruments for the parents’ heights, he gets 
an even larger mother-child association, whilst the father-child link almost disappears. 
In contrast, Dolton and Xiao (2015) use data from the China Health and Nutrition 
Survey (CHNS) covering the period 1989-2009 and find that the size of the father-child 
association in BMI is slightly larger than in the case of the mothers for almost all OLS 
and fixed effects specifications. 
 
2.2.1 The use of panel data in the study of the intergenerational transmission 
of BMI  
Although most of the studies in the intergenerational transmission literature have used 
cross sectional data, having one single observation for parents and children in a 
specific point of time may arise some difficulties in the analysis of this relationship. 
First of all, even when a study accounts for an exhaustive set of controls, there is 
always a possibility that some unobserved factors might be influencing both the 
anthropometric measures of parents and children.  This unobserved heterogeneity may 
be caused either by individual intrinsic factors (such as genetic conditions) or by 
household specific characteristics that are not usually observed (for example family 
habits or decision-making processes inside the household). Usually, when using cross 
sectional data the solution to the endogeneity problem is to use instrumental variables, 
however it is hard to find appropriate instruments that don’t compromise the credibility 
of the analysis (Garcia & Quintana-Domeque, 2007).  
In an attempt to overcome these problems, some studies have chosen to use data sets 
with a panel structure. Dolton and Xiao (2015) use the CHNS data base from 1989 to 
2009 to document the intergenerational transmission of the BMI in China. In their 
study, the authors recognize the presence of unobservable heterogeneity at both 
individual and household level and follow a fixed effects methodology to deal with 
potential endogeneity coming from these unobserved factors. Under the OLS 
specification they find that one standard deviation increase in the father’s BMI z-score 
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is associated with an increase of 0.223 in the child’s BMI z-score, whilst this figure is 
0.208 for the case of the mother. When using individual fixed effects, these estimates 
go down to 0.151 and 0.160 respectively, whilst both converge to 0.152 when applying 
household fixed effects.  Brown and Roberts (2012) use the British Household Panel 
Survey from 2004 to 2006 to carry out a decomposition analysis of the 
intergenerational correlation in the BMI of mothers and their adolescent children. 
However, instead of using a simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) approach they follow 
a Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) methodology that takes into account the 
individual and household fixed effects. Then, the intergenerational correlation is 
defined as “the fraction of the overall variance in BMI that stems from shared family 
background characteristics”. In other words, the authors define the intergenerational 
correlation as the result of dividing the variance that is due to differences between 
families by the total variance in BMI. For this analysis the authors estimate an 
intergenerational correlation of 0.25. Once this figure is calculated, the authors 
monitor the change in this variable when socioeconomic variables are gradually added 
to the analysis in order to measure their contribution to the intergenerational 
correlation. In general, all the observable factors included in the decomposition 
analysis such as maternal characteristics and adolescent’s behaviour account for 11.2 
percent of the intergenerational correlation. 
Using panel data can also help to clean the estimation from measurement errors. 
Classen (2010) for instance, uses longitudinal data for mothers and adolescents when 
they are both between 16 and 24 years old to analyse the intergenerational 
transmission elasticity of BMI, which is estimated to be 0.42 for the full sample. In this 
case, the author averages all the available observations for each individual across time 
and uses these averages to estimate his model. The author explains that this kind of 
approach helps him to mitigate possible bias from measurement error due to temporal 
variation in the anthropometric outcome. One disadvantage of this kind of approach is 
that by averaging observations a considerable portion of information is lost in terms of 
year-to-year variations that could help us to get better estimates of the 
intergenerational link. 
Some other studies only have access to panel data for one of the generations. This is 
the case of the work by Castelnovo (2014) who calculates an estimate of the 
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intergenerational elasticity of BMI using the British Cohort Study of 1970. Although 
the author has access to information on the children for three different years (when 
they are 10, 16 and 34 years old, taken from the 1980, 1986 and 2004 survey, 
respectively) he only has information in one point of the time for the parents of this 
specific cohort (1980 survey). Even though this amount of data might be good enough 
to calculate the persistence of the intergenerational transmission elasticity, the 
endogeneity problems caused by unobserved heterogeneity arise again, just as in the 
case of cross-sectional data. The author recognizes this difficulty and dedicates a whole 
separate section of his analysis to explore possible sources of endogeneity coming from 
the parental education variable. In this case, the author decides that the best way to 
overcome these issues is by applying instrumental variables. However, since he does 
not have access to appropriate instruments for parental education, he follows an 
alternative methodology known as “the Lewbel approach”, a special variation of the 
traditional instrumental variables methodology. According to his results, the maternal 
intergenerational elasticity varies (depending on the specification) from 0.09 to 0.25 for 
male children and from 0.11 to 0.38 for females; whilst the paternal elasticity varies 
from 0.08 to 0.23 and from 0.13 to 0.35, respectively. 
 
2.2.2 The Intergenerational Transmission of Health and Anthropometric 
Outcomes in Mexico. 
The existence of a family transmission process for health and anthropometric 
outcomes has been also documented for the Mexican case, yet literature in this matter 
is not very abundant. Rodriguez Oreggia and Perez Lizaur (2010) used the 2002 and 
2005 waves of the Mexican Family Life Survey to analyse the factors of social dynamics 
associated with the determination of BMI in adults. According to their results, those 
individuals living in households with a high incidence of overweight and obesity among 
their family members are more likely to be overweight and obese, relative to people 
living in households whose members have a normal weight.  Specifically, having a 
higher obesity index within the household is associated with an increase in the male 
individuals’ BMI of 3.94 to 6.79 per cent (depending on the model specification) and 
these figures are similar for the female individuals (around 3.5 to 6.5 per cent). The 
authors conclude that the family environment is an important determinant of the BMI 
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outcomes, yet they recognise the fact that this relationship might also be influenced 
by genetic factors.  
Some other studies have attempted to find a more direct relationship between parents 
and children. As part of a study of the intergenerational transmission of adiposity 
across six countries, Dolton and Xiao (2014) analyse the elasticity of transmission 
between Mexican mothers and their children using panel data from the Survey for the 
Evaluation of Urban Households (ENCELURB) for three years: 2002, 2004 and 2009. 
They estimate a mother-child BMI elasticity of 0.112, once the analysis controls for the 
child’s age and gender, though these results might not be representative of the whole 
population since rural households are omitted from the estimation. Also, since the 
father’s anthropometric information is not available in the survey, it is quite possible 
that the estimation of the mother-child elasticity is slightly biased due to the presence 
of assortative mating. 
Another branch of literature has focused on the identification and analysis of risk 
factors that may enhance the presence of overweight and obesity on children, 
considering the presence of obesity in the parents as one of these factors. Shamah-
Levy, et al. (n.d.) used a sample of 60 elementary public schools to analyse the 
relationship between Mexican school-age children obesity and the BMI of their parents. 
According to their results, there is a close relationship between the weight status of 
the parents and the anthropometric measures of child. Specifically, they find that more 
than 80 per cent of children with obesity or overweight problems had parents that were 
also obese or overweight. Similarly, Klünder- Klünder, et al. (2011) carried out a study 
of treatments and controls in 9 primary schools in Mexico City and calculated the risk 
for a child to have obesity problems using the nutritional situation of the parents as 
explanatory variable. They find that the odds ratio of a child being obese when the 
father is overweight is 3.9 whilst this figure goes up to 12.1 when the father is obese. 
For the mothers these estimates are 4.5 and 6.5, respectively. These results make them 
conclude that there is indeed a close relationship between the anthropometric 
outcomes of mothers and children.  
This chapter will attempt to study the intergenerational transmission of BMI from 
parents to children using panel data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) in 
2002, 2005 and 2009. The main objectives are to calculate an estimate of the parental 
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transmission of BMI for both parents and their children and to investigate the 
sensitivity of the parent-child correlation to the child´s characteristics, the household 
socioeconomic level and the anthropometric status of the parents. The study of the 
intergenerational transmission of BMI presented in this document will contribute to 
the existing literature in the following ways. Unlike Rodriguez Oreggia and Perez Lizaur 
(2010), the main focus here is to measure the parent-child anthropometric relationship 
in a detailed way, rather than study the general effect of having adult family members 
suffering from obesity on the individual’s BMI, an effect that could be due to a number 
of different relationships. In other words, when a correlation in BMI is observed among 
adult household members it is possible that this relationship could be driven by links 
between parents and children, within siblings, or between spouses, so it is hard to 
isolate and make inferences about the specific nature of the parental transmission. 
Also, this study analyses the parent-child relationship for children and adolescents 
between 0 and 19 years old, unlike Rodriguez Oreggia and Perez Lizaur who only take 
into account adult members of the household.  
This study also differs from the analysis for the Mexican case carried out by Dolton 
and Xiao (2014) since it uses data from a representative sample at the national level, 
which includes both rural and urban households compiling anthropometric 
information for both parents.   
Although the methodology used in the study of the Chinese case performed by Dolton 
and Xiao (2015) is followed here as reference, this analysis departs slightly from the 
one they did. Once they estimated the intergenerational correlation, they use quantile 
regression to estimate whether the strength of the transmission is different across the 
distribution of the child´s BMI. They find that the parental link tends to be higher for 
children with high BMI z-scores, from which they conclude that obese and overweight 
children are more likely to have inherited their condition from their parents. In this 
paper this outcome is studied from a different perspective. Since the causality naturally 
goes from parents to children, the question is whether the fact that a father or mother 
has a certain anthropometric status, such as obesity and overweight, makes him or 
her more prone to transmit his or her own condition. For this purpose, the analysis 
includes interaction terms indicating the anthropometric condition of each parent.  
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2.3   Sample  
 
This study uses all three available waves from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), 
a longitudinal database that covers a wide variety of topics on socioeconomic, 
demographic and health indicators and that is representative at the national, urban, 
rural and regional level. The original sample chosen for the first round consisted on a 
set of 35,000 individuals (8,400 households), 90 per cent of which were relocated and 
reinterviewed for subsequent rounds. It is important to keep in mind that, for the 
purposes of the Mexican Family Life Survey, a household consists of a group of 
individuals (related or unrelated) that share a living space and usually consume meals 
prepared on the same stove/oven, so it may contain both nuclear or extended families. 
Table 2.0 (a): Number of children per household, by wave(year). 
  
Number of children per 
household 
Year   
2002 % 2005 % 2009 % Total 
1 977 34.76 672 35.28 715 36.29 2,364 
2 979 34.83 632 33.18 665 33.76 2,276 
3 542 19.28 403 21.15 397 20.15 1,342 
4 196 6.97 126 6.61 115 5.84 437 
5 72 2.56 47 2.47 52 2.64 171 
6 31 1.10 17 0.89 19 0.96 67 
7 8 0.28 3 0.16 1 0.05 12 
8 5 0.18 5 0.26 5 0.25 15 
9 1 0.04 0 0.00 1 0.05 2 
Total of households 2,811   1,905   1,970   6686 
Total of children 5996   4047   4126   14169 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012.  
     
 
Table 2.0 (b): Number of nuclear families (number of mother-father pairs) per household, per 
wave(year) 
Number of nuclear 
families per household 
Year   
2002 % 2005 % 2009 % Total 
1 2,782 98.97 1,883 98.85 1,917 97.31 6,582 
2 29 1.03 19 1.00 48 2.44 96 
3 0 0 3 0.16 3 0.15 6 
4 0 0 0 0 2 0.10 2 
Total of households 2,811   1,905   1,970   6686 
Total of nuclear families 2,840   1,930   2,030   6800 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-
2012.        
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Table 2.0(c): Number of children per nuclear family, per wave(year).    
Number of children per 
nuclear family 
Year   
2002 % 2005 % 2009 % Total 
1 1,019 35.88 701 36.32 786 38.72 2,506 
2 977 34.40 641 33.21 672 33.10 2,290 
3 533 18.77 394 20.41 388 19.11 1,315 
4 195 6.87 123 6.37 114 5.62 432 
5 73 2.57 47 2.44 50 2.46 170 
6 29 1.02 17 0.88 17 0.84 63 
7 8 0.28 3 0.16 0 0.00 11 
8 5 0.18 4 0.21 3 0.15 12 
9 1 0.04 0 0.00 0 0.00 1 
Total of nuclear families 2,840   1,930   2,030   6,800 
Total of children 5996   4047   4126   14169 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012.  
     
 
For the purposes of this research, the sample has been restricted to contain only 
children and adolescents between the ages of 0 and 19 that have complete 
anthropometric and biological information (i.e. weight, height, age and gender) so a 
BMI measure could be calculated for them. After cleaning the data set from biologically 
implausible outliers9 and working under a pooled cross-section framework there is a 
total of 14,169 child-mother-father sets, across 6686 households. Table 2.0(a) shows 
that most of the households included in this sample only contain a small number of 
children, with almost 90 per cent of them having between one and three children. Also, 
as shown in Table 2.0 (b), most of the households in this sample consist of one nuclear 
family, with around 99 per cent of the households having only one mother-father pair 
(in this case, the 6686 households included in the sample represent a total of 6800 
nuclear families). Consequently, the distribution of the number of children per 
household and the number of children per nuclear family is actually very similar (Table 
2.0(c)).  Finally, almost 70 per cent of the individuals appear at least twice in the panel, 
that is, they have anthropometric information for two years (See Tables A1 and A2 in 
Appendix A). Having repeated observations for a single individual is an important 
advantage since it provides additional information that might be useful to clean the 
                                                          
9 According to the WHO, only BMI values whose z-scores are between -5 and 5 should be considered as biologically plausible, 
so these criteria are used for children and parents. Also, the sample has dropped those observations of children for whom gender 
is not registered to be constant over time and whose parents were reported to be outside reproductive age at the time of the 
child’s birth. 
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analysis from unobserved heterogeneity that could be affecting the estimation of the 
parental transmission. 
Instead of analysing children’s BMI itself the study uses a z-score of the BMI, which 
considers how far or close is an individual’s BMI from the mean in a reference 
population. Thus, a very high and positive z-score would indicate that a person’s BMI 
is much higher than the mean in the reference population, suggesting that the person 
is very likely to be at high risk of overweight or obesity. As in Dolton and Xiao (2015), 
the analysis considers two sets of reference populations: the 2006 WHO Growth 
Standards for children aged between 0 and 5 years and the 2007 WHO Reference group 
for children and adolescents between the ages of 6 and 19. The 2006 WHO reference 
population uses data collected from Brazil, Ghana, India, Norway, Oman and the US; 
whilst the 2007 WHO standards are based in a sample of children from the state of 
Ohio in the United States. The conversion from BMI values to z-scores for children and 
adolescents aged 0 to 19 can be easily computed by running a simple software routine 
designed by the WHO10. Since the body size and complexion of an individual is not 
expected to change dramatically from late adolescence to maturity, using this 
conversion also for the parents becomes convenient and acceptable enough for the 
purposes of this study11. Table 2.1 shows the proportion of individuals in the sample 
that are classified as obese, overweight, normal weight or wasted according to the WHO 
standards12. As expected, the distributions of the BMI z-scores for parents and children 
are positively skewed, meaning that in general, people in this sample tend to be heavier 
than their reference populations. In fact, more than 30 per cent of children can be 
classified as having some degree of overweight, while this number goes up to almost 
70 and 74 per cent for fathers and mothers, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
10 The Stata routines can be downloaded from http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/en/ (for children aged 0 to 5 years) and 
http://www.who.int/growthref/tools/en/ (for children and adolescents between 5 and 19 years old). 
11 Also following the procedure carried out  in Dolton and Xiao (2015), parents whose age is over 19 are treated as if they were 
exactly 19 years old, in order to calculate the z-scores.  
12 The document explaining this classification can be found at: 
http://www.who.int/childgrowth/training/module_c_interpreting_indicators.pdf 
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Table 2.1: Anthropometric classification, z-scores. 
    Mother Father Child 
WHO classification for z-scores z-score range Obs. % Obs % Obs % 
        
Obese z  > 3 1,227 8.66 584 4.12 332 2.34 
Overweight 3 ≥  z  > 2 4,223 29.80 3,432 24.22 1,456 10.28 
Possible risk of overweight 2 ≥  z  > 1 5,135 36.24 5,883 41.52 3,056 21.57 
Normal weight 1 ≥  z  ≥  -2 3,557 25.10 4,211 29.72 9,075 64.05 
Wasted (malnourished) -2  > z  ≥-3 22 0.16 35 0.25 181 1.28 
Severely wasted (malnourished) z < -3 5 0.04 24 0.17 69 0.49 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012.  
 
 
2.4  Methodology 
 
2.4.1 The Use of BMI z-scores in the Measurement of Parental Transmission. 
The Body Mass Index (BMI) is a measure that has been traditionally used to determine 
whether a person’s weight is healthy or normal, according to their height. This measure 
is calculated as follows: 
 
𝐵𝑀𝐼 = [
𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑘𝑔)
ℎ𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡2(𝑐𝑚)
] ∗ 10,000    (2.1) 
 
The main objective of this paper is to quantify the parental transmission of the BMI in 
children and adolescents. However, simply regressing the BMI of the child on the 
parents’ BMI is not likely to give us accurate estimations. First of all, since small 
children are still growing up, the BMI that is healthy or normal is not going to be the 
same for individuals of all ages. Similarly, as the growing process is different for boys 
and girls, it is not advisable to directly compare their BMI nor pool them all together 
in the analysis. Consequently, it is necessary to find a standardized measure that 
captures how low or high the child’s BMI is, regardless of their age or gender. In this 
case, the analysis uses the z-score of the child’s BMI with respect to a reference 
population of the same age and sex.  The z-scores are calculated as indicated in 
equation (2.2): 
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𝑧𝑖 = [
𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑖−𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑅
∗
𝜎𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑅
]       (2.2) 
 
 
Where 𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑖 represents the child’s BMI while  𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑅
∗ and 𝜎𝐵𝑀𝐼𝑅   are respectively the 
mean value and the standard deviation of the BMI in their correspondent reference 
population, which can be found in the 2006 or 2007 WHO sets of reference groups 
depending on the child’s age.  
 
 
2.4.2 Model and Estimation Strategy 
The next step is to specify a model that formalizes the parent-child association of 
anthropometric outcomes, in this case the BMI. The baseline model is shown in 
equation (2.3)13.  
𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜕𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                              (2.3) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 indicates the BMI z-score of the child “i” from household “j” in wave “t”, 𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 
and 𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 represent the BMI z-scores for the child’s mother and father, respectively, also 
in wave t14. Therefore,  𝛽1 and 𝛽2 represent how much of the variation in the child’s 
BMI z-score can be explained by the variation in the BMI z-score of the mother and 
father, respectively. The term 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents a vector of basic controls including the 
child’s age and gender, an interaction term between the child’s age and gender, the age 
of both parents as well as the squared age of the child, mother and father. The reader 
should keep in mind that the z-scores already consider the position of the child’s 
anthropometric levels relative to a selected sample of children of the same age and 
                                                          
13 Our baseline model keeps the essence from the one used in Dolton and Xiao (2015) for the Chinese case, though some small 
details have been modified. 
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gender, thus these measures do not have to be cleaned out to consider any gender or 
age effects. However, it is possible that the relative position of a child in the distribution 
of BMI of their reference group itself could be related to the child’s age and gender. For 
example, there could be a parental preference for male children for cultural and 
traditional reasons, which could be affecting the amount and quality of food they get 
in comparison with female children. Or it could be the case that parents have a greater 
preference for babies and small children over adolescents.  In order to consider this 
possibility, the model includes the child’s age and its squared term, as well as their 
gender and its interaction term with age. Nonetheless, even after the estimation 
controls for age and gender, there could be an additional source of endogeneity coming 
from the fact that the z-scores are computed using two different sets of reference 
populations composed of samples extracted from different countries (United States for 
the 2007 WHO reference and a mix of developing and developed countries for the 2006 
WHO standards), one should consider the possibility that children’s overweight could 
be “accentuated” under one of the specifications. For example, it could be the case that 
all children whose z-scores were calculated under the WHO 2007 standards might tend 
to have greater measures of their z-scores just because the standard deviations of the 
reference samples are lower than the ones used to calculate the z-scores under the 
WHO 2006 standards, which is very likely as the latter uses a wide sample of children 
from six different countries. In order to make sure this possibility is accounted for, the 
estimation includes a dummy variable, 𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡, to indicate whether the z-score of any 
particular child was calculated under the WHO 2007 standards, as opposed to the 
2006 reference. Finally, the model should acknowledge the fact that the 
anthropometric condition of a child or teenager could also be a function of the 
availability of resources in the household and other family characteristics. For this 
reason, the estimation includes vector 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 which represents a set of variables 
describing the socioeconomic status and general characteristics of the child’s family 
such as the level of household income, the number of bedrooms per capita in the 
house, the father’s occupation, the mother’s last level of education and the total size 
of the household. The last vector in the model  𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡  , represents a set of time and region 
dummy variables as well as their interaction terms, which are aimed to capture any 
trends in the children’s anthropometric condition and any other transitory 
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circumstances taking place in certain regions of the country that could have affected 
the anthropometric outcome of children living there. 
 
What the transmission coefficients in equation (2.3) tell is the extent to which the BMI 
of the child is associated with the one of the parents. However, these estimates include 
a mix of genetic, behavioural and environmental factors that are transmitted or shared 
by the family and do not provide any information about the specific causality or 
mechanism that is driving this correlation (Dolton & Xiao, 2015). Fortunately, it is 
possible to partial out the time-invariant components of the parental transmission by 
using a household-specific intercept in equation (2.4), say 𝛽𝑗, which will capture all the 
behavioural and environmental factors that are common to all the members of the 
household “j” but remain constant over time, such as general food preferences, relative 
decision-making power of each member of the household, or special preference for 
certain child in the allocation of resources, as suggested by Dolton and Xiao (2015), 
following the ideas of Qian (2008) and Dasgupta (1993). This household fixed effects 
term also captures the social environment to which all family members are exposed 
and that could be affecting their weight status15. An example of this kind of influence 
is given by the “factors of social dynamics” studied by Rodriguez Oreggia and Perez 
Lizaur (2010) who argue that having a large number of obese people living in the 
household has an obesity-enhancing effect on the rest of the members via social 
interactions, independently of their kinship. Then, as long as the strength of these 
interactions is relatively stable over time their effect will be included in the 𝛽𝑗 term. 
 
      𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜕𝑟𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡                          (2.4) 
 
Additionally, it is possible to isolate the genetic component of the parental transmission 
by performing a fixed effects regression at the individual level. By substituting 𝛽𝑗 by 𝛽𝑖 
in equation (2.4) it is possible to estimate how much of the variation on the child’s BMI 
can be explained by the variation on the parents’ BMI, independently of the effect of 
                                                          
15 The reader should keep in mind that a household one or more nuclear or extended families, but also unrelated families or 
unrelated individuals belonging to different families (house-sharing). In strict terms, the household fixed effects would control 
for all those factors that are common to all the individuals living in that particular household. Even when members of unrelated 
families might not share common eating or exercising habits, the household fixed effects would still control for factors such as 
location of the house, availability of fast food in the area, exercising facilities nearby, etc.  
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genetics and any other non-shared habits and behaviours that could be affecting the 
child’s anthropometric condition. Finally, the baseline model described by equation 
(2.3) is used in order to measure how the size of the parental transmission differs 
across the distribution of to: i) the child’s age and gender, ii) socioeconomic 
characteristics of the household and iii) the level of the parental BMI, the latter being 
particularly useful to identify the presence of intergenerational vicious cycles of 
unhealthy BMI outcomes.  
 
 
2.5  Results 
 
This section presents the results of estimating a measure for the parental transmission 
using equation (2.3) and (2.4). The first subsection discusses the results of estimating 
the parental correlation using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions which include 
all the genetic, environmental and behavioural factors involved in the transmission 
process. Next, subsection 2.5.2 presents the results of estimating a fixed effects model 
at the household and individual level, where all time-invariant factors which are 
intrinsic to each household and individual are held constant. Finally, subsection 2.5.3 
discusses the results of adding interaction terms to the estimation in order to consider 
possible variations in the size of the transmission across the distribution of the child’s 
age and gender, the household’s socioeconomic characteristics and the level of BMI of 
the parents.  
2.5.1 Pooled Ordinary Least Squares Estimation (OLS)   
Table 2.2 shows the pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) results of estimating 
equation (2.3). Departing from a very simplistic specification in which the child’s BMI 
z-score is exclusively explained by the parents’ BMI z-scores, the analysis estimates an 
intergenerational correlation of 0.231 for the mother and 0.211 for the father (column 
(3)), both being significant at 1 per cent. This means that one standard deviation 
increase in the mother’s BMI is associated with an increase of 0.231 standard 
deviations in the child’s BMI. Similarly, one standard deviation increase in the father’s 
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BMI is associated with an increase of 0.211 standard deviations in the child’s BMI16.  
Since both transmission coefficients increase when they are considered separately in 
the model (columns (1) and (2)), it is reasonable to assume that there is some level of 
correlation between the mother’s and the father’s BMI status, so the mother’s influence 
on the child’s BMI is somehow “absorbed” in the father’s transmission coefficient when 
the mother is omitted from the equation, and vice versa. Consequently, a model that 
attempts to estimate a coefficient of parental transmission considering only one of the 
parents at a time is very likely to be biased upwards. 
In columns (4) and (5) the estimations introduce the child’s age and gender as 
additional explanatory variables. As mentioned before, even though the z-scores are 
free from any gender or age affect, it is important to include such variables in the 
estimation to recognise the fact that the relative position of a child’s BMI in the 
distribution of the reference population could be correlated with the child’s age or 
gender. Results show that children’s BMI z-scores tend to decline with age, suggesting 
that, on average, obesity might be a graver problem for small children that it is for 
adolescents. Also, the coefficient associated with male children is positive and 
significant under any of the specifications, meaning that, on average, boys in this 
sample tend to be heavier than girls. However, the negative sign of the interaction term 
for age and gender introduced in column (5) suggests that the gender gap tends to 
shrink as the individuals grow up. Since the z-scores already account for the biological 
differences between boys and girls, this could mean that there might be a certain 
preference for boys over girls in terms of food allocation, which tends to disappear as 
children get more autonomy over the amount and kind of meals they eat. 
From columns (6) to (10), an additional set of variables is included to control for the 
parents’ age. This allows the estimation to account for any correlation between the 
child’s anthropometric situation and the parents’ age, which could be a problem if 
parents of certain age group also tend to have a BMI z-score that is higher or lower 
than the rest. Results suggest that, on average, children of older parents tend to be 
leaner, a result that is especially significant for the case of the father. The small size 
and lack of significance of the quadratic terms associated with parental age in most of 
                                                          
16 This interpretation applies only in this particular context, since both variables (dependent and explanatory) are z-scores, and 
therefore have a standard deviation of 1.  
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the specifications suggest that the relationship between the parents’ age and the child’s 
BMI might be in fact linear. Before any other set of socioeconomic controls is 
introduced (column (6)), results show that including the parents’ age and their 
quadratic terms has a boosting effect on both transmission elasticities, though this 
influence is slightly higher for the mother (whose estimated coefficient goes from 0.240 
to 0.245).                          
Next, the estimation adds a set of controls attempting to capture the household’s 
socioeconomic situation using specific characteristics such as: the classification of the 
household’s level of income (measured as a dummy variable indicating the quantile 
classification), number of people living in the household, number of bedrooms per 
capita, as well as the classification of the father’s occupation and the mother’s 
educational level (column (7)).  In column (8) the household’s characteristics are kept 
in the estimation while also including a set of region-time interactions to consider 
possible events or external influences that happened in a specific region in certain year 
which could have had an effect on children’s anthropometric measures. 
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Table 2.2 . Baseline model, pooled OLS estimation.             
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5)    (6) (7) (8) 
         
BMI z-score mother 0.266***  0.231*** 0.240*** 0.240*** 0.245*** 0.252*** 0.252*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)    
BMI z-score father  0.252*** 0.211*** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.210*** 
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)    
Child's gender: Male    0.055** 0.173*** 0.175*** 0.178*** 0.179*** 
    (0.025) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.055)    
Child´s age    -0.026*** -0.006 0.000 -0.003 -0.003    
    (0.003) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017)    
Child's age squared     -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Gender (Male)*age     -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011** -0.011**  
     (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)    
Mother´s age      -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Father´s age      -0.006** -0.007** -0.007**  
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
WHO 2007 Reference 0.106*** 0.139*** 0.071** 0.313*** 0.271*** 0.273*** 0.325*** 0.326*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.059) (0.058)    
Constant 0.034 0.091*** -0.182*** -0.142*** -0.241*** -0.045 0.007 0.009    
  (0.032) (0.031) (0.035) (0.038) (0.062) (0.088) (0.338) (0.335)    
Household socioeconomic level             Y Y 
Region*time interactions               Y 
R-squared 0.057 0.048 0.087 0.092 0.093 0.095 0.108 0.110    
N. of cases 14169 14169 14169 14169 14169 14166 11065 11065 
Clusters (Households) 3928  3928 3928 3928 3928 3928 3284 3284 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in 
parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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Once the household’s characteristics are included in column (7), results show that 
both parental correlations adjust slightly and remain almost unchanged as the rest of 
the controls are added.  Finally, taking the complete specification represented in 
column (10) as reference, the regression analysis estimates a maternal and paternal 
transmission coefficient of 0.252 and 0.210, respectively. This result indicates that a 
mother’s BMI outcome that is one standard deviation above her reference mean is 
associated with her child’s BMI being 0.252 standard deviations above its reference 
mean, assuming the rest of the variables in the model are held constant. Analogously, 
a father’s BMI measure that is one standard deviation higher than his reference mean 
is associated with a child whose BMI is 0.210 standard deviations higher than his or 
her reference mean, assuming that the rest of the controls remain constant. 
 
2.5.2 Fixed Effects Estimates 
 
The parental correlation estimated in the previous section comprises a mix of different 
transmission mechanisms including genetic factors, learned behaviour and shared 
environment.  Given the longitudinal nature of the data it is possible to isolate some 
of these mechanisms by following a fixed effects approach. In this section, household 
and individual fixed effects methodologies are employed in order to partial out any 
time-invariant factors influencing the children’s anthropometric condition. 
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Table 2.3.  Intergenerational transmission of the BMI, fixed effects estimation. 
  (a)    Household Fixed Effects (b)    Individual Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    
 
         
BMI z-score mother 0.060** 0.046 0.045    0.049 0.042 0.035    
 (0.029) (0.039) (0.040)    (0.033) (0.041) (0.041)    
BMI z-score father 0.065** 0.072** 0.075**  0.092*** 0.088** 0.099*** 
 (0.028) (0.036) (0.035)    (0.032) (0.039) (0.038)    
Child's gender: Male 0.136** 0.110* 0.115*       
 (0.054) (0.061) (0.061)        
Child´s age 0.013 0.011 0.012    -0.021 -0.041 -0.104*** 
 (0.016) (0.019) (0.019)    (0.024) (0.029) (0.034)    
Child's age squared -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*   -0.001 -0.001 -0.001    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Gender (Male)*age -0.010** -0.007 -0.008    0.001 0.004 0.004    
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)    (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)    
Mother´s age 0.019*** 0.017** -0.033    0.032** 0.032* 0.011    
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.039)    (0.013) (0.018) (0.042)    
Father´s age -0.011* -0.013 0.020    0.004 0.002 -0.021    
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.032)    (0.009) (0.011) (0.037)    
WHO 2007 reference 0.290*** 0.334*** 0.337*** 0.357*** 0.484*** 0.485*** 
 (0.053) (0.060) (0.060)    (0.066) (0.078) (0.078)    
Constant -0.091 0.131 0.409    -0.907** 0.040 2.461**  
  (0.134) (0.317) (0.558)    (0.414) (0.595) (0.994)    
Household socioeconomic level   Y Y   Y Y 
Region*time interactions     Y     Y 
R-squared 0.016 0.019 0.023    0.039 0.051 0.061    
N. of cases 14166 11065 11065 14166 11065 11065 
N. of groups 3928 3284 3284 9124 7459 7459 
Clusters (Households) 3928 3284 3284 3928 3284 3284 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
 
Household Fixed Effects 
 
In this subsection the main objective is to partial out any time-invariant factors that 
are common to all the individuals living in the same household. Examples of this kind 
of influences are sleeping and eating habits, traditions, cultural factors as well as any 
specific preferences regarding the allocation of resources within the household17.  For 
this purpose, the estimation follows the model represented by equation (2.4).  
Panel (a) in Table 2.3 shows the results from following this procedure. According to the 
estimates shown in column (1), once household fixed effects methodologies are applied, 
the mother-child and the father-child transmission coefficients are estimated to be 
0.067 and 0.070, respectively. Since the estimation is controlling for time-invariant 
influences that are common to all members of the household, such as general 
preferences, cultural factors, strength of social interactions inside the home, and even 
shared genetic predispositions, it is still not surprising that the sizes of both parental 
transmission coefficients shrink with respect to the pooled OLS estimation. Although 
both estimates are still significant at 10 per cent, the fall in the size of the mother’s 
                                                          
17 Since a portion of genetics is shared among family members (parents and children, siblings and other relatives), using 
household fixed effects also takes out a small fraction of the genetic component, however it does not entirely isolate it as in the 
case of the individual fixed effects. 
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coefficient with respect to the pooled OLS is remarkably higher than the case of the 
father’s, suggesting that shared genes, family habits and common preferences in the 
household might be playing a more important role in the maternal transmission than 
in the paternal one. As the household’s socioeconomic characteristics are included in 
the estimation (column (2)), the maternal correlation shrinks in size and loses its 
significance, whilst the father’s transmission coefficient marginally grows in size 
keeping its significance level.  Once region and time dummies are included in column 
(3), the maternal link keeps weakening at the same time that the father’s correlation 
seems to get even stronger. These results might be suggesting that even though the 
maternal transmission process appears to go beyond shared family habits and other 
characteristics, there must be at least one element from the set of variables called 
“Household’s socioeconomic status” that is playing an important role in it, so when it 
was explicitly included in the estimation the maternal BMI z-score was not significant 
anymore. In other words, factors such as household income, household size or 
parental education could be driving the mother-child relationship. An interesting 
exercise is to compare columns (1) and (2) from panel (a) in Table 2.3, as both 
estimations include household fixed effects, the only difference between them being 
that the latter also controls for the influence of socioeconomic characteristics that 
might not be included in the household fixed effect. The reader can think of the father’s 
occupation or the mother’s education as examples of those factors. For instance, two 
cousins living in the same house may have different BMI z-scores because the 
decisions involving their nutrition and health are made by different mothers that could 
have different levels of education. Thus, the drop in the significance of the maternal 
coefficient from column (1) to (2), seems to suggest that the strength of the mother-
child relationship could be driven by the mother’s socioeconomic condition, measured 
by her education in this case. Conversely, the father’s correlation seems to be resistant 
to the inclusion of both household fixed effects and the socioeconomic status of the 
family. Even though the reduction in the coefficient size from the pooled OLS 
estimation to the household fixed effects one indicates that at least some portion of the 
father-child relationship was driven by shared genetics, habits and other generally 
fixed characteristics of the family, the significance of the regression coefficients 
measuring this relationship across different specifications following both 
methodologies implies that the strength of the paternal link might also have to do with 
other factors. Using the complete specification of column (3) the analysis suggests that, 
once the estimation controls for household fixed effects, a mother whose BMI is one 
standard deviation above her reference mean is associated with children whose BMI 
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are, on average, 0.045 standard deviations above their reference mean; whilst a father 
whose BMI is one standard deviation above his reference mean is associated with 
children whose BMI are, on average 0.075 standard deviations higher than their 
reference mean, the latter estimate being significant at 5 per cent. 
 
Individual Fixed Effects 
 
By substituting 𝛽𝑗 for 𝛽𝑖 in equation (2.4) the estimation captures all the individual-
specific factors influencing the child’s anthropometric condition in the 𝛽𝑖 term, so the 
parental transmission estimates exclude any genetic components and account only for 
the mechanisms that involve non-fixed influences such as transitory environmental 
conditions and behaviours. Panel (b) in Table 2.3 presents the results of estimating 
such a model. 
  
Just as in the case of the household fixed effects regression, once a fixed effects 
methodology is applied at the individual level there is a considerable reduction in the 
size of both parental transmission coefficients with respect to the OLS results, which 
is not surprising since the analysis is taking out the effect of genetics and habits that 
are fixed over time18. Interestingly, the mother-child link loses all its strength and 
significance this time, while the father’s transmission coefficient grows in size (in 
comparison with the household fixed effects approach) and is now significant at 1 per 
cent. As the socioeconomic controls are included in the estimation, the father’s 
coefficient keeps its size and significance whilst the maternal link keeps shrinking. 
Taking the complete specification shown in column (6), the estimation yields a 
transmission coefficient of 0.035 for the mother and 0.099 for the father, which means 
that once the effect of genetics has been taken out, a mother whose BMI is one 
standard deviation above her reference mean is associated with a child whose BMI is 
0.035 standard deviations above his or her reference mean. Similarly, a paternal BMI 
that is one standard deviation above its reference mean is associated with a child’s 
BMI that is 0.099 standard deviations greater than its reference mean, this correlation 
being significant at 1 per cent. These results suggest that, unlike the maternal 
transmission, the father-child relationship seems to be based in factors that go beyond 
a simple genetic correlation. This might be reflecting the greater bargaining and 
decision-making power of the father inside the household, which could be fuelled not 
                                                          
18 As the effect of genetics is taken out, the estimation is also neutralizing the biasing effect of any existing correlations 
between genetics and other determinants of the child´s weight. 
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only by psychological and cultural factors but also economic influences. Since more 
than 90 per cent of the fathers in the sample are reported to be working, while only 30 
per cent of the mothers are, the greater father-child association under the individual 
fixed effects specification could be reflecting the fact that children are more likely to 
consume food that is compatible with the breadwinner’s time-variant preferences and 
choices19.  
At this point, it is convenient to compare the individual and the household fixed effects 
estimates and understand the different intuition behind them. As commented before, 
in the individual fixed effects approach the estimation of the parent-child link is taking 
out the effect of all those time-invariant factors that are intrinsic to each individual 
and that might be having an effect on their anthropometric condition, which in this 
case refers mostly to genetics and its role on the transmission of biologically 
predetermined trends. What remains in the individual fixed effects estimates is then a 
mix of environmental and behavioural influences that vary over time and have an effect 
on the children’s BMI.  
Inversely, when the estimation is based on a household fixed effects approach the 
model is cleaning the parental correlation from the influence of time-invariant factors 
common to all the individuals living in the same household and that have an effect on 
their BMI, such as cultural and environmental factors affecting the BMI of all the 
members of the family. In general, the paternal correlation seems to be stronger and 
more resistant to both fixed effects procedures than the maternal one. This suggests 
that the father-child link in BMI cannot be totally explained by either genetics 
(individual fixed effects) or time-invariant habits and cultural factors affecting all 
members of the household (household fixed effects). 
 
2.5.3 Determinants of the size of the parental transmission 
This section discusses how the size of the parental transmission changes across the 
distribution of a variety of factors. First, the analysis aims to investigate whether the 
degree of parental correlation varies according to the child’s age and gender. Secondly, 
the study measures the size of the transmission across the distribution of different 
variables describing the household’s socioeconomic status.  
                                                          
19 Once the sample is restricted to only consider children whose both parents work, the significance of the father-child link 
disappears (see Tables A3 and A4 in Appendix A).  
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Child’s age and gender 
 
In this subsection a pooled OLS model is estimated while introducing a set of 
interaction terms in order to determine whether the size of the parental transmission 
is higher or lower for children of certain gender or age group. Table 2.4 shows the 
results of introducing interaction terms to account for the effect of the child’s 
characteristics on the size of the parental correlation.  
Results imply that, on average, boys tend to experience a greater BMI transmission 
from their fathers and a lower transmission from their mothers, in comparison with 
girls. Although the differences between both groups are not statistically significant, 
this outcome suggests the presence of a role modelling process in which children are 
more likely to imitate the behaviours and health attitudes of the parent of the same 
sex. In order to analyse the effect of age on the size of the parental transmission the 
analysis follows two different approaches. First, the child’s age is measured in years 
and interaction terms are then used with the mother and father’s BMI z-scores 
(columns (1) and (2)). This particular methodology allows the analysis to estimate the 
marginal effect of an extra year in the child’s age on the strength of the mother-child 
and father-child correlations. 
Regardless of whether the estimation allows or not for a quadratic effect of age on the 
child’s BMI, growing up seems to increase the link between children and their parents, 
this effect being especially significant for the father-child relationship. Specifically, 
results suggest that each additional year in the child’s age in associated with an 
increase of 0.005 and 0.008 points in the maternal and paternal correlation, 
respectively. This outcome might be reflecting the fact that older children tend to have 
meals that are more similar to the ones consumed by the parents, in comparison with 
babies and small children.  
Nevertheless, the previous estimates are implicitly assuming that the marginal effect 
of age on the size of the parental transmission is the same across the distribution of 
the child’s age, which is not necessarily true.  As an alternative approach, children are 
classified into four age groups and interactions are then built with the parents’ BMI z-
scores (column (3)). The sign and size of the new interaction terms suggest that older 
children tend to experience a higher degree of parental transmission, with respect to 
babies and small kids between 0 and 5 years old. However, adolescents between 15 
and 19 years old have smaller maternal correlations than children between 12 and 14, 
and between 6 and 11. 
47 
 
Table 2.4:  Variation in the size of the transmission elasticity. Child's age and gender 
 
  (1) (2) (3)    
    
BMI z-score mother 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.195*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.029)    
BMI z-score father 0.118*** 0.116*** 0.112*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.030)    
Child´s age -0.039*** -0.017                 
 (0.007) (0.018)                 
Child's age squared  -0.001                 
  (0.001)                 
Child's gender: Male 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.130**  
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.066)    
Gender (Male)*Age  -0.011** -0.011**                 
 (0.005) (0.005)                 
Child's age group: 6-11 years old   0.133    
   (0.082)    
Child's age group: 12-14 years old   0.120    
   (0.079)    
Child's age group: 15-19 years old   0.000    
   (.)    
Gender (Male)*Child's age group: 6-11   -0.023    
   (0.062)    
Gender (Male)* Child's age group: 12-14   -0.033    
   (0.069)    
Gender (Male)*Child's age group: 15-19   -0.138**  
   (0.067)    
Interaction terms:       
Gender:       
BMI z-score mother* Child's gender (male) -0.034 -0.034 -0.033    
  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)    
BMI z-score father* Child's gender (male) 0.028 0.028 0.029    
  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
Age as a continuous variable:       
        
BMI z-score mother * Child's age 0.005** 0.006**                 
  (0.003) (0.003)                 
BMI z-score father * Child's age 0.008*** 0.008***                 
  (0.003) (0.003)                 
Age in categories (Base category: 0-5 years)       
        
BMI z-score mother *  Child's age group: 6-11 years old     0.104*** 
      (0.032)    
BMI z-score mother * Child's age group: 12-14 years old     0.114*** 
      (0.035)    
BMI z-score mother *  Child's age group: 15-19 years old     0.083**  
      (0.038)    
        
BMI z-score father *  Child's age group: 6-11 years old     0.122*** 
      (0.034)    
BMI z-score father * Child's age group: 12-14 years old     0.095**  
      (0.037)    
BMI z-score father *  Child's age group: 15-19 years old     0.114*** 
      (0.036)    
Mother's age and father's age  Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region* time interaction dummies  Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.112 0.112 0.115    
N. of cases 11065 11065 11065 
Clusters (Households)  3284 3284 3284 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their 
significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. 
Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the household, 
bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
Similarly, children between 12 and 14 years old tend to experience a lower paternal 
transmission with respect to children in the age groups of 6 to 11 and 15 to 19 years. 
Moreover, the ages in which the parental transmission coefficients reach their 
maximum is not the same for both parents. As the estimates show, the highest level of 
maternal transmission seems to be experienced by preadolescents between 12 and 14 
years old, whilst the paternal link reaches its maximum strength among children 
between 6 and 11 years old. 
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Household socioeconomic characteristics 
 
The next objective is to study the relative strength of the parental transmission 
according to the household’s socioeconomic characteristics, including household 
income, the father’s education and occupation, the mother’s education and work 
status and the number of people living in the household. First, the analysis considers 
the quantile of household’s income and includes its interactions with the parental BMI 
z-scores. Table 2.5 shows the results of following this procedure, taking the first 
quantile as reference category. 
In the case of the mother-child correlation there seems to be a u-shaped pattern in 
which households in the second quantile of the income distribution tend to experience 
the lowest level of transmission; however, these differences are not statistically 
significant. In the case of the father, there is a clear positive relationship between the 
level of income and the size of the intergenerational correlation. As shown in column 
(2), the fact that the household belongs to the fourth quantile of the income distribution 
makes the paternal transmission coefficient grow 0.094 points with respect to the 
households in the first quantile, this estimate being significant at 5 per cent. The size 
and significance of this coefficient suggest that children living in relatively rich 
households tend to experience a higher father-child transmission than those in the 
lower tail of the income distribution. This effect might have to do with the level of 
economic freedom that the father has, which also conditions the extent to which he 
can, advisedly or not, transmit his own preferences in terms of food and health habits. 
A father with a higher economic status has a greater spectrum of choices in which he 
might be more able to provide his children with food that matches his own preferences. 
 
 
 
Table 2.5:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Quantile of Household Income 
  (1) (2) (3)    
    
BMI z-score mother 0.249*** 0.252*** 0.255*** 
 (0.031) (0.015)    (0.030) 
BMI z-score father 0.210*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 
 (0.016) (0.032)    (0.032) 
Quantile of Household Income       
2nd Quantile 0.028 -0.017    0.026 
 (0.078) (0.067)    (0.089) 
3rd Quantile -0.041 -0.077    -0.088 
 (0.075) (0.071)    (0.091) 
4th Quantile 0.026 -0.080    -0.093 
 (0.078) (0.071)    (0.092) 
Interaction terms:       
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BMI z-score mother * 2nd Quantile  -0.029                 -0.031 
  (0.041)                 (0.041) 
BMI z-score mother * 3rd Quantile  0.014                 0.008 
  (0.037)                 (0.037) 
BMI z-score mother *4th Quantile  0.023                 0.008 
  (0.039)                 (0.039) 
        
BMI z-score father * 2nd Quantile    -0.004    0.001 
    (0.041)    (0.041) 
BMI z-score father * 3rd Quantile    0.041    0.039 
    (0.040)    (0.040) 
BMI z-score father *4th Quantile    0.094**  0.093** 
    (0.039)    (0.040) 
Child's age child's age squared, mother's age and father's age Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.111 0.111 0.111 
N. of cases 11065 11065 11065 
Clusters (Households)  3284 3284 3284 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their 
significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. 
Household socioeconomic level includes: size of the household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation 
and mother’s level of education. 
 
Next, the size of the maternal transmission is analysed across the distribution of the 
mother’s level of education and work status (Table 2.6). Interestingly, the fact that a 
mother works has a significant effect on the child’s anthropometric status. As shown 
in column (3), children of working mothers are, on average, 0.082 standard deviations 
heavier in comparison with children of non-working mothers, and this effect is 
significant at 5 per cent. On average, having a working mother also has a boosting 
effect on the size of the maternal transmission, this effect being significant at 10 per 
cent (columns (4) and (5)). This result suggests that having a job might provide the 
mother with additional bargaining power that allows her to choose the children’s 
meals, which are likely to be compatible with her own preferences. 
Finally, the study analyses the effect of the household’s size on the strength of the 
parental transmission (Table 2.7). In theory, a child living in a large household is 
subject to a number of different influences from the rest of the family members, so the 
share of the child’s BMI that is explained exclusively by the parental transmission 
might not be as high. In order to measure this effect, the estimation includes 
interaction terms between the parental BMI and the size of the household, as shown 
in Table 2.7.  In the case of the mother-child relationship, although there is a small 
and positive correlation between the size of the household and the strength of the 
transmission, this effect is not statistically significant. However, the father-child link 
does seem to respond significantly to changes in the household size. As shown in 
columns (1) and (3), an increase of one person in the household size is associated with 
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a reduction of 0.027 points in the size of the father-child transmission, this effect being 
significant at 1 per cent. 
Table 2.6:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Mother's education and work status 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) 
        
BMI z-score mother 0.252*** 0.274*** 0.241*** 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 
 (0.015) (0.051) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.053) (0.054)    
BMI z-score father 0.212*** 0.212*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.211*** 0.253*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.049)    
Mother's education (Base category: High school):                
Less than high school -0.149*** -0.109    -0.116 -0.054    
 (0.056) (0.100)    (0.100) (0.119)    
More than high school -0.112 -0.073    -0.071 0.013    
 (0.086) (0.146)    (0.146) (0.183)    
Mother's work status:                
Mother works    0.082** -0.005 -0.002 -0.021 -0.009    
   (0.034) (0.064) (0.077) (0.066) (0.081)    
Interaction terms : Mother's education               
                
BMI z-score mother * Less than high school   -0.025       -0.017 -0.013    
    (0.053)       (0.053) (0.055)    
BMI z-score mother * More than high school   -0.025       -0.036 -0.034    
    (0.079)       (0.079) (0.082)    
BMI z-score father * Less than high school             -0.041    
              (0.050)    
BMI z-score father * More than high school             -0.051    
              (0.090)    
Interaction terms : Mother's work status               
                
BMI z-score mother * Mother works       0.052* 0.052* 0.051 0.053    
        (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032)    
BMI z-score father * Mother works         -0.002   -0.006    
          (0.031)   (0.033)    
Child's age and age squared, mother's age and father's age. Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.107 0.108 0.108 0.11 0.111 
N. of cases 11065 11065 12123 12123 12123 11063 11063 
Clusters (Households) 3284 3284 3499 3499 3499  3282 3282 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s 
income, size of the household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
 
Table 2.7:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Size of the household 
  (1) (2) (3)    
     
BMI z-score mother 0.252*** 0.253*** 0.225*** 
 (0.045) (0.015)    (0.043) 
BMI z-score father 0.210*** 0.361*** 0.367*** 
 (0.016) (0.048)    (0.048)     
Size Household -0.026* 0.012    0.006 
 (0.014) (0.013)    (0.016) 
Interaction terms       
BMI z-score mother * Size household 0.000                 0.005 
  (0.007)                 (0.007) 
BMI z-score father * Size household   -0.026*** -0.027*** 
    (0.008)    (0.008) 
Child's age and age squared, mother's age and father's age, Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.11 0.111 0.111 
N. of cases 11065 11065 11065 
Clusters (Households) 3284 3284 3284 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their 
significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. 
Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, bedrooms per capita, 
father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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2.5.4 Robustness checks 
In this section, I briefly discuss the results of performing a robustness check on the 
previous estimates. Specifically, I investigate whether results change significantly 
when: a) I separate the sample into two different groups according to the child’s age 
(from 0 to 5 years old and from 6 to 19 years old), and b) I use the Mexican sample to 
calculate the reference values for the BMI z-scores (instead of using the reference 
values provided by the World Health Organisation). Section I in Appendix D shows the 
results of running separate regressions for different age groups (Part “a”) and running 
the same regressions presented previously but using the Mexican sample as reference 
(Part “b”).  
Results show a small degree of heterogeneity between age groups in terms of the 
estimated values of the coefficients associated with parental transmission. For most of 
the specifications under the pooled OLS framework, for instance, children between 0 
and 5 years old seem to have slightly lower coefficients of parental transmission in 
comparison with children and adolescents between 6 and 19 years old; however, the 
level of significance of the transmission coefficients in the final (baseline) pooled OLS 
specification is similar for both groups (1 per cent). Once fixed effects methodologies 
are applied, the divergence between these two groups gets larger, as the coefficients 
for parental transmission become statistically non-significant for children between 0 
and 5 years old. Conversely, the positive and significant coefficient for the parental 
transmission generally holds for children between 6 and 19 years old. This pattern is 
similarly observed for the rest of the methodologies and specifications, in which the 
parent-child relationship seems to be stronger for older children. Overall, results seem 
to suggest that most of the effects captured in the analysis presented before are driven 
by older children and adolescents, rather than babies and small children. This result 
is not surprising, as older children might be more likely to resemble the eating and 
exercising habits of the parents, with respect to babies and smaller children who are 
likely to have separate diets and habits.  
Part “b” in Section I (Appendix D) shows the results of redoing the whole analysis 
presented in previous sections using the sample from the Mexican Family Life Survey 
to construct the z-scores of the BMI for both: parents and children. In other words, 
instead of using the reference values provided by the World Health Organisation, I 
calculate the sample mean for BMI by age and gender and use it as reference to 
construct z-scores. As shown in the regression results, changing the reference point 
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does not significantly alter the main results associated with the sign and significance 
of the parental transmission of the BMI. Even though the magnitude of the coefficients 
is slightly changed in some cases, most of the main results discussed in previous 
sections remain unchanged.  
 
2.5.5 Quantile regression 
 
The analysis presented before employed Ordinary Least Squares methodologies in 
which the estimations are calculated on the conditional mean of the dependent 
variable. In other words, it has been assumed that the association of the explanatory 
variables with the child’s BMI z-score (dependent variable) is constant across the 
distribution of the child’s BMI. However, it is possible that factors such as the parents’ 
education or the household income could have regression coefficients that vary across 
different quantiles of the child’s BMI. In order to consider this possibility, the analysis 
could benefit from the use of quantile regressions, a technique that has been used in 
many areas of economics and medicine to study the association between a set of 
explanatory variables and a dependent variable, across the distribution of the latter 
(Koenker & Hallock, 2001; Lê Cook & Manning, 2013; Huang, Zhang, Chen, & He, 
2017). 
 
In this section, I perform quantile regressions to analyse possible heterogeneity on the 
regression parameters across the distribution of the child’s BMI z-score, paying special 
attention to the coefficients associated with household income and parental education, 
in order to provide additional insight into the parent-child relationship in BMI. Figure 
2.2 shows the values of the regression coefficients associated with household income, 
mother’s education and father’s education across the distribution of the child’s BMI20.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20 Table A5 in Appendix A shows the coefficient regressions and bootstrapped standard errors estimated for the mother’s and 
father’s BMI, household income per capita, mother’s education and father’s education. 
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Figure 2.2. Quantile regression, with respect to mother’s education, father’s education and household 
income per capita.  
 
 
 
The first graph in Figure 2.2 shows the regression coefficients associated with the 
mother’s level of education (in years), across the distribution of the child’s BMI z-score. 
The positive slope of the line depicted in the graph indicates that the marginally 
positive relationship between the mother’s education and the child’s BMI is stronger 
for children in the upper tail of the BMI distribution. Actually, it is only for those 
children above the 0.60 quantile that the positive relationship is statistically different 
than zero (we can see this by looking at the grey area around the estimated line, which 
represents a confidence interval of 95%) This means that maternal education might 
play a more important role in children’s eating and exercising habits for those children 
who are overweight and obese. A similar pattern can be found with respect to the 
father’s education, where the sign of the relationship is actually different depending 
on the quantile of the child’s BMI that is taken into consideration. For those children 
below the 0.50 quantile in BMI, the father’s education is actually negatively correlated 
with the child’s BMI, however this is not a significant coefficient at 5%. As the child’s 
BMI increases, the relationship between the father’s education and the child’s BMI 
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becomes positive and significant at 5%. Just as in the case of the mother, the influence 
of the father’s education on the child’s eating and exercising habits seems to be 
stronger for those children who are relatively heavier. Finally, the bottom graph in 
Figure 2.2 shows the quantile regression coefficients associated with household 
income. Conversely to the patterns found for parental education, this particular 
variable does not show any particular trend across the distribution of the child’s BMI. 
The effect of household income on children’s BMI seems to be fairly homogeneous 
across the distribution of the child’s BMI, this association being very small and 
statistically non-significant for all quantiles.  
 
2.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter studies the intergenerational transmission of the Body Mass Index (BMI) 
from parents to children using panel data from the Mexican Family Life Survey 
(MxFLS). Departing from a simple model specification using pooled ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and then applying fixed effects methodologies at the household and 
individual level, the analysis estimates a set of measures of the intergenerational 
transmission of the BMI between children and adolescents between 0 and 19 years old 
and their parents. Additionally, the study analyses the sensitivity of this estimate 
across the distribution of the child’s age and gender, the household socioeconomic 
characteristics and the anthropometric status of both parents.  
Results suggest that only the paternal link is resistant to the consideration of both 
household and individual fixed effects, implying that, unlike the mother-child 
relationship, the strength of the paternal link lies in factors that go beyond a simple 
genetic correlation or the presence of shared family habits and other time-invariant 
characteristics. Also, as children grow up their anthropometric statuses resemble the 
ones of their parents in a more noticeable way; however, this positive marginal effect 
is not constant across the distribution of the child’s age.  
Similarly, the family’s socioeconomic status seems to have an important effect on the 
size of the parental transmission. Specifically, this study finds that the father-child 
link in BMI tends to be particularly stronger for those households in the higher tail of 
the income distribution and for children whose fathers work as patrons, employers or 
business owners. In general, having a higher socioeconomic status might make fathers 
more able to choose their children’s food and habits, so these are more compatible 
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with their own. An analogous rationale is valid in the case of the maternal link, as 
results suggest that, on average, children of working mothers tend to experience a 
higher degree of maternal transmission in comparison with children of mothers who 
do not work. Also, the strength of the father-child link seems to weaken as the 
household grows in size, suggesting that the marginal effect of the father´s influence 
on the child´s BMI decreases as the child has additional behavioural and 
environmental influences inside the household.  
Finally, results from quantile regressions suggest that maternal education might play 
a more important role in children’s eating and exercising habits for those children who 
are overweight and obese. A similar pattern can be found with respect to the father’s 
education, where the sign of the relationship is actually different depending on the 
quantile of the child’s BMI that is taken into consideration. Conversely, household 
income does not show any particular trend across the distribution of the child’s BMI. 
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Chapter 3 
Women’s intrahousehold decision-making power and its 
relationship with education and employment: An Ordered 
Logit Approach. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper studies women’s intrahousehold decision-making power and its relationship with 
education and employment using an ordered logit model. Fixed effects estimations are also 
carried out to solve potential endogeneity coming from unobservable time-invariant factors. 
Finally, the paper analyses quadratic and community divergence effects of education on power. 
Results show heterogeneity in the correlation of women’s power with education and employment 
across different levels of power and suggest the presence of a significant quadratic effect of 
education. Having more education than the community average is negatively associated with 
power, supporting the notion that women tend to compensate their success outside the household 
with submissive attitudes at home.  
 
 
3.1  Introduction  
 
The level of decision-making power inside the household constitutes an elementary 
dimension of empowerment and it often associated with other power-enhancing 
attitudes and behaviours outside the household that reinforce women’s position at 
home, creating a virtuous circle. For example, a woman that is allowed to make 
decisions is more likely to go to school or work outside the home if she wishes so. Then, 
contributing to the household income makes women more able to participate in 
decision-making processes (Bernasek & Bajtelsmit, 2002; Malhotra & Mather, 1997).  
Evidence also suggests that changes in intrahousehold decision-making power 
favouring women are an important source of improvements in child welfare, showing 
that it is the bargaining power and not necessarily the economic contribution of the 
woman what drives this relationship (Minsoo, Jeungil, & Sora, 2011). In fact, women’s 
decision-making power by itself has been widely used to explain children’s welfare 
outcomes in a variety of contexts and has been proven to have a significant positive 
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impact (Ahmed, 2006; Lépine & Strobl, 2013; Schmidt, 2012; Ueyama, 2006; 
Chakraborty & De, 2011; Reggio, 2011; Antman, 2010). 
While some authors choose to study the determinants of women’s power in certain 
aspects, others build indexes to try and capture more general effects. The common 
factor in most of these studies is the consideration of two separate possibilities: full 
power (the woman makes the decision) or involvement (either she makes the decision 
herself or jointly with other family member), without exploring the ordinal nature of 
these classifications. In this regard, one might be interested on knowing the factors 
that make women more likely to pass from not having any involvement to getting 
involved and from being involved to making decisions on their own. This question is 
especially relevant considering the fact that full power or shared involvement are not 
optimal choices for some decisions. However, it is important to take into account the 
impact of non-observable characteristics on women’s ability to bargain, such as 
personality, cultural background, or social links. If any of these variables were to be 
correlated with women’s employment or job income (as it is likely), running a simple 
Linear Probability Model would not suffice. This chapter uses data from Mexico to 
study women’s intrahousehold decision-making power and its relationship with 
education and employment at three different levels: no power, shared power and 
exclusive power. Then, fixed effects methodologies are employed to address 
endogeneity problems due to time-invariant features. Finally, the study analyses the 
correlation between women’s education and decision-making power allowing for 
quadratic and community divergence components in this relationship. 
The next section presents a general literature review on the economic and 
sociodemographic determinants of women’s decision-making power. Section 3.3 
examines the nature of gender roles and social norms in Mexico and briefly outlines 
the most relevant work on the determinants of women’s power for this country. Section 
3.4 describes the data used in the study and offers a preliminary descriptive analysis. 
The methodology used to cover each of the objectives of the article is explained with 
detail in section 3.5. Results are discussed in section 3.6. Finally, section 3.7 presents 
the conclusions. 
 
3.2  The Determinants of Women’s Decision-Making Power.  
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This chapter studies how education and employment are associated with the level of 
intrahousehold decision-making power for women, allowing for heterogeneity in the 
magnitude and size of this relationship across different levels of power. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that the level of decision-making power is not a measure of 
wellbeing itself, since the desirability of each level of power might vary according to the 
nature of each decision. The level of women’s decision-making power in this paper has 
been used as a proxy for a much broader and hardly measurable concept: the 
bargaining power.  
3.2.1 A Bargaining Approach for Household Decision-Making 
Bargaining models appeared as an alternative to the unitary approach introduced by 
Becker (1965; 1981) that proposes the household as the decision-making entity of 
interest, without allowing for any negotiation process among family members. The 
bargaining approach considers that each person living in the household has different 
preferences, and consequently any decision-making process in the household will 
inevitably involve two elements: cooperation and conflict (Agarwal, 1997). Although 
cooperation allows allocations that can generally make members better off, it also 
implies some level of loss for one or more of the participants, who might have to 
compromise their own preferences or wellbeing in order to comply with what was 
agreed during the negotiation process. In exchange, individuals may gain power in 
some other aspect of decision-making or potentially improve their social capital by 
complying with social norms. So, for example, a woman might be willing to compromise 
her decision-making power regarding large expenditures if this makes her comply with 
a social norm that recognises the husband as the main decision-maker of the 
household. 
In theory, the level of an individual’s bargaining power will depend on their “fallback 
position”, also called “reservation wellbeing”, which represents the maximum level of 
wellbeing a person can achieve if the negotiation fails (Agarwal, 1997; Dauphin, 2001). 
As stated by Chiappori and Donni (2009), the difference between each particular 
bargaining model found in the literature can be reduced to the choice of the threat 
point. In the particular context of married women this notion suggests that their 
bargaining power will be strongly related with any factors that improve their fallback 
position, i.e., her wellbeing in case she divorced her partner. McElroy (1990) calls these 
variables the “extra household environmental parameters (EEPs)” which include 
aspects such as parental wealth, nonwage income, legal institutions regarding 
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marriage and divorce, unemployment faced by the person’s demographic group, among 
others. If the way a woman is socially perceived is considered as an additional variable 
in her fallback position function, her bargaining power will be also determined by 
sociocultural factors such as gender norms and traditional values.  
Nonetheless, there is another branch of the literature suggesting that divorce or 
partnership dissolution might not be an accurate representation of a realistic threat 
point since it might seem excessive. Lundberg and Pollack (1993), for instance, 
proposed a model where the threat point is given by the classification of household 
decisions into gender-specific “spheres”, where each spouse becomes an exclusive 
decision-maker in their own masculine or feminine sphere.  In this context, the 
separate spheres approach would suggest that if negotiation fails women would make 
decisions regarding traditionally “feminine” aspects (most likely those related with food 
and everyday housekeeping) while their husbands would make decisions regarding 
aspects that are perceived as “masculine (possibly large expenditures and other 
important decisions in the household).  
 
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Most of the empirical research on the determinants of female intrahousehold decision-
making power has focussed on the socioeconomic elements that provide women with 
bargaining power within the household. Ownership of financial and physical assets, 
earnings and income are positively associated with female power (Wiklander, 2010; 
Oduro, Boakye-Yiadom, & Baah-Boateng, 2012; Huber & Spitze, 1981). Some direct 
inteventions in the form of microfinance and other self-help group programmes 
targeted to enhance women’s control of the household’s resources have also been 
found to significantly increase their level of decision-making power (Brody, et al., 2017; 
Ashraf, Karlan, & Yin, 2010; Bali Swain & Yang Wallentin, 2009), however the 
effectiveness of such projects depends widely on the particular context being studied 
and women’s social identity (Garikipati, Johnson, Guérin, & Szafarz, 2017; Duvendack 
& Palmer-Jones, 2017) . 
Other factors, such as the woman’s age, level of education, years of marriage and 
urban residence have also been found to have a positive correlation with decision-
making power (Arooj, et al., 2013; Khan & Sajid, 2011). However, the relative impact 
of the woman’s socioeconomic status on her bargaining power is not the same for all 
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the decision-processes that occur in the household. There is evidence from Sri Lanka 
suggesting, for instance, that a woman’s level of education and employment status are 
strongly associated with her decision-making power in financial matters, but not for 
social and organisational issues (Malhotra & Mather, 1997). On the other hand, there 
is also evidence supporting the relevance of some factors across all levels of decision-
making. For the Nigerian case, the work by Oyediran and Odusola (2004) concludes 
that the determinants of female decision-making power are different depending on the 
nature of the decision, however economic influences such as women’s education and 
employment status have a significant influence across all dimensions of 
intrahousehold decision-making, including those regarding reproductive, cultural, and 
economic issues.  
Institutions in the form of traditional conventions and social norms also play an 
important role in the distribution of power inside the household, especially in highly 
gender-stratified communities where “autonomy continues to be shaped largely by 
traditional factors” (Jejeebhoy & Sathar, 2001). There are culture-specific aspects, 
such as religion, ethnicity, or even traditional values and beliefs that are strongly 
associated with gender norms which prevent women from participating in the 
household decision-making process (Banerjee & Roy, 2015; Kritz & Makinwa-
Adebusoye, 1999). The sociocultural context can also help explain the apparently 
contradictory results found in the literature suggesting that some economic 
characteristics that were thought to enhance female autonomy, such as paid 
employment or age at marriage actually have a neutral or even negative effect (Hossain, 
1998; Wiklander, 2010). According to Mabsout and Van Staveren (2009), gendered 
institutions in the form of social norms and practices play an important role in the 
intrahousehold distribution of bargaining power and might mediate the effect of other 
individual and household characteristics. The authors suggest that well-educated 
women with a high economic contribution to the household may perceive themselves 
as deviations from a social standard that has established the man as the breadwinner 
and try to compensate this fact by being submissive with their male partners at home, 
a behaviour that had been previously identified in the literature and conceptualised as 
“doing gender” (West & Zimmerman, 1987). In certain cultures, some of the apparently 
power-enhancing characteristics in women are associated with a negative social 
connotation, which harms the woman’s self-esteem and impoverishes the image that 
the husband has of her. In some rural areas in India, for example, it is not socially 
acceptable for women to get married at an old age, and those who do might be subject 
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of criticism. So, even though being older can give the woman more experience and 
ability to bargain, this effect can be reversed for social pressures that make her less 
capable of claiming power inside the household. In practice, social norms can be 
quantified in the form of community averages. Mason and Smith (2003), for instance, 
study the determinants of women’s empowerment across different dimensions for five 
Asian countries and find that gender norms in the form of community’s average values 
for age, age at marriage, age difference with husband, education and paid work have 
the potential to explain around two-thirds of the within-country variation in the level 
of women’s intrahousehold decision-making power. 
3.3  Gender, Social Norms and the Study of Female Decision-Making 
Power in Mexico. 
 
Any society can be described in terms of two parameters: “tightness” and gender-
stratification. The first concept is a notion found in the sociology literature referring to 
the extent to which the lives of the members of a society are shaped and influenced by 
non-written social norms and tradition (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, 2006). Therefore, a 
tight society will be one in which its members face a great pressure to comply with 
social norms and expectations. The second term refers to the degree of differentiation 
between the rights and opportunities between men and women, or as Adams (2007) 
describes it, “the differential ability of men and women to access society’s resources 
and receive its privileges”. Mexico can be classified as a “tight” society, since people 
experience a strong pressure to comply with accepted social norms, even when they 
are in conflict with their own personal interests (Hietanen & Pick, 2015). This means 
that, although individuals are legally free to make choices according to their own 
wishes and objectives, there are some psychological barriers that restrain their 
decision-making power. In the Mexican context social norms regulating people’s 
conduct also tend to be highly gender-stratified, meaning that the behaviours and 
attitudes that are expected from men are very different from those expected from 
women, who are supposed to be obedient and submissive; consequently, any 
psychological restrictions preventing individuals from exercising autonomy and 
decision-making power are even stronger for women (Guendelman, Malin, Herr-
Harthorn, & Vargas, 2001).  
The concept of social norm is quite complex and may have different meanings 
depending on the context (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991). An injuctive social norm 
for instance, refers to a behaviour that most individuals identify as the right thing to 
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do, and so depicts what is commonly approved in a society. On the other hand, a 
descriptive norm refers to what people typically do, or the average behaviour, which 
may or may not be in concordance with the injuctive norm. In this case, it might be 
the injuctive norm for men and women to have similar rights and equal access to 
education and employment, however what is typically observed is for married women 
to have less years of education with respect to their husbands, which are also 
appointed as the households’ breadwinners. Due to the lack of information regarding 
injuctive norms in the data set, in this paper we’ll use community averages in order to 
study how deviations from descriptive norms (in terms of years of education) can 
change the magnitude of the correlation between women’s education and power. 
The analysis of the determinants of women’s decision-making power in the household 
is relatively new for the Mexican case, but there are a few articles that have addressed 
this question. In cross-sectional studies performed by Casique (2000; 2010) using the 
1995 National Survey of Family Planning and the 2003 National Survey on the 
Dynamics of Intrahousehold Relationships, the author constructs global indexes for 
women’s intrahousehold decision-making power and finds that factors such as years 
of education, labour force participation, age and having been in previous unions have 
a significant enhancing effect on power. Even though Casique’s research has made an 
important contribution to the literature and constitutes a baseline to the 
understanding the determinants of female decision-making power in Mexican 
households, it has some limitations. For instance, in both studies the author decided 
to build global indexes that measure the level of women’s decision-making power 
across a variety of aspects of family life, a methodology that does not allow us to 
compare the effect of different sociodemographic, economic and cultural factors on 
each dimension of decision-making. A second limitation, which is explicitly recognised 
in her work, has to do with the nature of the data sets she used. The information used 
in both studies is cross-sectional and therefore it is not possible to explore any 
individual life-time changes and their effect on bargaining power (Casique, 2010). 
Additionally, the surveys she worked with do not provide any information about men’s 
perceptions of women’s power. Having the couple’s report instead of the woman’s 
response only allows a more comprehensive understanding of intrahousehold 
dynamics and reduces the risk of getting biased results (Allendorf, 2007; Story & 
Burgard, 2012; Duvendack & Palmer-Jones, 2017). 
Another relevant study for the Mexican case is the one done by Antman (2014), who 
uses the Mexican Family Life Survey to study the effect of employment status on 
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intrahousehold decision-making power regarding large expenditures. The author uses 
fixed effects models to deal with potential endogeneity issues coming from the 
correlation between work status and any household-specific unobserved factors that 
could also have an influence on bargaining power. According to her results, the head 
of the household’s spouse is more likely to be involved in decision-making processes 
regarding large expenditures when she has been employed in the last 12 months. An 
important contribution of this work is the use of panel data which is useful in the 
treatment of endogeneity. However, just as in Casique’s work, the author considers the 
responses from one of the spouses only (in this case the head of the household), and 
the analysis does not allow the effect of women’s employment to vary across different 
levels of decision-making power.  
This work contributes to the literature in very specific aspects. To begin with, it 
represents the first attempt to use Mexican panel data in the measurement of the 
association of education and employment with women’s intrahousehold decision-
making power regarding a variety of domestic aspects, including food choices, 
children’s wellbeing, economic matters and decisions regarding the woman’s 
autonomy. Unlike previous work that has been done for the Mexican case (Casique, 
2000; 2010), this study recognises the fact that each aspect of intrahousehold 
decision-making might represent a different process, so sticking to one single decision-
making power index might not provide enough information (Malhotra & Mather, 1997). 
Secondly, the analysis also makes use of the answers provided by the woman’s partner 
regarding who is the household decision-maker and compares results according to 
which response is used in the regressions, which addresses the problem of not having 
men’s views in the analysis. Additionally, a partial proportional odds model is used to 
consider that factors such as education and employment might have different 
correlations with women’s power across different levels of power, which is important 
to recognise since having exclusive power might not be ideal for some aspects of 
decision-making such as children’s education and health. Finally, quadratic effects in 
the relationship between education and power are analysed and locality averages are 
used to measure the influence of deviating from social norms (in years of education) 
on the magnitude of the correlation between education and women’s intrahousehold 
decision-making power.  
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3.4  Data and Descriptive Analysis 
 
This paper uses panel data from the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), a publicly 
available dataset which contains a broad variety of socioeconomic and demographic 
information for a large sample of Mexican households and individuals in three rounds: 
2002, 2005 and 200921. The design for the first round was undertaken by the National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI, in Spanish), and consists of a 
probabilistic, stratified, multi-staged and independent sample, which is representative 
of the Mexican population at the national, urban, rural and regional level. 
 
Since the survey aimed to collect data both at the household and individual level, the 
questionnaire includes a “Decision-Making” section where each adult family member 
is asked to identify the decision-maker(s) for several aspects of family life. This paper 
will focus on seven specific decisions: food, children’s education, children’s health care, 
large expenditures, cash transfers to relatives, the woman’s work status, and 
contraceptive use. Even though the woman’s perception of her own power will be the 
main variable of interest, the husband’s responses are also considered in the analysis. 
The explanatory variables include a set of socioeconomic characteristics at the 
individual, couple, household and community level, though the analysis will mainly 
focus on the effect of women’s years of education and employment status. Since the 
main variable of interest is the level of decision-making power for women living in a 
marriage or free union, the sample is restricted to all women who reported to have a 
husband or partner living in the same household, for whom there is also socioeconomic 
information available22.  Due to the presence of extended families, in some cases this 
might include not only the wife/partner of the head of the household but also any 
other women living with a husband/partner in the same household. After excluding 
implausible values23, the initial sample consists of 18,419 observations distributed 
across the three waves of the panel.  
 
Fortunately, in the case of the Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS), attrition is not 
expected to be a significant problem since the survey aimed to follow individuals over 
                                                          
21 The MxFLS currently contains information for a 10-year period, collected in three rounds: 2002, 2005-2006 and 2009-2012. 
For simplicity, the waves will be referred as: “ 2002”, “2005” and “ 2009”, to indicate the year the information collection 
process began for each round. The MxFLS data can be downloaded from: http://www.ennvih-mxfls.org/english/index.html 
22 The study only considers women living with a partner or spouse since the bargaining process for single women is likely to be 
driven by different forces, and therefore will require a separate analysis. 
23 For instance, women who reported to have more than one partner/spouse at a time or an implausible number of years of 
education were omitted from the analysis. 
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time, regardless of changes in residence or new household formations (for instance 
due to split-offs). So, even if some couples get divorced or separated over the duration 
of the three waves, both the man and the woman would still appear in the survey. In 
other words, separation does not imply attrition. So, for instance, if a woman gets 
divorced and then gets married again, she would still be included in my sample, 
regardless of the fact that she has now a different husband. The estimation actually 
controls for this matter using the variable “Previous Unions” in order to capture any 
effects that having a previous husband could have on the woman’s power. However, if 
those divorced or separated women do not choose to marry again they would not be 
considered in my sample anymore, since this exclusively contains women who live with 
a husband or partner in the household. It is important to remember that the main 
objective of this paper is to measure the association between education and 
employment and decision-making power, specifically for women who live with a 
husband or partner, and not a general effect for all women. If we take this into account, 
the fact that my sample (not the survey) is dropping some women who get divorced or 
separated and do not get married again over the course of 10 years does not really 
represent a selection problem. What I’m measuring is the relationship between 
education and employment for women who are in a cohabitation relationship (even if 
they switch partners over time), while the estimation also controls for “previous 
unions”, to take into account the fact that women who remarry might be different than 
those who have been only in one stable relationship. In any case, I don’t expect attrition 
to be a problem, since most of the individuals (more than 80%) appear in my sample 
at least in 2 (out of 3) waves, as shown in Table 3.0. 
 
Table 3.0 Number of individuals interviewed across the panel's waves. 
Number of waves 
(times)  
Number of individuals Percentage 
1 3144 17.07 
2 4184 22.72 
3 11091 60.21 
 18419 100 
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Decision-making power in this context is seen as an ordinal measure rather than a 
simple binary variable. For each aspect of family life, the dependent variable “decision-
making power” takes the value of 0 if the woman does not participate in the decision-
making process at all, 1 if she shares the decision-making with at least one other 
person, and 2 if she makes the decision by herself. Figure 3.1 shows the distribution 
of decision-making power across different aspects of family life, according to the 
woman’s perception of her own power24. 
 
Not surprisingly, the decision where women tend to have a higher share of power is 
food purchased for the household, an aspect of family life traditionally assigned to 
women. Decisions related to children’s welfare such as education and health care, as 
well as the use of contraceptives are more likely to be made in association with some 
other family member, most likely the woman’s husband or partner. Interestingly, 
sending cash transfers to her own family does not seem to depend entirely on the 
woman’s choice, since more than 50 per cent of women reported they share this 
                                                          
24 Please refer to Table B5 in Appendix B for the exact values of the percentages.  
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Figure 3.1. Level of women's decision-making power by type of decision (frequencies 
in percentages)
"0": Does not participate in the decision-making process
"1": Shares decision-making process with at least one other family member
"2":. Makes decision by herself
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012 
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decision with at least some other family member. Likewise, almost 20 per cent reported 
that they do not have any say in their decision to work, suggesting that there is a 
considerable portion of women living in marriages or free unions who cannot go to 
work even if they want to, or that go to work against their own will. However, it is large 
expenditures the aspect in which women tend to report the highest level of non-
participation, with more than 30 per cent of women reporting other family members 
as decision-makers. These facts are compatible with the traditional nature of social 
norms in Mexico, which identify men as the main decision-makers, and women as 
agents in charge of minor household affairs.  
 
Table 3.1(a) shows the average level of power reported by women across seven aspects 
of decision-making, for each of the waves collected in the panel data set. Since the 
variable denoting power can take three values, namely: “0” for no power, “1” for shared 
power and “2” for exclusive power, an average response that is closer to 0 would 
indicate a relatively low level of decision-making power, whilst an average response 
closer to 2 would indicate a relatively high level of decision-making power. As shown 
in table 3.1 (a), even though women’s participation in some decisions such as food 
purchases, large expenditures or contraceptive use has not changed much over time, 
their say in decision-making aspects such as cash transfers to her relatives and 
whether she should work has systematically increased. Interestingly, this rise seems 
to have been counteracted by a lower level of power regarding children-related 
decisions. 
 
 
Table 3.1 (a): Mean of women’s decision-making power by year and aspect. 
 2002 2005 2009 
  Observations Mean Observations Mean Observations Mean 
Food  6026 1.554 5861 1.572 6121 1.564 
Children's education 5451 0.957 5160 0.942 5284 0.890 
Health care and medicines 
for children 5494 1.002 5218 0.970 5384 0.933 
Large expenditures 6017 0.729 5826 0.782 6058 0.759 
Cash transfers to her 
parents/relatives 4403 1.148 3875 1.256 3903 1.286 
If she should work 6007 1.098 5804 1.208 6047 1.278 
Contraceptive use 4331 1.055 4013 1.049 4260 1.069 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012 
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Table 3.1 (b). Mean of the variation on women’s decision-making power across waves. 
 Period 
Average variation 
in decision-
making power 
Standard 
error of 
the 
variation Min Max 
t-statistic  
(Ho: Mean 
Differnce=0)  
Food  
2005-2002 0.0368 0.7756 -2 2  3.2057 
2009-2005 0.0273 0.7737 -2 2 2.2821 
Children's education 
2005-2002 -0.0474 0.6575 -2 2 -4.5143 
2009-2005 -0.1181 0.7082 -2 2 -9.8129 
Health care and medicines for children 
2005-2002 -0.0600 0.7057 -2 2 -5.3669 
2009-2005 -0.0872 0.7392 -2 2 -7.0012 
Large expenditures 
2005-2002 0.0741 0.7980 -2 2  6.2526 
2009-2005 -0.0073 0.8147 -2 2 -0.5750 
Cash transfers to her 
parents/relatives 
2005-2002 0.1367 0.8177 -2 2 8.1146 
2009-2005 0.0581 0.8365 -2 2 3.0077 
If she should work 
2005-2002 0.1481 1.0082 -2 2 9.8662 
2009-2005 0.1005 1.0251 -2 2 6.2540 
Contraceptive use 
2005-2002 -0.0004 0.5157 -2 2  -0.0390 
2009-2005 0.0201 0.5261 -2 2 1.7667 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012 
 
Since the analysis considers longitudinal data, it is important to corroborate that the 
level of women’s decision-making power shows some degree of variation over time. 
Table 3.1 (b) shows the average difference in decision-making power across waves. For 
each woman in the sample, I calculated the change in their reported level of decision-
making power from 2002 to 2005 and from 2005 to 2009, and then averaged these 
numbers across individuals for each aspect of decision-making. As the level of 
decision-making power itself can only go from 0 to 2, the average differences across 
time are not expected to exceed the unit, however they are far enough from zero for 
most aspects of decision-making. In fact, for 11 out of 14 differences being analysed, 
the absolute value of the t-statistic associated with the null hypothesis that the average 
difference is equal to zero is greater than the 5 per cent critical value of 1.96, suggesting 
that the levels of decision-making power do show variation across time. 
 
3.5  Methodology 
 
One of the key objectives of this paper is to recognise the presence of heterogeneity in 
the relationship between women’s decision-making power and factors such as 
education and employment across the distribution of power itself. Consequently, the 
quantitative analysis must treat power as an ordinal measure, considering that 
decision-making power comes in at least three different levels: non-participation, 
shared participation and exclusive decision-making. However, this hierarchy refers 
only to the level of power itself and should not be associated with a measure of 
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wellbeing where women are necessarily better off the more decision-making power they 
have25.  
3.5.1 Ordered Logit (Proportional Odds Model) 
A basic ordered logit model is used as a baseline approach. The main variable of 
interest is the level of female decision-making power, for which it is only possible to 
observe three values in the sample: 0, for non-participation, 1, for shared participation 
and 2 for being the exclusive decision-maker. However, these values can be seen as 
classifications of a non-observable continuous variable measuring decision-making 
power. 
 
                                                                      𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡′𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                 
(3.1) 
 
Where 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is a latent variable representing women’s decision making power and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 is a 
vector of observable characteristics including the woman’s level of education, work 
status, age, marital status, age at marriage, whether she has been in previous unions 
or marriages, whether she belongs to an indigenous ethnic group26, number of 
children, age of the children, the proportion of male children, the couple’s differences 
in age, education and power perception,  household income as well as the size of the 
community where she lives in period 𝑡. Additionally, region and time fixed effects are 
included as control variables in order to account for regional heterogeneity and 
possible trends in the level of decision-making power. 𝛽 is then the set of regression 
coefficients measuring the relationship between decision-making power and the 
woman’s characteristics while 𝜀𝑖 represents a set of unobserved factors that also have 
an effect on the dependent variable. However, the model depicted in equation (3.1) 
cannot be directly estimated since there are only K=3 categories of response, which are 
related to the latent variable as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖 = 0            (𝑛𝑜 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟)       𝑖𝑓  − ∞ <  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜏1                               
𝑦𝑖 = 1      (𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟)        𝑖𝑓   𝜏1 <  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ 𝜏2 
𝑦𝑖 = 2     (𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟)     𝑖𝑓      𝜏2 <  𝑦𝑖
∗ ≤ ∞ 
 
                                                          
25 The desirability of each level of power will depend on the nature of the decision. However, the discussion of the desirability 
of each outcome is beyond the scope of this paper. 
26 There are more than 60 indigenous groups in Mexico. This study considers the dummy variable ‘Indigenous group’ equal to 1 
if the person belongs to any of them. 
(3.2) 
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Where the probability of a woman being classified in the 𝑘  category of decision-making 
power, given the level of her socioeconomic characteristics (𝑥 ) can be expressed as: 
 
                                     Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = (
exp(𝜏𝑘+1−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽)
exp(𝜏𝑘+1−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽)+1
) − (
exp(𝜏𝑘−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽)
exp(𝜏𝑘−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽)+1
)           (3.3)   
 
3.5.2 Generalised Ordered Logit (Partial Proportional Odds Model) 
 
An implicit supposition represented in equation (3.3) is the parallel regression 
assumption, meaning that the parameters measuring the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the level of decision-making power are constant across 
different levels of power, which might not be necessarily true for all parameters. If, for 
instance, the association between an additional year of education and power is 
particularly higher for women who have a low level of decision-making power, running 
a simple ordered logit model might not capture this relationship appropriately. 
Consequently, the analysis will make use of a generalised order logit model to allow 
the regression parameters to vary across different levels of decision-making power. In 
this case, the probability of an individual 𝑖 having a level of power 𝑘, given her 
socioeconomic characteristics (𝑥) is: 
 
      Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘|𝑥𝑖𝑡) = (
exp(𝜏𝑘+1−𝑥1𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1−𝑥2𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2(𝑘+1))
exp(𝜏𝑘+1−𝑥1𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1−𝑥2𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2(𝑘+1))+1
) − (
exp(𝜏𝑘−𝑥1𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1−𝑥2𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2𝑘)
exp(𝜏𝑘−𝑥1𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽1−𝑥2𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽2𝑘)+1
)       (3.4) 
 
Where 𝛽1 is the vector of parameters associated with the variables for which the parallel 
regression assumption holds (subset 𝑥1), and 𝛽2𝑘 is the vector of parameters associated 
with the variables for which it does not (subset 𝑥2).  
 
 
 
3.5.3 Fixed Effects Ordered Logit Model (‘Blow-Up and Cluster’ estimator) 
 
The previous approaches treat all observations as if they came from a cross-sectional 
data set, that is, they do not explicitly exploit the panel structure of the data. In this 
case, the analysis would benefit from the use of a fixed-effects methodology since there 
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a considerable set of unobservable characteristics that could simultaneously affect 
women’s decision-making power and some of their socioeconomic outcomes. One can 
think, for instance, on the role that a woman’s personality or the way she was brought 
up play not only on her ability to bargain but also on her willingness to work and go 
to school. Additionally, applying an individual fixed-effects methodology will allow us 
to specifically measure how much does the women’s decision-making power changes 
when she increases her education or modifies her work status. When the estimation 
considers the presence of individual-specific fixed-effects, the latent variable model in 
equation (3.1) becomes: 
 
         𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                 (3.5) 
 
Where 𝛼𝑖 represents a set of time-fixed unobservable characteristics associated with a 
woman’s level of decision-making power (such as: personality, ability to bargain, 
cultural background). Then, if the model is written in a more general form considering 
individual-specific thresholds, the probability of any individual i being classified in 
category 𝑘 in period t is (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004; Baetschmann, Staub, & 
Winkelmann, 2015): 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑘|𝑥𝑖𝑡, 𝛼𝑖) = (
exp(𝜏𝑖𝑘+1−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽−𝛼𝑖)
exp(𝜏𝑖𝑘+1−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽−𝛼𝑖)+1
) − (
exp(𝜏𝑖𝑘−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽−𝛼𝑖)
exp(𝜏𝑖𝑘−𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽−𝛼𝑖)+1
)      (3.6) 
 
 
However, the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (3.6) presents a few 
challenges: firstly, only 𝛼𝑖𝑘 = 𝜏𝑘 − 𝛼𝑖 can be identified (not 𝛼𝑖, as required); and 
secondly, under ‘fixed-t’ asymptotics, it is not possible to estimate 𝛼𝑖𝑘 consistently due 
to the incidental parameter problem (Baetschmann, Staub, & Winkelmann, 2015). A 
simple solution to these problems would be to collapse the dependent variable into a 
binary variable with only two categories and use the Chamberlain estimator for fixed 
effects for a logit model. In order to follow this approach, it is necessary to choose an 
appropriate cut-off point for the dependent variable, each choice giving place to a 
different estimator.  
 
A few options have been proposed in the literature, the most relevant being: the  Ferrer-
i-Carbonell and Frijters estimator (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Frijters, 2004), the Das and 
Van Soest two-step estimator (Das & Van Soest, 1999) and the Blow-Up and cluster 
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estimator, developed by Baetschmann, Staub, & Winkelmann (2015). The Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Frijters methodology finds an optimal cutoff point for every individual 
by minimising the Hessian matrix at a preliminary estimate of the regression coefficient 
𝛽. Conversely, the Das and Van Soest approach estimates the model for all the possible 
cutoffs and then combining the results in a second stage, in which different weights 
are assigned to each estimator according to their variance. Finally, the Blow-Up and 
Cluster estimator estimates all possible cutoffs jointly by replicating K-1 times every 
observation, and choosing a different cut-off point for each of them. Then, a 
Conditional Maximum Likelihood logit is applied using the whole sample. 
 
In a recent simulation experiment by Baestschmann, Staub and Winkelmann it has 
been found that the Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Fijeters estimator is actually biased, while 
both the Das and Van Soest and the Blow-Up and Cluster estimators generally perform 
well (Baetschmann, Staub, & Winkelmann, 2015). However, the Das and Van Soest 
estimator could still show a few problems, especially in small samples. Specifically, 
there is a possibility that the variance matrix for the regression coefficients could 
contain very few non-zero components leading to an imprecise estimation, which could 
happen if there is only a minor overlap between the samples derived from different 
dichotomisations. In other words, there could be a problem if the number of 
observations in certain categories of the dependent variable is particularly small 
(Dickerson, Hole, & Munford, 2014).  
 
For these reasons, the regression analysis in this chapter follows the Blow-Up and 
Cluster approach suggested by Baetschmann, Staub, & Winkelmann (2015), which is 
the only one that has been shown to yield consistent estimators even when the number 
of cases for some categories is small. In this case the Blow-Up and Cluster estimator 
is slightly more preferable than the Das and Van Soest one, due to the small number 
of women belonging to a few categories (for instance, not having a say in food-related 
decisions, or exclusive decision-making regarding large expenditures)27. In order to 
calculate the BUC estimators the author makes use of the Stata routine developed by 
Dickerson, Hole and Munford (2014)28. 
 
                                                          
27 However, the Das and Van Soest estimators are also provided as a robustness check in Appendix D, section II, Table DII-3.4. 
28 As the authors point out, the code originally presented by Baetschmann, Staub, & Winkelmann (2015) can inadvertently drop 
observations in some cases. 
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3.6  Results 
Results are presented as follows. First, subsection 3.6.1 shows the results of 
estimating equation (3.3) using cross-sectional variation in the ordered logit model. 
Next, subsection 3.6.2 presents the results of relaxing the parallel regression 
assumption by running a generalised ordered logit regression (specifically, the partial 
proportional odds model). Third, the ‘Blow-Up and Cluster’ methodology is applied to 
get fixed effects estimates that exploit within-individual variation in the ordered logit 
model. Finally, the estimation allows for the presence of quadratic effects in the 
relationship between education and power, also studying the impact of diverging from 
community standards in education, in terms of locality averages.  
3.6.1 Ordered Logit (OL). 
The decision-making processes considered in this study are clustered into four 
categories: daily life, children’s wellbeing, economic decisions, and autonomy29. For 
each aspect of decision-making, the study estimates the association between a set of 
characteristics at the individual, couple, household and community level, and the 
degree of decision-making power reported by the woman and her partner, as shown in 
Tables 3.2a and 3.2b, respectively. The coefficients in these tables represent the 
change in the log-odds given a change in a covariate, holding the rest of the variables 
constant. However, the reader should keep in mind that the coefficients shown in 
Tables 3.2a and 3.2b should not be interpreted in a strict causal manner, especially 
regarding those associated with “work” in the decisions about women’s autonomy, 
which might face endogeneity problems due to the presence of reverse causality. For 
instance, women who work also reported to have a higher level of power regarding their 
decision to work, but it is not possible to know the direction of the causality. Similarly, 
if a woman has more power to decide on whether she uses contraceptives she might 
be less likely to get pregnant and more likely to work. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
29 Although fertility decisions affect the lives of both: wife and husband, contraceptive use can be seen as a measure of 
women’s control over when to get pregnant, representing her level of autonomy over her own body.  
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Table 3.2a: Ordered Logit estimates, based on women's opinion. 
  Daily Life Children's wellbeing Economic decisions Autonomy 
  Food 
Children's 
Education 
Children's 
Health 
Care  
Large 
Expenditures 
Cash 
Transfers 
to Her 
Relatives 
If She 
Should 
Work 
Contraceptive 
Use 
Individual Level        
Education (years) -0.004 -0.004 0.013* 0.015** 0.040*** 0.059*** 0.048*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)    
Work -0.193*** 0.234*** 0.204*** 0.683*** 0.325*** 0.546*** 0.185**  
 
(0.052) (0.061) (0.057) (0.051) (0.056) (0.046) (0.077)    
Age 0.046*** -0.005 -0.001 0.010* 0.016** 0.026*** 0.012    
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)    
Married 0.237*** -0.035 -0.016 0.029 -0.105 -0.118** -0.041    
 
(0.060) (0.068) (0.066) (0.061) (0.070) (0.058) (0.096)    
Age at marriage -0.022*** 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.017** 0.001 -0.019*   
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)    
Previous unions 0.118 0.450*** 0.436*** 0.127 0.306*** 0.180* 0.129    
 
(0.103) (0.134) (0.120) (0.099) (0.114) (0.097) (0.166)    
Indigenous group -0.251*** -0.064 -0.056 -0.002 0.040 -0.019 -0.429*** 
 
(0.070) (0.081) (0.079) (0.069) (0.081) (0.068) (0.123)    
Number of children 0.017 0.089*** 0.076*** 0.046*** -0.001 0.003 0.021    
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.026)    
Age of children (mean) -0.009 -0.106*** -0.076*** -0.001 0.006 0.007 -0.017    
 
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011)    
Proportion of male children  0.018 -0.063 -0.117* -0.129** -0.190*** -0.056 0.047    
 (0.064) (0.068) (0.067) (0.060) (0.069) (0.058) (0.094)    
Couple Level        
Difference in Age -0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006    
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)    
Difference in Education 0.000 0.014** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.004 -0.000 0.010*   
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)    
Household Level: Quantile of Net Income       
2nd -0.013 0.018 0.022 0.030 0.007 -0.007 0.123    
 
(0.064) (0.070) (0.067) (0.064) (0.071) (0.059) (0.100)    
3rd -0.002 -0.020 0.071 -0.042 0.142** 0.099* 0.079    
 
(0.063) (0.070) (0.068) (0.063) (0.071) (0.059) (0.097)    
4th 0.052 -0.082 0.014 0.099 0.116 0.152** 0.112    
 
(0.069) (0.078) (0.076) (0.067) (0.077) (0.063) (0.104)    
Community/Locality Level: Population (Base: Less than 2,500)     
Between 2,500 and 15,000 0.149* 0.069 0.097 -0.015 0.167** 0.097 0.150    
 
(0.079) (0.081) (0.078) (0.071) (0.082) (0.066) (0.106)    
Between 15,000 and 100,000 0.057 -0.044 0.036 0.018 0.072 0.129* 0.108    
 
(0.077) (0.086) (0.081) (0.075) (0.082) (0.071) (0.104)    
More than 100,000 0.062 -0.024 0.061 -0.030 0.227*** 0.287*** 0.143*   
 
(0.056) (0.061) (0.060) (0.054) (0.061) (0.050) (0.082)    
Region (Base: North)        
Center-North 0.137 -0.192* -0.142 -0.327*** 0.068 -0.063 -0.064    
 
(0.098) (0.104) (0.100) (0.096) (0.099) (0.085) (0.152)    
Center 0.218** -0.197* -0.301*** -0.388*** 0.203* 0.037 -0.246    
 
(0.103) (0.112) (0.106) (0.102) (0.111) (0.093) (0.159)    
South -0.034 -0.249** -0.432*** -0.216** -0.190* 0.170* -0.286*   
 
(0.107) (0.113) (0.111) (0.102) (0.107) (0.092) (0.160)    
Year (Base: 2002)        
2005 -0.161 -0.265** -0.525*** 0.083 0.326*** 0.221** -0.352**  
 
(0.103) (0.113) (0.107) (0.098) (0.102) (0.087) (0.140)    
2009 0.092 -0.128 -0.198 0.043 0.536*** 0.513*** 0.110    
 
(0.114) (0.141) (0.132) (0.112) (0.120) (0.103) (0.174)    
τ1 -1.443*** -3.513*** -2.923*** -0.138 -1.261*** 0.661*** -2.684*** 
 
(0.177) (0.195) (0.183) (0.166) (0.183) (0.158) (0.284)    
τ2 0.838*** 0.749*** 0.918*** 3.191*** 1.700*** 2.438*** 2.483*** 
 
(0.172) (0.189) (0.179) (0.171) (0.182) (0.160) (0.279)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.025 0.064 0.037 0.025 0.024 0.041 0.014    
Wald Chi-Square 327.991 665.641 434.572 417.665 332.947 771.891 116.188    
N. of cases 9476 9301 9355 9446 7116 9445 7726    
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. Dependent variable: women’s perception of their own power as an ordered measure (“0”, 
“1” or “2”). The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors 
by household in parenthesis (since women living in the same household face similar living conditions that might have an effect on their 
level of power, unobserved components in the outcome variable for women within one household are likely to be correlated). The 
estimation also includes interaction terms between region and year. 
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Table 3.2b: Ordered Logit estimates, based on the partner's opinion. 
  Daily Life Children's wellbeing Economic decisions Autonomy 
  Food 
Children's 
Education 
Children's 
Health 
Care  
Large 
Expenditures 
Cash 
Transfers to 
Her 
Relatives 
If She 
Should 
Work 
Contraceptive 
Use 
Individual Level        
Education (years) 0.006 0.003 0.012 0.025*** 0.030*** 0.051*** 0.041*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012)    
Work -0.173*** 0.190*** 0.116** 0.574*** 0.184*** 0.565*** 0.144*   
 
(0.049) (0.060) (0.057) (0.051) (0.056) (0.046) (0.086)    
Age 0.023*** -0.014* -0.010 0.002 0.011* 0.018*** -0.004    
 
(0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.011)    
Married 0.188*** 0.167** 0.089 0.009 -0.087 -0.095* 0.068    
 
(0.057) (0.073) (0.071) (0.061) (0.069) (0.056) (0.104)    
Age at marriage -0.016*** 0.009 0.001 0.013** -0.013* 0.008 0.007    
 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.011)    
Previous unions 0.169* 0.295** 0.269** 0.088 0.284*** 0.033 -0.247    
 
(0.095) (0.140) (0.125) (0.099) (0.106) (0.094) (0.156)    
Indigenous group -0.168** 0.103 0.113 0.164** -0.057 -0.049 -0.019    
 
(0.065) (0.084) (0.079) (0.069) (0.079) (0.064) (0.125)    
Number of children 0.030* 0.099*** 0.081*** 0.038** -0.020 -0.003 -0.019    
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.015) (0.029)    
Age of children (mean) 0.013* -0.105*** -0.075*** 0.006 0.007 0.013** 0.021*   
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.012)    
Proportion of male children  0.015 -0.087 -0.068 -0.046 -0.066 -0.039 -0.092    
 (0.059) (0.070) (0.070) (0.061) (0.067) (0.056) (0.099)    
Couple Level        
Difference in Age 0.005 0.003 0.005 -0.006 0.000 0.001 -0.005    
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.008)    
Difference in Education -0.008 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.008* -0.002 -0.015** 0.003    
 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)    
Household Level: Quantile of Net Income       
2nd 0.022 0.179** 0.165** -0.042 0.018 0.003 0.102    
 
(0.061) (0.077) (0.072) (0.063) (0.071) (0.060) (0.111)    
3rd -0.005 0.066 0.128* -0.088 0.115* 0.061 0.160    
 
(0.060) (0.074) (0.072) (0.063) (0.069) (0.059) (0.106)    
4th -0.036 -0.066 0.057 -0.100 0.108 0.136** 0.200*   
 
(0.065) (0.080) (0.078) (0.068) (0.076) (0.063) (0.116)    
Community/Locality Level: Population (Base: Less than 2,500)     
Between 2,500 and 15,000 0.082 0.109 0.039 -0.129* 0.183** 0.052 0.117    
 
(0.070) (0.078) (0.075) (0.071) (0.081) (0.066) (0.115)    
Between 15,000 and 100,000 0.177** -0.041 -0.023 -0.202*** 0.215*** 0.098 -0.096    
 
(0.076) (0.087) (0.086) (0.074) (0.080) (0.070) (0.116)    
More than 100,000 0.174*** 0.155** 0.056 -0.120** 0.173*** 0.147*** -0.108    
 
(0.052) (0.063) (0.063) (0.054) (0.059) (0.051) (0.090)    
Region (Base: North)        
Center-North 0.230** -0.273** -0.231** -0.221** 0.147 0.107 0.100    
 
(0.090) (0.110) (0.109) (0.100) (0.095) (0.082) (0.168)    
Center -0.130 -0.492*** -0.179 -0.395*** 0.306*** 0.159* -0.003    
 
(0.094) (0.120) (0.115) (0.106) (0.109) (0.090) (0.168)    
South 0.075 -0.325*** -0.350*** -0.373*** 0.105 0.378*** -0.206    
 
(0.098) (0.122) (0.122) (0.107) (0.104) (0.095) (0.175)    
Year (Base: 2002)        
2005 0.113 -0.223** -0.281** 0.015 0.406*** 0.360*** -0.003    
 
(0.096) (0.111) (0.117) (0.107) (0.101) (0.084) (0.150)    
2009 0.205* -0.510*** -0.531*** -0.430*** 0.567*** 0.305*** -0.206    
  (0.106) (0.136) (0.137) (0.112) (0.122) (0.103) (0.196)    
τ1 -1.179*** -3.222*** -2.821*** -0.195 -1.243*** 0.681*** -2.257*** 
 
(0.162) (0.203) (0.194) (0.169) (0.185) (0.153) (0.287)    
τ2 0.962*** 1.287*** 1.362*** 3.442*** 1.650*** 2.273*** 3.252*** 
 
(0.160) (0.198) (0.190) (0.179) (0.185) (0.155) (0.291)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.079 0.045 0.019 0.014 0.034 0.009    
Wald Chi-Square 320.908 822.560 490.833 285.718 192.242 663.135 66.105    
N. of cases 9432 9224 9289 9406 7267 9419 7784    
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. Dependent variable: husband/partner’s perception of women’s power as an ordered 
measure (“0”, “1” or “2”). The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered 
standard errors by household in parenthesis. The estimation also includes interaction terms between region and year. 
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A quick comparison between Tables 3.2a and 3.2b show that most of the explanatory 
variables have a similar association with women’s decision-making power, regardless 
of what answers are considered in the analysis: the woman’s own or her partner’s. As 
expected, an additional year of education is significantly associated with increased 
power in decisions regarding large expenditures, cash transfers to her relatives, her 
work status and contraceptive use. On the other hand, being employed has a strong 
positive correlation with power, on all aspects of decision-making30, except food 
choices, for which the association is negative. This result should not be surprising 
since working women are more likely to share or even delegate household 
responsibilities (such as food purchases), as their opportunity cost of spending time at 
home or the supermarket is higher than for non-working women. At the couple level, 
the number of extra years of education a woman has in comparison with her partner, 
has a significant positive association with decision-making power regarding children’s 
wellbeing and large expenditures. Regarding the variables at the household level, 
results in Tables 3.2a and 3.2b suggest that, in comparison with women in the poorest 
quarter of the sample, women living in the third and fourth quantiles of income tend 
to have more decision-making power regarding cash transfers to her relatives and her 
own work status, respectively. Intuitively, the positive relationship between family 
income and women’s power can be explained by the traditional nature of Mexican 
society and the connection between income and the external influences the household 
is exposed to. For instance, individuals living in high-income households are more 
likely to have international exposure (through travels, education, social circles) and 
consequently be more aware of the existence of less traditional cultural environments 
where women tend to be more independent. In contrast, poor households’ cultural 
framework is likely to revolve around local values and social norms, which in the 
Mexican case tend to be highly traditional and gender-stratified. Also, the 
characteristics of the community where the woman lives are likely to be correlated with 
the way the household makes decisions and the extent to which women are allowed to 
negotiate. In this case, the size of the community is considered as a proxy for 
conservativeness or traditionalism, which can have an important association with 
women’s power. As expected, women living in big localities and cities with more than 
                                                          
30 The results also suggest a positive relationship between working and participation in the decision of whether she should 
work. However, since this particular coefficient is likely to be biased due to reverse causality issues, one should limit the 
interpretation of its positive sign to a result of the fact that women who reported to be working also reported a relatively high 
level of decision-making power in that matter. A more detailed analysis of this particular relationship is beyond the scope of 
this study.  
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100,000 inhabitants are significantly more likely to have power regarding cash 
transfers and work status, in comparison with women living in small towns with less 
than 2,500 people. Lastly, the estimation includes region and time fixed effects to 
capture any general differences in women’s power across the country and through 
time. Since most of the coefficients associated with the region dummies included in 
the analysis have negative signs and are highly significant, the analysis suggests that 
women living in the north of the country (base category) have higher levels of power 
than those living in other regions, these differences being especially significant for 
decisions regarding children’s wellbeing and large expenditures. This result is 
consistent with well-known sociocultural differences between the north and the rest of 
the country31. With respect to 2002, women’s decision-making power regarding 
children’s health care significantly reduced in 2005. At the same time, women’s power 
regarding cash transfers and work status in 2005 and 2009 significantly increased 
with respect to 2002.  
 
The previous results seem to suggest that, at least in this particular case, taking the 
responses of women or the ones of their husbands/partners does not modify much the 
estimated correlations between women’s socioeconomic characteristics and their level 
of decision-making power. For this reason, the quantitative analysis from this point 
will focus on women’s responses and will consider women’s perception of their own 
power as the main dependent variable of interest.  
 
 
A note on the employment-power relationship and the woman’s individual 
contribution to the couple’s income. 
  
So far, the study of the relationship between employment status and women’s decision-
making power has been focusing on the analysis of whether the woman is in 
employment or not. However, it is quite possible that at least part of this relationship 
is driven by the actual contribution that the woman provides to the couple’s income, 
which will be greater than zero for working women. In other words, the ‘employment 
effect’ might have a lot to do with the ‘individual income’ effect. Table DII-3.2a in 
Appendix D, Section II shows the results from including an additional variable 
                                                          
31 For historical reasons the centre and south of the country have a richer cultural heritage and are more ‘traditional’ than the 
north, a region that has a strong cultural influence from the United States.  
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“woman’s individual contribution to the couple’s income”, in the couple-level set of 
variables. 
 
For most aspects of decision-making the ‘work status effect’ seems to be largely driven 
by the level of the woman’s individual contribution to the couple’s income, which is 
positively and significantly correlated with power for most aspects of decision-making, 
expect food choices. However, the fact alone that the woman works, independently 
from her income contribution, does still seem to have a positive and significant 
relationship with her level of decision-making power regarding large expenditures, just 
as in the previous estimations. 
 
However, since the objective of this chapter is to measure the general effect of 
employment status, rather the individual components of the employment-power 
relationship, the rest of the analysis will continue to study the association between a 
woman being employed and her level of intrahousehold decision-making power.  
 
3.6.2 Generalised Ordered Logit (Partial Proportional Odds Model). 
Previously, the analysis assumed that the correlation between decision-making power 
and the woman’s characteristics at the individual, couple, household and community 
level is the same for all levels of power. In other words, it has been assumed that each 
regressor has the same coefficient when analysing women who pass from non-
participation to having any level power (from power category ‘0’ to either ‘1’ or ‘2’) as 
from having none or limited power to becoming exclusive decision-makers (from power 
categories ‘0’ or ‘1’ to ‘2’). In this subsection the analysis uses women’s perception of 
their own power as the dependent variable while relaxing the ‘parallel regression 
assumption’ by applying a partial proportional odds model on the set of specifications 
previously presented in Table 3.2a. Table 3.3 shows the results of fitting such a model 
for each aspect of intrahousehold decision-making, allowing the regression coefficients 
to change across different levels of power when the parallel regression assumption has 
been violated32. For each decision, column (1) represents the association of each of the 
explanatory variables with the log odds of moving from category ‘0: no power’ to 
categories ‘1: shared power’ or ‘2: exclusive power’, whilst column (2) shows the effect 
of each variable on the log odds of moving from categories ‘0: no power’ or ‘1: shared 
                                                          
32 The tests for the parallel regression assumption used in the Stata routine that fits the partial proportional odds models 
consider a significance level of 5 percent (see Table B4 in Appendix B).   
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power’ to category ‘2: exclusive power’. For instance, a positive coefficient for a variable 
in column (1) means that variable has a positive correlation with the probability of 
acquiring some power (either sharing it or being exclusive decision-maker). 
Analogously, a positive coefficient associated with a variable in column (2) means that 
such variable has a positive relationship with the probability of having exclusive power.  
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Table 3.3: Generalised Ordered Logit estimates (Partial Proportional Odds) 
  Daily Life Children's Wellbeing Economic Decisions Autonomy 
  
Food Children's Education Children's Health Care Large Expenditures 
Cash Transfers to Her 
Relatives 
If She Should Work Contraceptive Use 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Individual Level               
Education (years) -0.004 -0.004 0.028** -0.044*** 0.053*** -0.018* 0.024*** -0.006 0.079*** 0.031*** 0.094*** 0.046*** 0.129*** 0.016    
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.017)    (0.011)    
Work -0.189*** -0.189*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.162*** 0.162*** 0.801*** 0.400*** 0.599*** 0.278*** 0.950*** 0.433*** 0.197**  0.197**  
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.061) (0.061) (0.056) (0.056) (0.061) (0.087) (0.112) (0.061) (0.075) (0.052) (0.077)    (0.077)    
Age 0.079*** 0.042*** -0.047*** 0.002 -0.023*** 0.000 0.007 0.022*** 0.016** 0.016** 0.020*** 0.032*** 0.012    0.012    
 (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009)    (0.009)    
Married 0.230*** 0.230*** -0.074 -0.074 0.160 -0.132* 0.069 -0.171 0.128 -0.180** -0.012 -0.182*** 0.207    -0.189*   
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.074) (0.074) (0.106) (0.077) (0.065) (0.111) (0.102) (0.073) (0.071) (0.064) (0.127)    (0.105)    
Age at marriage -0.022*** -0.022*** 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.008 -0.017* -0.016** -0.016** 0.012* -0.005 -0.016*   -0.016*   
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010)    (0.010)    
Previous unions -0.241 0.153 -0.219 0.670*** -0.002 0.543*** 0.019 0.413*** 0.285** 0.285** -0.045 0.281*** 0.090    0.090    
 (0.170) (0.100) (0.145) (0.119) (0.151) (0.113) (0.101) (0.154) (0.111) (0.111) (0.116) (0.098) (0.153)    (0.153)    
Indigenous group -0.244*** -0.244*** -0.053 -0.053 -0.044 -0.044 0.007 0.007 0.046 0.046 -0.003 -0.003 -0.737*** -0.083    
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.084) (0.084) (0.081) (0.081) (0.069) (0.069) (0.081) (0.081) (0.066) (0.066) (0.142)    (0.135)    
Number of children 0.017 0.017 0.096*** 0.040* 0.094*** 0.035* 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.077**  -0.010    
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.015) (0.035)    (0.030)    
Age of children (mean) -0.040*** -0.005 -0.132*** -0.042*** -0.107*** -0.024*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 0.010 0.006 0.006 -0.017    -0.017    
 (0.012) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011)    (0.011)    
Proportion of male children  0.018 0.018 -0.069 -0.069 -0.124* -0.124* -0.134** -0.134** -0.189*** -0.189*** -0.062 -0.062 0.042    0.042    
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.073) (0.073) (0.069) (0.069) (0.061) (0.061) (0.069) (0.069) (0.058) (0.058) (0.094)    (0.094)    
Couple Level               
Difference in Age -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 0.016*   -0.020**  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)    (0.008)    
Difference in Education 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.052*** 0.010 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.010*   0.010*   
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)    (0.006)    
Household Level: Quantile of Net Income             
2nd -0.010 -0.010 -0.018 -0.018 -0.001 -0.001 0.032 0.032 0.016 0.016 -0.006 -0.006 0.127    0.127    
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.073) (0.073) (0.070) (0.070) (0.063) (0.063) (0.071) (0.071) (0.058) (0.058) (0.098)    (0.098)    
3rd -0.004 -0.004 -0.017 -0.017 0.059 0.059 -0.040 -0.040 0.146** 0.146** 0.096* 0.096* 0.069    0.069    
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.073) (0.073) (0.070) (0.070) (0.063) (0.063) (0.071) (0.071) (0.058) (0.058) (0.096)    (0.096)    
4th 0.054 0.054 -0.052 -0.052 0.023 0.023 0.113* 0.113* 0.131* 0.131* 0.169*** 0.169*** 0.135    0.135    
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.080) (0.080) (0.077) (0.077) (0.068) (0.068) (0.077) (0.077) (0.064) (0.064) (0.105)    (0.105)    
Community/Locality Level: Population (Base: Less than 2,500)           
Between 2,500 and 15,000 -0.262** 0.187** 0.082 0.082 0.123 0.123 -0.018 -0.018 0.161* 0.161* 0.093 0.093 0.157    0.157    
 (0.133) (0.077) (0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) (0.071) (0.071) (0.083) (0.083) (0.066) (0.066) (0.110)    (0.110)    
Between 15,000 and 100,000 0.047 0.047 -0.045 -0.045 0.048 0.048 0.020 0.020 0.059 0.059 0.119 0.119 0.109    0.109    
 (0.077) (0.077) (0.091) (0.091) (0.085) (0.085) (0.076) (0.076) (0.086) (0.086) (0.073) (0.073) (0.113)    (0.113)    
More than 100,000 0.051 0.051 -0.007 -0.007 -0.150* 0.203*** -0.041 -0.041 -0.041 0.297*** 0.281*** 0.281*** -0.130    0.238*** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.063) (0.063) (0.081) (0.069) (0.054) (0.054) (0.092) (0.064) (0.050) (0.050) (0.127)    (0.091)    
Constant 0.844*** -0.723*** 5.226*** -1.285*** 3.556*** -1.259*** -0.037 -2.866*** 1.144*** -1.681*** -0.882*** -2.397*** 1.627*** -2.170*** 
 (0.252) (0.164) (0.311) (0.216) (0.279) (0.200) (0.170) (0.268) (0.209) (0.184) (0.187) (0.167) (0.309)    (0.265)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.027 0.122 0.077 0.030 0.031 0.054 0.031    
Wald Chi-Square 356.464 1860.333 1569.761 469.628 389.865 955.704 238.725    
N. of cases 9476 9301 9355 9446 7116 9445 7726    
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012.  Dependent variable: women’s perception of their own power as an ordered measure (“0”, “1” or “2”). The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance 
(***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. The estimation also includes time and region dummies as well as their interaction terms. 
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Results show that the relationship between women’s education and decision-making 
power is rather heterogeneous across levels of power. In the case of decisions regarding 
children wellbeing, for instance, one additional year of education is only positively 
associated with power in column (1), meaning that having more years of education is 
associated with an increase in the likelihood of passing from no role in decisions about 
children to a shared role in these decisions. However, further education is not positively 
correlated with the likelihood of passing from shared power to exclusive decision-
making. Arguably, educated women realise that exclusive decision-making in these 
areas is not optimal. Moreover, education could allow women to share power regarding 
large expenditures, cash transfers to her relatives, whether she should work and 
contraceptive use. In the case of cash transfers and her work status, education is 
positively associated with the likelihood of passing from no control to shared control, 
and from shared control to exclusive control, albeit the magnitude of the second 
correlation is half as large as the first one. Considering that exclusive decision-making 
power is the optimal outcome for the decision of whether she should work33, it is clear 
that education is positively associated a result that is highly desirable. The correlation 
between the woman’s working status and her level of power, on the other hand, seems 
to be fairly homogenous across different levels of power. However, the magnitude of the 
relationship is significantly different for some decisions. In the case of large 
expenditures, cash transfers for her relatives and her work status, the positive 
coefficient associated with having a job is higher in column (1). This result implies that 
even though working is positively associated with the probability of being exclusive 
decision-maker in these matters, this relationship is even stronger regarding women’s 
likelihood to share power. Similarly, the couple’s difference in education has a 
significant positive association with decision-making power regarding children’s 
wellbeing, large expenditures and contraceptive use. In the specific case of children-
related decisions, women who are more educated than their partners are significantly 
more likely to be exclusive decision-makers, as opposed to sharing power. Even though 
having both parents sharing power regarding children’s decisions is theoretically the 
most desirable outcome, leaving these matters in the hands of the most educated parent 
could also be an optimal choice if education provides individuals with knowledge and 
ability that might help them make better decisions.  
                                                          
33 Since cash transfers to her relatives do not necessarily involve changes to the woman’s lifestyle as her work 
status does, and given the fact that this decision is likely to affect other members of the household in a direct 
way, the question of whether cash transfer to her relatives should also be a matter of exclusive power is subject 
to discussion. 
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3.6.3 Fixed Effects Ordered Logit Model (‘Blow-Up and Cluster’ estimation) 
Table 3.4 shows the results of using the ‘Blow-Up and Cluster’ methodology developed 
by Baetschmann, Staub and Winkelmann (2015). Each coefficient presented in Table 
3.4 measures how much the level of decision-making power of a woman changes when 
a given explanatory variable is modified by one unit, holding constant all other aspects 
of the individual that are fixed over time and might be having an effect on her decision-
making power. 
Table 3.4: Fixed Effects Ordered Logit estimates (BUC) 
  
Daily Life Children's wellbeing 
Economic decisions Autonomy 
  Food 
Children's 
Education 
Children's 
Health Care  
Large 
Expenditures 
Cash 
Transfers to 
Her 
Relatives 
If She 
Should 
Work 
Contraceptive 
Use 
Individual Level        
Education (years) 0.003 -0.015 -0.024 0.014 -0.034 -0.008 0.105*   
 
(0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.025) (0.030) (0.025) (0.058)    
Work -0.014 0.051 0.115 0.346*** 0.170 0.349*** 0.199    
 
(0.105) (0.111) (0.103) (0.101) (0.123) (0.092) (0.156)    
Age -0.062 -0.141** -0.139** 0.023 -0.015 -0.005 -0.088    
 
(0.051) (0.064) (0.058) (0.054) (0.067) (0.052) (0.094)    
Married 1.113 0.519 0.329 0.692 1.132 0.747 0.808    
 
(0.779) (0.612) (0.613) (0.643) (0.844) (0.679) (0.687)    
Age at marriage 0.015 0.046 0.030 0.005 -0.076 -0.053 0.011    
 
(0.038) (0.045) (0.042) (0.042) (0.048) (0.037) (0.069)    
Previous unions 2.069 14.468*** 14.477*** -12.591*** -11.388*** 0.411 13.834*** 
 
(1.485) (1.332) (0.801) (0.798) (1.499) (1.142) (1.228)    
Number of children -0.257 0.397 0.334 -0.030 0.112 -0.039 -0.298    
 
(0.251) (0.299) (0.206) (0.152) (0.299) (0.164) (0.367)    
Age of children (mean) -0.018 -0.077** -0.060** 0.006 0.005 0.038* -0.035    
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.026) (0.020) (0.027) (0.021) (0.032)    
Proportion of male children 0.058 -0.560* -0.483 -0.080 -0.071 -0.056 -0.706    
 (0.283) (0.340) (0.310) (0.279) (0.349) (0.270) (0.444)    
Couple Level        
Difference in Age 0.027 0.045 0.015 -0.033 0.020 0.023 -0.015    
 
(0.027) (0.036) (0.033) (0.026) (0.035) (0.027) (0.041)    
Difference in Education 0.001 0.020 0.023** 0.009 0.024* 0.013 -0.060    
 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.042)    
Household Level: Quantile of Net Income       
2nd 0.045 0.090 0.008 0.033 -0.038 -0.029 0.134    
 
(0.102) (0.113) (0.107) (0.094) (0.126) (0.088) (0.152)    
3rd 0.103 -0.076 0.012 -0.071 0.150 0.018 -0.081    
 
(0.108) (0.117) (0.113) (0.100) (0.131) (0.092) (0.163)    
4th 0.143 -0.059 0.057 0.091 0.155 -0.008 -0.105    
 
(0.121) (0.130) (0.126) (0.111) (0.147) (0.105) (0.193)    
Community/Locality Level: Population (Base: Less than 2,500)     
Between 2,500 and 15,000 0.337 -0.333 -0.067 -0.266 -0.096 -0.013 0.374    
 
(0.260) (0.303) (0.291) (0.232) (0.323) (0.238) (0.347)    
Between 15,000 and 100,000 0.096 -0.296 -0.335 0.259 -0.219 -0.161 0.458    
 
(0.321) (0.392) (0.349) (0.296) (0.389) (0.287) (0.445)    
More than 100,000 -0.242 0.970*** 0.785*** 0.030 -0.015 -0.242 0.429    
 
(0.258) (0.298) (0.288) (0.235) (0.391) (0.229) (0.404)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.017 0.057 0.032 0.018 0.052 0.058 0.021    
Wald Chi-Square 970.134 1194.770 924.282 370.344 270.147 1167.467 621.583    
N. of cases 4562 3694 4146 5157 3388 7194 1709    
N. of groups/clusters 1528 1280 1427 1744 1214 2089 649 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. Dependent variable: women’s perception of their own power as an ordered measure (“0”, “1” or 
“2”). The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in 
parenthesis (since the analysis should recognise the fact that observations within one household are not independent and they might show 
similar variations over time). The estimation originally includes region, time and their interaction terms, however they were automatically omitted 
for some of the columns, due to lack of within-variation. 
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Since some of the woman’s characteristics are not likely to change over time, it is not 
surprising that for most aspects of decision-making the significance of many 
explanatory variables reduces when the estimation considers only within-individual 
variations. On the other hand, there are some characteristics at the individual, couple, 
and community level that are still significant under a fixed effect specification. 
Education, for instance, seems to have a significant positive association with power 
regarding contraceptive use, meaning that when women increase their level of education 
they become more likely to have a say in this matter. Similarly, when a woman gets a 
job (i.e., her work status variable changes from ‘0’ to ‘1’), her odds of participation in 
decision-making regarding large expenditures significantly increases by a factor of 1.4 
(𝑒0.346 = 1.4). Results also suggest that women who got a job in the period of analysis 
also reported an increase in her level of decision-making power regarding her work 
status. Also, acquiring an additional year of education in comparison with their partner 
makes women significantly more powerful on decisions regarding children’s health care 
and cash transfers to her relatives.  
 
Results do not change much when the alternative Das and Van Soest two-step estimator 
is used (see Appendix D, Section II, Table DII-3.4), however not all the regressions can 
be estimated (lack of convergence) in this case mostly due to the small degree of variation 
in some aspects of decision-making. Just as in the previous estimations, results suggest 
a positive relationship between marriage and women’s decision-making power for food-
related choices and cash transfers, these correlations being statistically significant this 
time. Also, the negative relationship between age at marriage and power found before 
now seems to become significant. Similarly, the negative association between having 
previous unions and power regarding large expenditures, cash transfers and whether 
she should work is still large in size and significant at 1 per cent, just as in the previous 
estimations.  
 
 
3.6.4 Non-linear Effects of Education and the Impact of Diverging from the 
Community Average. 
 
In the previous analyses, the relationship between the woman’s characteristics and her 
level of power is assumed to be constant across the distributions of the explanatory 
variables. So, for example, results from Table 3.2a imply that education has always a 
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positive correlation with women’s power regarding large expenditures, independently of 
the specific level of education of the woman. However, there are at least two reasons 
why this statement might not be completely accurate. First of all, it is possible that the 
association between education and decision-making power is significantly smaller for 
highly-educated women. Secondly, the analysis should consider the effect of diverging 
from social standards, in the sense that having more education than the average in the 
community might actually be negatively associated with power. As suggested by 
Mabsout and Van Staveren (2009), highly-educated women might face social pressures 
that make them give up some of their power at home, since they may perceive 
themselves as deviations from social norms, some of which are likely to be community-
specific. In this section, the estimation allows for quadratic effects on the relationship 
between education and power and studies the association between women’s divergence 
from community averages and their level of power34. For each aspect of decision-making, 
the analysis considers three different forms of divergence: simple difference, difference 
by age (with respect to women of exactly the same age), and difference by age group 
(with respect of women in the same age group35).  Table 3.5 shows the estimated 
coefficients for the quadratic and divergence terms on a partial proportional odds model. 
Section (I) shows the regression coefficients associated with the explanatory variables 
for those women transitioning from having no power at all (level “0”) to at least sharing 
power (level “1” or “2”), whilst section (II) contains the regression coefficients associated 
with the transition from having none or limited  power (level “0” or “1”) to becoming an 
exclusive decision-maker (level “2”).  
 
Results for the quadratic term on education suggest that, for most aspects of decision 
making, the positive correlation that each additional year of education has with 
decision-making power decreases as the woman becomes more educated. However, for 
decisions regarding work status and large expenditures this relationship seems to have 
an explosive behaviour as more educated women tend to benefit more (in terms of 
additional power) from increases in education, a result that is particularly significant 
for women transitioning from having no decision-making power at all to sharing or 
having full power (section I).  
                                                          
34 For each explanatory variable the divergence terms are calculated as: xi − x̅, where xi is the woman’s years of education and x̅ 
is the community average for women’s education in a given community/locality. 
35 The age groups were built in sets of 5 years, starting from 20 years old and until 80. The lower and upper tails of the age 
distribution were classified as ‘19 years or less’ and ‘80 years or more’, respectively. 
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Having a higher educational level than the average in the community is negatively 
associated with power on most aspects of decision-making. For food-related decisions, 
every additional year of education that the woman has above the community average is 
associated with a lower probability of being exclusive decision-maker (section II) and at 
least sharing power (section I), though the effect is slightly stronger for the latter. A 
similar effect is observed for decisions regarding children’s health, for which diverging 
from the community’s average for women in the same age group is negatively associated 
with all levels of power. In the case of large expenditures, the divergence effect is only 
significant in the transition from having no power at all to at least sharing power with 
other family members, meaning that having more education than the community 
average is negatively associated with the probability of sharing power and positively 
associated with the likelihood of having no power at all. Having a higher level of 
education than the community average is also negatively associated with power 
regarding cash transfers to her relatives, for all levels of power, and a decreased 
likelihood of participating in decisions regarding contraceptive use. These results 
suggest that even though education is generally positively correlated with decision-
making power, this relationship is significantly stronger for women who live in 
communities where the average level of education is similar to their own.
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Table 3.5: Quadratic and divergence effects of education: Partial Proportional Odds Model (controlling for the husband's divergence from his community average) 
      (I) (II)       
      
Educ   Educ2 
Simple 
Difference 
Diff. by 
Age 
Diff. by 
Age 
Group 
Educ   Educ2 
Simple 
Difference 
Diff. by 
Age 
Diff. by 
Age 
Group 
Pseudo 
R-
squared 
Wald 
Chi-
Square 
N. of 
cases 
Daily Life Food 
(1) 0.116*** -0.006***     0.035** -0.002**     0.028 381.415 9476 
(2) 0.134*** -0.006*** 0.016    0.053** -0.002** 0.016    0.029 384.209 9476 
(3) 0.083*** -0.003***  -0.087***   0.046*** -0.003***  -0.021*   0.029 392.022 9476 
(4) 0.152*** -0.006***                                 -0.057**  0.052*** -0.002**                                  -0.013    0.029 396.478 9476 
Children's Wellbeing 
Children's 
Education 
(1) 0.063*** -0.002*       -0.009 -0.002*       0.122 1857.544 9301 
(2) 0.049* -0.002* -0.020    -0.022 -0.002* -0.020    0.122 1863.545 9301 
(3) 0.068*** -0.002*  -0.004   -0.004 -0.002*  -0.004   0.122 1862.833 9301 
(4) 0.067*** -0.002*                                   -0.020    -0.004    -0.002*                                   -0.020    0.122    1868.217    9301    
Children's 
Health 
(1) 0.080*** -0.002*     0.011 -0.002*     0.077 1562.871 9355 
(2) 0.077*** -0.002* -0.043    0.018 -0.002* -0.043    0.076 1549.398 9355 
(3) 0.083*** -0.002*  -0.007   0.014 -0.002*  -0.007   0.077 1569.139 9355 
(4) 0.090*** -0.002*                                   -0.028**  0.021    -0.002*                                   -0.028**  0.077    1572.349    9355    
Economic Decisions 
Large 
Expenditures 
(1) -0.023 0.003***       -0.023 0.001       0.031 472.477 9446 
(2) 0.034* 0.003*** -0.087***    -0.055* 0.003*** -0.020    0.032 488.304 9446 
(3) -0.020 0.003***  -0.010   -0.020 0.001  -0.010   0.031 473.861 9446 
(4) -0.017    0.003***                                 -0.020*   -0.017    -0.000                                    -0.020*   0.032 484.037 9446 
Cash 
Transfers 
(1) 0.077*** 0.000     0.029 0.000     0.031 389.671 7116 
(2) 0.111*** 0.000 -0.091***    0.063*** 0.000 -0.091***    0.031 395.239 7116 
(3) 0.078*** 0.000  -0.009   0.030 0.000  -0.009   0.031 390.295 7116 
(4) 0.084*** 0.000                                    -0.022*   0.036*   0.000                                    -0.022*   0.031    393.945    7116    
Autonomy 
Work 
(1) 0.024 0.005***       0.024 0.001       0.055 929.317 9445 
(2) 0.036* 0.005*** 0.007    0.036* 0.001 0.007    0.055 933.488 9445 
(3) 0.024 0.005***  0.003   0.024 0.001  0.003   0.055 929.218 9445 
(4) 0.032*   0.005***                                 -0.015    0.032*   0.001*                                   -0.015    0.055    930.707    9445    
Contraceptive 
use 
(1) 0.154*** -0.002     0.048* -0.002     0.031 246.223 7726 
(2) 0.183*** -0.002 -0.086**    0.077** -0.002 -0.086**    0.032 251.546 7726 
(3) 0.176*** -0.002  -0.067**   0.046* -0.002  0.006   0.032 259.382 7726 
(4) 0.211*** -0.002                                    -0.092*** 0.059*   -0.002                                    -0.020    0.033    262.956    7726    
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors in parenthesis. All estimations include the baseline set of control 
variables shown in Tables 2a and 2b. The estimations have also controlled for the husband’s differences from his own community averages, however the coefficients associated with such variables were generally not statistically significant.
90 
 
 
3.7. A brief note on power perception misalignment  
 
Even though the main objective of this paper is to analyse women’s decision-making 
power and its relationship with their level of education and employment status, an 
interesting question is to ask what factors make women and men report different 
values for the same variable: women’s decision-making power. Table 3.6 shows the 
results of using an ordered logit model to study the couple’s misalignment in power 
perception. The dependent variable in this case is the absolute value of the difference 
between women’s self-reported level of power and her partner’s report on her level of 
power for the 7 aspects of decision-making studied before. Since each individuals’ 
report of the woman’s power can take the values from “0” to “2”, the absolute value of 
the difference in power perception between a woman and her partner can rank between 
“0” (if both the woman and the partner reported the same level of power for the woman), 
“1” or “2”, depending on how different are their answers in terms of level of power. 
The estimated coefficients in Table 3.6 show a significant level of heterogeneity in the 
association between the woman’s education and employment status and the 
misalignment in the couple’s perception of power. Women’s education seems to be 
negatively correlated with misalignment in power perception regarding decision’s on 
children’s wellbeing, large expenditures and contraceptive use, which seems to suggest 
that households where women are more educated tend to have a more homogenous 
perception of power between women and their partners regarding those aspects of 
decision-making. However, women’s education is also positively correlated with the 
couple’s misalignment in power perception on decisions about cash transfers and 
whether she can work. Similarly, couples in which the woman is employed tend to 
have a higher level of disagreement regarding her level of power on food choices and 
her decision to work; however, women’s employment is negatively correlated with the 
couple’s misalignment on power perception regarding large expenditures.  
Interestingly, married couples (as opposed to couples who live in free union) do seem 
to have a significantly lower level of disagreement in the woman’s level of power 
regarding most aspects of decision-making. Marriage might be a proxy for a couple’s 
stability, which in turn might influence their level of alignment in power perception. 
Finally, couples in which the woman has at least one previous union tend to have a 
higher level of disagreement in their perception of the woman’s power. 
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The difference in the couple’s age and level of education also seem to have a significant 
association with their misalignment in their perceptions of the woman’s power in some 
aspects of family life. Couples in which the woman is older than the man tend to have 
a lower level of disagreement in their answers regarding children’s education, cash 
transfers and contraceptive use. Conversely, couples in which the woman has a higher 
level of education than her partner tend to have a higher level of misalignment in their 
answers regarding children’s education. 
Table 3.6 . Misalignment in power perception between women and their partners in absolute values (ordered logit estimates). 
  Daily Life Children's wellbeing Economic decisions Autonomy 
  Food 
Children's 
Education 
Children's 
Health 
Care  
Large 
Expenditures 
Cash 
Transfers 
to Her 
Relatives 
If She 
Should 
Work 
Contraceptive 
Use 
Individual Level        
Education (years) -0.011 -0.034*** -0.022*** -0.019*** 0.019** 0.038*** -0.041*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011)    
Work 0.132*** 0.009 -0.081 -0.242*** 0.025 0.293*** 0.037    
 (0.051) (0.060) (0.057) (0.053) (0.060) (0.047) (0.075)    
Age -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.012* 0.019*** -0.017*   
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)    
Married -0.102* -0.141** -0.167** -0.048 -0.226*** -0.097* -0.313*** 
 (0.061) (0.070) (0.065) (0.061) (0.071) (0.056) (0.082)    
Age at marriage 0.002 0.005 -0.001 -0.020*** -0.009 -0.004 0.013    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.009)    
Previous unions 0.008 0.253** 0.126 0.188** 0.184 0.221** 0.000    
 (0.096) (0.112) (0.107) (0.096) (0.124) (0.090) (0.136)    
Indigenous group 0.026 -0.031 0.120 -0.086 -0.040 -0.044 0.161    
 (0.071) (0.081) (0.075) (0.070) (0.087) (0.067) (0.098)    
Number of children -0.016 -0.008 -0.004 -0.003 0.014 -0.012 0.022    
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.024)    
Age of children (mean) -0.007 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.014    
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)    
Proportion of male children  -0.114* -0.081 -0.107 -0.107* -0.111 -0.060 -0.116    
 (0.062) (0.072) (0.067) (0.061) (0.072) (0.057) (0.086)    
Couple Level        
Difference in Age -0.002 -0.012** -0.001 -0.001 -0.009* -0.003 -0.011*   
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)    
Difference in Education 0.008 0.029*** 0.009 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.008    
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010)    
Household Level: Quantile of Net Income     
2nd -0.017 0.069 -0.028 -0.059 -0.005 0.039 -0.109    
 (0.064) (0.072) (0.069) (0.063) (0.074) (0.059) (0.090)    
3rd -0.094 -0.010 -0.005 -0.040 0.184** 0.136** -0.079    
 (0.064) (0.073) (0.069) (0.063) (0.073) (0.060) (0.088)    
4th -0.033 0.057 -0.013 -0.014 0.242*** 0.202*** -0.034    
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.074) (0.068) (0.078) (0.064) (0.097)    
Community/Locality Level: Population (Base: Less than 2,500)   
Between 2,500 and 15,000 -0.033 0.020 0.084 0.182*** 0.261*** 0.081 0.033    
 (0.070) (0.081) (0.078) (0.069) (0.084) (0.063) (0.102)    
Between 15,000 and 100,000 -0.099 0.025 0.089 0.032 0.145* 0.079 -0.010    
 (0.077) (0.092) (0.081) (0.077) (0.088) (0.070) (0.111)    
More than 100,000 -0.147*** 0.009 0.163*** 0.087 0.217*** 0.255*** 0.185**  
 (0.055) (0.062) (0.058) (0.055) (0.062) (0.049) (0.076)    
Region (Base: North)        
Center-North 0.016 0.040 0.023 0.062 0.404*** 0.147* 0.075    
 (0.094) (0.109) (0.102) (0.098) (0.103) (0.086) (0.128)    
Center 0.130 0.192* -0.147 0.197* 0.570*** 0.293*** -0.016    
 (0.099) (0.114) (0.110) (0.104) (0.113) (0.091) (0.135)    
South -0.089 -0.066 -0.222* 0.028 0.194 0.338*** -0.293*   
 (0.106) (0.124) (0.117) (0.108) (0.120) (0.094) (0.154)    
Year (Base: 2002)        
2005 -0.360*** -0.353*** -0.321*** -0.250** 0.312** 0.136 -1.001*** 
 (0.113) (0.125) (0.117) (0.108) (0.125) (0.097) (0.180)    
2009 -0.042 0.130 0.146 0.251** 0.878*** 0.779*** 0.174    
 (0.108) (0.123) (0.115) (0.112) (0.132) (0.099) (0.149)    
τ1 -0.059 1.156*** 0.655*** 0.023 0.823*** 0.826*** 0.534**  
 (0.166) (0.201) (0.185) (0.173) (0.192) (0.155) (0.248)    
τ2 1.931*** 3.853*** 3.208*** 2.559*** 2.444*** 2.324*** 3.395*** 
 (0.169) (0.209) (0.189) (0.179) (0.195) (0.156) (0.267)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.008 0.026 0.015 0.009 0.016 0.028 0.027    
Wald Chi-Square 124.637 289.023 192.481 136.327 186.798 535.764 184.236    
N. of cases 9339 9047 9144 9287 5946 9279 6979    
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. Dependent variable: Misalignment in power percetion measured as the absolute value of the difference between 
woman's perception of her own power and her partner's perception of her power. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. The estimation also includes interaction terms between region and year. 
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Even when the analysis above does provide some interesting insights, it does not seem 
to suggest a general effect in terms of the association between the woman’s education 
and employment and the level of divergence in the couple’s responses, as the 
correlations in question differ greatly across aspects of decision-making. However, 
factors such as marriage, previous unions and age difference do seem to have 
associations that are fairly homogenous across decisions.  
 
3.8. Conclusions 
 
This chapter studies women’s intrahousehold decision-making power and its 
relationship with education and employment, using an ordered logit approach that 
considers the existence of three different levels of power regarding seven different 
aspects of decision-making. Generalised ordered logit models are used in order to allow 
the regression coefficients to vary across different levels of power. Also, the analysis 
makes use of fixed effects estimations to partial out the effect of unobservable time-
invariant factors which could be affecting women’s power as well as her socioeconomic 
characteristics. Finally, the study allows for the presence of quadratic effects in the 
relationship between education and power and analyses the association between 
women’s divergence from community averages in years of education and their level of 
power.  
Results suggest a significant level of heterogeneity on the nature of the relationship 
between women’s power and factors such as their education and employment status 
across different levels of power. Regarding decisions on children’s wellbeing and large 
expenditures, for instance, education seems to be positively correlated with the 
probability of passing from non-participation to shared decision-making, though it 
negatively associated with the likelihood of exclusive decision-making. Although the 
correlation between power and employment seems to be more homogeneously positive 
across levels of power, its magnitude varies significantly. Once all time-invariant 
individual-specific factors are taken out from the analysis using a fixed effects model, 
the study finds that life events such as getting a job and acquiring a higher level of 
education than the partner have significant positive effects on women’s power. Finally, 
results suggest the presence of a significant negative quadratic effect on the 
relationship between education and power, for most aspects of decision-making. Also, 
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having a higher level of education than the average woman in the community is 
generally associated with a lower level of power, this effect being particularly strong at 
increasing women’s likelihood of not participating in the decision-making process.  
An important implication of this study is that each dimension of women’s power in the 
domestic sphere should be studied separately. Since each aspect of household 
decision-making might be influenced by the woman’s characteristics in a different way, 
pooling all decisions into one single index is not likely to provide enough information 
on the nature of the bargaining process taking place for each of them. Secondly, since 
the association between women’s power and factors such as education and 
employment is not homogenous across different levels of power and given that not all 
of them are equally desirable for every aspect of decision-making, carrying out a simple 
ordered logit analysis might lead to inaccurate conclusions.  
Finally, it is also important to recognise the restricting impact of social norms, which 
can undermine the typically positive association between women’s decision-making 
power and factors such as education. In this context, highly-educated women might 
benefit the most from the positive effect of education when living in localities where 
other women are also highly-educated, so they do not perceive themselves as 
deviations from a social standard. 
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Chapter 4 
The Role of Cognitive Ability on Children’s Participation and 
Time Allocation between Work, Schooling and Housework. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses panel data from the Mexican Family Life Survey using fixed effects and 
instrumental variables methodologies in order to study the relationship between children’s 
cognitive ability and time allocation among three activities: work, school and housework. Overall, 
results suggest that cognitive ability does not have a significant correlation with children’s 
participation or time allocated to work; however, it does seem to have a strong relationship with 
school enrolment, number of hours spent at school and participation in housework. 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
The way children spend their time has important implications for their wellbeing in 
both the short and long run. Time spent on educational activities is associated with 
the development of cognitive skills (Fiorini & Keane, 2014), whilst leisure time and 
recreational activities have beneficial effects on psychological wellbeing, social 
behaviour, physical health and intellectual achievement (Hertting & Kostenius, 2012; 
Whitebread, Basilio, Kuvalja, & Verma, 2012; McKay, 2012). Conversely, time spent in 
paid labour and housework has been shown to have negative effects on academic 
performance and other schooling outcomes (Ligeve & Poipoi, 2012; Buonomo Zabaleta, 
2011; Assaad, Levison, & Zibani, 2010), which in turn has adverse consequences in 
terms of future income and employment.  
The study of children’s time allocation on child labour, school attendance and 
housework has mainly focused on the socioeconomic determinants that make children 
more likely to perform any of these activities. Factors such as poverty and less 
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educated parents are positively associated with child labour and tend to reduce school 
attendance. However, little attention has been given to the intrahousehold decision-
making process regarding the amount of time that each child dedicates to each activity, 
given their cognitive or health endowments. The question of parental selection has 
been mostly studied from a socioeconomic perspective, measuring how parents assign 
different amount of school expenditures and other monetary investments to children 
based on their endowments. In some households, especially the very poor, the mere 
decision of sending children to work or to school might be a good indicator of parental 
willingness to invest in their children’s future income potential.  
This chapter analyses panel data from the Mexican Family Life Survey using fixed 
effects and instrumental variables methodologies in order to study the relationship 
between children’s cognitive ability and time allocation among three activities: work, 
school and housework, where work is understood as any activity inside or outside the 
household for which the child gets a payment that contributes to household 
expenditures, and housework refers to domestic chores and other unpaid activities 
done in the house (such as washing clothes or doing the dishes). Overall, results 
suggest that cognitive ability does not seem to have a significant correlation with 
children’s participation or time allocated to work; however, it does seem to have a 
strong relationship with school enrolment, number of hours spent at school and 
participation in housework, some of these effects being significantly different for boys 
and girls.  
The next section presents a general literature review on the economic and 
sociodemographic determinants of children’s time allocation between school and work. 
Then, section 4.3 discusses the role of cognition on children’s time allocation patterns. 
Section 4.4 describes the data used in the study, methodology is briefly explained in 
section 4.5, and results are discussed in section 4.6. Finally, section 4.7 presents the 
conclusions. 
 
 
4.2  Parental Allocation of Children’s Time:  School vs Work  
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The amount of time children dedicate to different activities such as work, school or 
domestic chores is determined by the child’s characteristics at the individual, 
household and even community level. The decision of whether to send a child to school 
or to work usually involves a cost-benefit analysis that compares the extent to which 
school contributes to the child’s present value of future income with the costs of 
schooling in the present, which can be either direct such as fees and uniforms, or 
indirect such as the salary the family loses when they decide not to send the child to 
work (Webbink, Smits, & de Jong, 2012). As pointed out by Orazem and Gunnarsson 
(2003), most of the variables determining whether a child goes to school or to work can 
be summed up in the following categories: the characteristics and strength of the child 
labour market, past accumulations of human capital, school quality, and the 
household’s socioeconomic status, size and composition. Each of these factors can be 
decomposed into specific variables at the individual, household, and community level. 
A major factor in the parental decision to send children to work is the market wage for 
child labour. Given that information on wages for this particular market is not always 
available researchers usually pay attention to factors determining the earning potential 
of children, such as age and gender. Most studies on children’s time allocation find 
strong and significant relationships between the child’s age and gender and their 
participation in work. For instance, as children reach adolescence they become more 
employable and their potential wage rises, making them more likely to work, in 
comparison with small children (Guarcello, Manacorda, Lyon, & Rosati, 2010). 
Similarly, girls have been found to be more likely to be involved in housework relative 
to boys (Ilahi, 2001; Bonke, 2010), a result that is likely to be driven by the gendered 
division of labour in adulthood and the difference in expected future labour income 
between boys and girls (Raley & Bianchi, 2006). The child’s current human capital 
accumulation might also be an important factor determining whether a child goes to 
school or works (Orazem & Gunnarsson, 2003). When a child has already been in 
school for some time, their potential future earnings derived from education are higher 
with respect to children who do not have such human capital accumulations, making 
them more likely to stay in school and less likely to be involved in labour or housework. 
In other words, when the parents have already invested in their children’s education, 
keeping them at school seems a more profitable strategy. Other factors such as birth 
order and number of brothers and sisters in the household also affect the way parents 
allocate children’s time. For instance, younger children tend to have better 
opportunities than firstborns and older siblings in terms of the division of work, since 
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they grow up when most tasks and responsibilities have already been assigned to other 
family members (Edmonds, 2005). On the other hand, girls with brothers are more 
likely to participate in housework and have poorer educational attainment (Morduch, 
2000; Conley, 2000). This result is compatible with the notion that families with male 
children tend to be more traditional towards gender roles and consequently have a 
greater degree of gender specialisation in the allocation of children’s time (Raley & 
Bianchi, 2006). However, the effect of the total number of siblings is not clear since it 
can be either positive or negative in terms of the workload assigned to children 
(Webbink, Smits, & de Jong, 2012). On the one hand, having more brothers and sisters 
living in the household means more work to be done and a greater competition for 
resources which might make each child less likely to go to school and more likely to 
work. However, the presence of more family members could also enable an efficient 
division of labour that lowers the workload of each individual. 
The household’s socioeconomic characteristics have also been found to affect the way 
children’s time is allocated. Income, for instance, increases the productivity of school 
(Orazem & Gunnarsson, 2003), making every investment in child’s education more 
profitable. In theory, an increase in parental income should also reduce child labour, 
since there is less pressure for resources in the household so children do not need to 
work. However, child work also brings home additional resources, hence the 
correlation between child labour and income might not be monotonic. Parental 
education also affects the decision to send children to work or school, since educated 
parents are more likely to have experienced and appreciate the benefits of investments 
in education, and consequently more likely to more likely to send children to school 
instead of work (Webbink, Smits, & de Jong, 2012; Rammohan, 2014). 
At the community level, an important determinant of children’s time allocation is the 
quality of schools. Higher school quality usually means a higher potential future 
income for every hour spent at school, making the choice of sending children to school 
more profitable (Orazem & Gunnarsson, 2003; Rosati & Rossi, Impact of School 
Quality on Child Labor and School Attendance: The Case of the CONAFE 
Compensatory Education Program in Mexico, 2007). Similarly, proximity to school is 
likely to have a positive effect on school attendance, though it does not necessarily 
reduces child labour (Kondylis & Manacorda, 2012). 
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4.2.1 Methodological Approaches to the Study of Children’s Time Allocation 
 
One of the first works on children’s time allocation is the study by Bianchi and 
Robinson (1997), who use time-diary data from California to examine the amount of 
time children spend reading (or being read to), watching TV, studying and doing 
housework. The authors use a series of unrelated Tobit equations to measure the effect 
of factors such as the child’s characteristics, parental education, family income, family 
composition, maternal labour force status, number of children and birth order. A 
similar methodological approach can be found in Hofferth and Sandberg (2001), where 
the authors consider additional activities such as day care, play, going to church, doing 
sports, among others. 
A different branch of the literature has focused on the specific decision regarding 
sending children to work or to school. A simple approach would consist of using single 
equations to separately analyse the factors that make children more likely to work or 
to study, however one should be aware that these decisions are usually made jointly. 
For this reason, some authors have chosen to use bivariate probit models that jointly 
analyse the decision about child labour and school attendance. While some studies 
limit their analysis to this particular question (Kamga, 2010), others go further and 
also investigate the determinants of the amount of time children dedicate to work and 
school, using a multivariate Tobit model (Koissy-Kpein, 2013). Rosati and Rossi (2001) 
analyse the joint decision of working and studying using a simultaneous equations 
that combine a Tobit and a probit model considering four different scenarios: working 
hours greater than zero and enrolled, working hours equal to zero and enrolled, 
working hours greater than zero and not enrolled, and working hours equal to zero 
and not enrolled. Similarly, Burki and Fasih (1998) use multinomial logit equations to 
model the probability for four possible scenarios for children’s time allocation in 
Pakistan: being full-time student, part-time work and school, full-time work and 
neither work or school. Other studies make a distinction between labour and 
housework, such as Bonsang and Faye (2005) where a multinomial logit model is 
employed to study children’s time allocation regarding school attendance, work, and 
housework. An additional question addressed in the literature has to do with selection 
issues that may arise in the study of children’s time allocation. Ahmed (2011), for 
instance, uses a Heckman two-step sample selection model to account for the fact that 
103 
 
 
children who spend a positive amount of hours at work might have unobserved 
characteristics that make them different than children who do not participate at all.  
A common characteristic for most of previous work on children’s time allocation is the 
use of cross-sectional data, which presents a number of limitations. First, taking into 
account potential endogeneity coming from the effect of unobservable characteristics 
at the household or individual level becomes more challenging, and often requires the 
use of instrumental variables to introduce a source of exogenous variation. Second, 
working with panel data allows us to focus on intrahousehold variations, which in turn 
makes it easier to study the effect of sibling differences on the way parents allocate 
children’s time. For instance, parents may pay attention on the child’s characteristics 
with respect to the rest of the children, in order to make a decision of whether that 
particular child should go to work or to school. Pörtner (2016) recognises these facts 
and utilises panel data from the Philippines to measure the effect of parental absence 
on the amount of time children allocate to work, school and housework. The author 
compares results from simple-equation and jointly estimated models for time spent on 
work and school using both OLS and fixed effects frameworks, emphasising the 
sensitivity of results to the use of different methodologies and suggesting the 
unsuitability of simple OLS models36.  
This chapter employs fixed effects and instrumental variables methodologies in order 
to measure the relationship between children’s cognitive ability and their time 
allocation patterns, including both their participation and number of hours spent on 
three activities: work, school and housework. Since the main objective is not to study 
children’s time allocation among all possible activities, but to disentangle the specific 
causality between ability and time allocation on work, school and housework, the 
variables associated with children’s participation and number of hours spent on each 
activity are treated as a separate dependent variable in order to focus on solving the 
problem of reverse causality, which, unlike the issue of interdependence between the 
activities, is likely to cause bias in the results.  
 
                                                          
36 Since all children in the sample used by Pörtner were involved in at least one of the three activities considered in the 
analysis, the usage of Tobit equations is not needed. 
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4.3  The Role of Children’s Ability on Parental Choices 
 
Most of the literature on the effect of children’s ability endowments on parental choices 
has mainly focused on the allocation of resources in terms of investments on human 
capital, usually measured by expenditures on education. The idea of parents making 
human capital investments in children with different levels of ability was first 
introduced by Becker and Tomes (1976), who develop a model that helps to determine 
whether parents compensate or reinforce ability differences on children. The model 
predicts that if the cost of the investment is negatively correlated with the child’s 
endowment less able children will receive a smaller investment, resulting in the 
parents reinforcing initial differentials in children’s ability. However, this approach 
does not consider the role of parental preferences on the allocation of resources among 
children.  According to Behrman, Pollack and Taubman (1982), parental aversion to 
inequality in their children’s future earnings play an important role in the allocation 
of resources and can even reverse the predictions of the investment model presented 
by Becker and Tomes.  
Empirical evidence supports the notion of parents selectively making investments on 
their children according to their endowments. In a study for rural Ethiopia, Ayalew 
(2005) shows that parents follow a compensating approach regarding their children’s 
health endowments, but a reinforcement strategy regarding educational investments. 
Similarly, for the case of Burkina Faso, Akresh et al. (2012) find that children with 
high ability test scores are more likely to be enrolled in school, a result that is robust 
to the consideration of reverse causality issues and household fixed effects. Using data 
from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY-C), Frijters et al. (2013) 
also find a positive relationship between cognitive ability and parental investment. 
Likewise, Majid (2012) analyses parental decisions for the Mexican case using family 
fixed effects models and finds ability reinforcing patterns in terms of schooling 
expenditures, especially for boys.  
Most of the literature available on this topic has measured parental investment in 
terms of schooling expenditures or indexes that intend to capture the effort parents 
make in providing children with cognitive stimulation, mainly measured by physical 
resources, parental time investments and procurement of additional tutelage (Frijters, 
Johnston, Shah, & Shields, 2013). However, this approach does not allow us to explore 
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more basic dimensions of parental investment, such as the way children’s time is 
allocated. In very poor households where income constrains make education a 
relatively expensive investment, a good measure of how much parents are willing to 
invest in their children is not how much money they spend or whether they provide 
them with private lessons, but the mere fact of sending them to school. For a family 
with limited resources, each hour that each child spends at school (instead of work) 
represents a major cost and can be perceived as a measure of parental investment. 
Moreover, analysing time allocation instead of monetary measures of investment allows 
us to study the role of children’s cognitive ability on the parental choice regarding child 
work. 
The relationship between cognitive ability and the way parents allocate children’s time 
has not been studied in depth. The closest effort to exploring this question is the study 
by Sequeira (2013), where the author uses data from the project Young Lives to study 
the association between child work and cognitive ability for the Peruvian case. Her 
results show a negative relationship between ability and child labour, though its 
significance quickly disappears when poverty is added as an additional explanatory 
variable, suggesting that such a relationship is mainly driven by the negative 
association between poverty and ability. However, this study works mainly with cross-
sectional variations and does not explore the possibility that parents decide on a 
particular child based not only on the ability of that child but also the one of the rest 
of the siblings. Moreover, it does not consider the possible presence of reverse causality 
between children’s ability and time allocation, which is likely due to the effects of 
school attendance and work on their still-developing cognitive capacity. 
The basic assumption behind the parental selection approach relies in the fact that 
parents observe their children’s ability and make decisions based on this information. 
Becker and Tomes’ model, for instance, suggests that if the parents follow a 
reinforcement strategy, more able children will be allocated a higher amount of time at 
school rather than doing housework or working. Even though the parents might be 
aware of children’s ability relative to other children of the same age, this might not 
necessarily be the only information they take into account when deciding which child 
should go to school and which one to work. If children of the same family are perceived 
as assets on a single portfolio, which is taken as given, parents will allocate resources 
(in this case time) in an efficient manner considering the differences between the 
siblings’ endowments. This study seeks to measure the relationship between child’s 
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time allocation and cognitive ability for any given household, studying intra-family 
variations in ability and how these affect parents’ decisions. In addition, the analysis 
considers the possible presence of reverse causality between children’s ability and time 
allocation, since the time children spend at school or work might be having a 
significant effect on their cognitive development, which in turn makes them more or 
less likely to attend school or work. In this case, the use of regular OLS methodologies 
might result in the production of biased estimates for the relationship between ability 
and time allocation, which could lead to erroneous conclusions.   
 
4.4  Data 
 
The quantitative analysis uses data from the Mexican Family Life Survey, a publicly 
available longitudinal dataset which contains a broad variety of socioeconomic and 
demographic information for a large sample of Mexican households and individuals. 
Among other variables, the survey contains information on the labour status, 
schooling, time allocation and cognitive ability for all family members younger than 15 
years old. Schooling in the form of basic education is compulsory for children aged 15 
or younger (studying primary and middle school, equivalent to grades 1st to 9th), and 
although compulsory attendance laws are unclear, most children who receive 
education actually attend school. Even though there is no clear regulation against 
home schooling, this is not a common practice37.   
 
In order to study children’s participation in work, school and housework, the analysis 
considers the survey’s information regarding the following questions: a) Has the child 
worked in the last 12 months? b) Is the child attending school in the current academic 
year38, and c) Did the child participate on housework in the last seven days? The 
answers to each of these questions are then converted into dummy variables that take 
the value of ‘1’ if the child participated in the activity and ‘0’ otherwise.  In order to 
study the amount of time children dedicate to each activity, the study will focus on the 
following questions: a) Hours a week spent at school, b) Hours a week spent at work 
and c) Hours a week spent doing housework.  
                                                          
37 According to the Home School Legal Defense Association (HSLDA), in 2016 only 5000 families were registered for home 
schooling in Mexico. Please visit: https://hslda.org/content/hs/international/Mexico/default.asp 
38 This question refers to the child’s enrolment in that particular academic year, not necessarily to the child’s attendance. 
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The main explanatory variable of interest is the child’s cognitive ability, which is 
measured by the results of a Raven test consisting of 18 progressive matrices. The 
scores from this test were measured in a scale from 0 to 100, then standardised by 
age. The z-scores were calculated by subtracting the value of the IQ test result minus 
the average score obtained by children of the same age, divided by the standard 
deviation of the IQ scores in that subsample39. Working with a z-score rather than the 
level of the test result allows us to analyse how much the probability of participation 
(or the time spent) on each activity is associated with differences in cognition with 
respect to other children of the same age. The analysis also considers other 
demographic and socioeconomic variables at the individual and household level, 
including the child’s age and gender, birth order, household income and size, parental 
education, mother’s work status and proportion of male children. Region and time 
fixed effects were also included in the estimations. 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of hours spent at work, school and doing housework, Kernel density. 
 
         
         
                                                          
39 Ideally, an external reference population should be considered in order to calculate the IQ z-scores, so the analysis is able to 
capture variations in children’s cognitive ability that do not alter their position in the sample distribution. Unfortunately, there 
is not any information available on reference populations for non-anthropometric measures. 
Figure 4.1: Participation in work, school and housework, percentage.   
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Figures 4.1 and 4.2 show the distribution of children’s participation and the number 
of hours spent on each activity: work, school and housework. Not surprisingly40, most 
children in the sample have been enrolled in school41 and it’s only a small percentage 
of them that is involved in work outside the home or housework. The number of hours 
allocated to school seems to be distributed normally, while the number of hours spent 
at work and doing housework concentrate mainly around zero with only a very small 
proportion of positive observations. 
 
4.5  Methodology 
 
This chapter focuses on two separate questions: how parents decide whether children 
participate or not on work, school, and housework, and what factors are correlated 
with the amount of time they dedicate to each activity. In order to answer the first 
question, logit regressions are estimated to account for the fact that all predicted 
values should be on the unit interval. In general terms, the logit model can be 
expressed as follows:  
                                                          
40 Basic education in Mexico is mandatory for children aged between 5 and 15. 
41 The small proportion of children out of school should not be a major cause for concern since my sample is large (more than 
20,000 observations) and that 5.65% actually represents around 1229 children, providing a considerable number of cases to 
work with. A very good explanation of the harmlessness of this situation can be found in a blog entry by Paul Allison in the 
blog “Statistical Horizons”, which is available here: 
https://statisticalhorizons.com/logistic-regression-for-rare-events 
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log (
𝑃(𝑌𝐾=1|𝑋)
1−𝑃(𝑌𝐾=1|𝑋)
) = 𝑋′𝛽 (4.1) 
Where 𝑃(𝑌𝑘 = 1|𝑋𝐾) denotes the probability of a child participating in activity K (work, 
study or housework), given their characteristics at the individual and household level 
X, whilst 𝛽 represents the association between these factors and the probability of 
participation.  
Regarding the second question the estimation uses Tobit equations in order to consider 
the fact that the minimum length of time a child can dedicate to each activity is zero. 
Specifically, the estimation recognises the presence of a latent variable 𝑌∗ which cannot 
be captured directly but through the observed variable  𝑌, which has a lower censoring 
bound at zero. In general terms, for each activity K: 
𝑌𝐾 = {
𝑌𝐾
∗    𝑖𝑓  𝑌𝐾
∗ > 0 
0    𝑖𝑓  𝑌𝐾
∗ ≤ 0
    (4.2) 
Where the latent variable 𝑌𝐾
∗ can be expressed as a function of a set of the child’s 
characteristics at the individual and household level, X.  
 
𝑌𝐾
∗ =  𝑋′𝛽 + 𝑢               (4.3) 
 
4.6  Results 
 
Results are presented as follows. Subsection 4.6.1 analyses the relationship between 
children’s participation and time allocation and their cognitive ability using pooled OLS 
models, subsection 4.6.2 focuses entirely on intrahousehold variations, applying 
household fixed effects at each particular point in time. Finally, subsection 4.6.3 
explores the issue of reverse causality between ability and time allocation, using 
instrumental variables. For each methodology the analysis begins with the results from 
logit regressions regarding children’s participation in each activity and then presents 
the outcomes from Tobit estimations regarding the amount of time children allocate to 
each activity42. 
 
                                                          
42 Regular fixed effects regressions (not Tobit) have been used to analyse intrahousehold variation in time allocation. Also, IV 
probit (instead of logit) are used in order to study the reverse causality issue regarding participation. 
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4.6.1 Pooled sample analysis 
Table 4.1 shows the results from running logit and Tobit regressions to study the 
relationship between cognitive ability and children’s participation and time allocated 
to work, school and housework, using different set of controls. For each specification, 
results show the regression coefficient associated with children’s IQ-for-age z score 
and its interaction with gender, general estimation diagnostics as well as the sample 
size considered in the analysis. 
 
Even though the IQ-for-age z-score seems to be negatively associated with children’s 
participation in paid work across all specifications, this relationship becomes 
statistically insignificant once the child’s characteristics at the individual level (such 
as gender, age, birth order and health status) are considered. In contrast, school 
enrolment seems to present a stronger case for the ability-participation link, as the 
regression coefficients are consistently positive and significant after controlling for the 
child’s characteristics and family income. Not surprisingly, the relationship between 
cognitive ability and participation in housework seems to be different for boys and 
girls. Specifically, results suggest a significant negative association between girls’ 
cognitive ability and their participation in housework, while this relationship is positive 
and not as strong for the case of boys. In other words, more able girls tend to 
participate less in housework while more able boys tend to participate more, yet the 
ability link is considerably smaller for the latter. Interestingly, for both boys and girls, 
once the analysis controls for parental education and maternal work status none of 
the associations seem to hold their level of significance, though the signs of the 
regression coefficients remain unchanged. The loss of significance in this case can be 
explained by the association between parental education and children’s ability, both 
of these variables having parental ability as a common cause. Thus, including parental 
education in the estimation is likely to be capturing part of the ability effect. 
 
Just as in the case of participation, the number of hours spent at work also seems to 
be negatively correlated with children’s IQ-for-age z-score; however, this association 
does not appear to be statistically significant under any of the specifications. Inversely, 
ability shows to be positively associated with the number of hours children spend at 
school, a relationship that is strongly significant even when all sets of controls are 
considered in the estimation, suggesting that more able children also tend to spend 
more time at school, independently of the child’s individual characteristics, family 
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income, parental education and work status, as well as household size and 
composition43. On the other hand, having a higher level of cognitive ability appears to 
be negatively associated with the number of hours children spend doing housework, 
this relationship being significant even after controlling for the child’s characteristics 
and family income.  
 
In general terms, results suggest the presence of a selection process in which less able 
children tend to be assigned more paid work and housework, and more able children 
are more likely to attend school. Additionally, the relationship between ability and time 
allocation does not seem to be significantly different between boys and girls, except for 
the case of participation in housework, where more able girls tend to be significantly 
less likely to participate, while the effect is nearly zero for boys. This result might be 
reflecting the important effect of gender roles on the intrahousehold division of work, 
where participation on domestic chores might be somewhat negotiable for girls 
according to their ability, while boys are simply not traditionally expected to participate 
at all44. Although the previous results provide a first glance at the study of the 
relationship between children’s ability and time allocation, one should keep in mind 
that the pooled sample framework used in the production of these estimates considers 
the whole variation in the sample coming from all children across different families, a 
methodology that might be ignoring the presence of family-specific factors that could 
be affecting both children’s ability and time allocation. In other words, the previous 
results are built under the assumption that parents react to their kids’ absolute level 
of cognitive ability. However, this assumption might not be as realistic as parents might 
actually take into account each child’s relative position with respect to other children 
in the same household when making decisions regarding their time allocation. 
                                                          
43 Most primary schools in Mexico run from 8:00 to 12:30, while private schools tend to extend the children’s stay for a couple 
of extra hours, so there is a possibility that a great part of the variation in the amount of hours spent at school could be simply 
driven by the fact that some children attend private schools. In this case, it is possible that more able children might be more 
likely to be sent to private schools, on average.  
44 As shown in Table A3 in the Appendix, even though the regression coefficients associated with boys 
(male=1) are generally positive, the interaction coefficient between age and male is negative and highly 
significant, suggesting a decrease in boys’ participation in housework as they grow up. 
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Table 4.1: Pooled sample analysis for children's participation and number of hours spent on each activity; using logit and Tobit regressions, respectively. 
   Controls 
    (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
    
  None 
Child's 
characteristics  
(I) + Family 
Income 
(II) + Parental 
education/work 
status 
(III) + Other controls  
Participation 
Work 
IQ z-score -0.088* -0.171 -0.164 -0.140 -0.145    
IQ z-score*Male(=1) 0.172 0.184 0.090 0.086 
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.095 0.112 0.107 0.129    
Wald Chi-Square 3.661 129.812 154.998 75.037 99.279    
N. of cases 16540 5795 5794 2308 2308    
School 
IQ z-score 0.325*** 0.286** 0.245* 0.316 0.411    
IQ z-score*Male(=1) 0.133 0.140 0.163 0.239 
Pseudo R-squared 0.012 0.177 0.194 0.375 0.419    
Wald Chi-Square 57.125 257.891 272.488 158.155 183.169    
N. of cases 16433 5764 5763 2286 2286    
Housework 
IQ z-score -0.007 -0.084** -0.095** -0.088 -0.079    
IQ z-score*Male(=1) 0.105* 0.108* 0.052 0.034 
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.106 0.108 0.104 0.121    
Wald Chi-Square 0.178 704.290 709.586 273.233 292.462    
N. of cases 16511 5794 5793 2308 2308    
Number of 
Hours  
Work 
IQ z-score -2.645 -4.725 -4.774 -3.052 -3.070    
IQ z-score*Male(=1) 4.296 4.984 1.828 1.233 
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.048 0.058 0.048 0.059 
F statistic 1.920 . . 4.272 3.913 
N. of cases 16471 5777 5776 2300 2300 
School 
IQ z-score 0.684*** 0.554*** 0.522*** 0.476** 0.434**  
IQ z-score*Male(=1) -0.088 -0.087 0.111 0.123 
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.029 0.029 0.039 0.042    
F statistic 86.988 27.531 23.047 11.117 8.268 
N. of cases 13580 4811 4811 1921 1921    
Housework 
IQ z-score -0.155* -0.324* -0.355** -0.277 -0.215    
IQ z-score*Male(=1) 0.294 0.292 0.323 0.293 
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.045 0.046 0.038 0.074    
F statistic 2.842 . . 13.125 . 
N. of cases 14145 4877 4876 2004 2004    
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), using clustered standard errors by household. Child's characteristics in column (I)  
include: age, gender, birth order and health  and disability status. Other controls  in column (IV) include household size,  proportion of male children, as well as region and time fixed effects. 
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4.6.2 Intrahousehold Variation 
In the previous subsection the analysis considers variations coming from comparing 
each child to the rest of the children in the sample. However, it is likely that parents 
only have access to information on the cognitive ability of their own children, so it is 
the relative position of a child’s cognition with respect to their own siblings what plays 
a role in the selection process. In other words, parents might take into account how 
able is a child with respect to the rest of the children in the household in order to 
choose who goes to work and who goes to school. In order to study this possibility this 
subsection analyses the results of using household fixed effects regressions for both 
participation and time allocation.  
 
The main assumption behind the use of this methodology is that parents observe 
differences in ability between their children at one particular point in time and 
simultaneously decide on their time allocation based on this information. Therefore, 
running simple household fixed effects in this case would not capture the ability-
selection effect appropriately since any results derived from following this methodology 
would inevitably mix two sources of variation: differences between siblings at each 
point of time and general changes in ability over time. Since the main objective of the 
estimation is to capture the former, the estimation will need to use a more specific 
form of fixed effects where the unit of reference is each household at each particular 
point in time45.   
 
Table 4.2 shows the results from running logit and regular fixed effects regressions at 
the household level. As expected, the strength of the ability coefficient is lower in 
significance for most of the specifications. Interestingly, the signs of the ability-
participation and ability-time allocation association change drastically under a fixed 
effects framework. For instance, once household fixed effects are considered the 
relationship between cognitive ability and the child’s likelihood to participate in paid 
work becomes positive indicating that children who are more able with respect to other 
children in the family tend to be more prone to work, though this relationship is not 
statistically significant. Also, once the child’s characteristics are controlled for in the 
school enrolment estimation results seem to suggest significantly opposite effects of  
                                                          
45 For instance, “Household 1 at year 1”, “Household 1 at year 2” and “Household 1 at year 3” would be three different fixed 
effects. 
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Table 4.2: Intrahousehold analysis for children's participation and number of hours spent on each activity; using logit and least squares fixed effects regressions, respectively. 
   Controls 
    (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
    
  None 
Child's 
characteristics  
(I) + Family 
Income 
(II) + Parental 
education/work 
status 
(III) + Other 
controls  
Participation 
Work 
IQ z-score 0.070 0.145 0.145 . . 
IQ z-score'*Male(=1)   0.441 0.441 . . 
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.722 0.722 . . 
Wald Chi-Square 0.307 87.398 87.398 . . 
N. of cases 496 170 170 . . 
N. of groups 191  66    66 . . 
School 
IQ z-score -0.073 -1.102 -1.102    . . 
IQ z-score'*Male(=1)   2.687** 2.687**  . . 
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.405 0.405    . . 
Wald Chi-Square 0.058 359.342 359.342    . . 
N. of cases 842 215 215    . . 
N. of groups 304 82 82 . . 
Housework 
IQ z-score -0.011 0.168 0.168    . . 
IQ z-score'*Male(=1)   -0.096 -0.096    . . 
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.403 0.403    . . 
Wald Chi-Square 0.058 335.927 335.927    . . 
N. of cases 3475 1162 1162    . . 
N. of groups 1352 469 469 . . 
Number of Hours  
Work 
IQ z-score 0.024 0.274 0.274 0.366 0.366    
IQ z-score'*Male(=1)   -0.167 -0.167 -0.347 -0.347    
R-squared 0.000 0.040 0.040 0.051 0.051    
F statistic 0.042 3.079 3.079 . .    
N. of cases 16471 5777 5776 2300 2300    
N. of groups 11941 4218 4217 1571 1571 
School 
IQ z-score 0.042 -0.129 -0.129 0.247 0.247    
IQ z-score'*Male(=1)   0.208 0.208 -0.117 -0.117    
R-squared 0.000 0.288 0.288 0.390 0.390    
F statistic 0.056 18.864 18.864 10.376 10.376    
N. of cases 13580 4811 4811 1921 1921    
N. of groups 10321 3731 3731 1424 1424 
Housework 
IQ z-score -0.042 -0.010 -0.010 0.105 0.105    
IQ z-score'*Male(=1)   0.233 0.233 0.367 0.367    
R-squared 0.000 0.163 0.163 0.177 0.177    
F statistic 0.215 22.852 22.852 . .    
N. of cases 14145 4877 4876 2004 2004    
N. of groups 9595 3308 3307 1272 1272 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), using clustered standard errors by household. Child's characteristics 
in column (I)  include: age, gender, birth order and health  and disability status. Other controls  in column (IV) include household size,  proportion of male children, as well as region and time fixed effects. The fixed 
effects estimation controls for each household at each particular year, allowing a direct sibling-level comparison at each point of time. 
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ability for boys and girls. Namely, boys who are more able than other children in the 
household are more likely to be enrolled in school whilst more able girls are actually 
less likely to do so46, though this last result is not significant.  
 
Regarding the number of hours spent on each activity, ability seems to have no 
significant effect under any of the specifications considered. The IQ-for-age regression 
coefficients for children’s time spent on work are all positive; indicating that, on 
average, more able girls tend to work more hours, this effect getting generally stronger 
in size as more controls are included in the estimation. As regards the number of hours 
spent at school and number of hours spent doing housework the effect of ability is not 
clear, as the IQ-for-age coefficient switches sign across different specifications.  
Overall, results from the intrahousehold analysis differ greatly from the ones obtained 
using a pooled sample framework. Once household fixed effects are considered in the 
estimation, there seems to be a different effect of ability on school enrolment for boys 
and girls. Also, results show that having a higher level of ability with respect to other 
children in the household does not seem to have a significant effect on the number of 
hours they dedicate to any of the activities. 
 
4.6.3 The Issue of Reverse Causality 
One of the main concerns that the previous methodologies arise is the potential 
presence of reverse causality between cognitive ability and children’s time allocation. 
Until now, the analysis has been assuming that children’s cognitive ability is rather 
fixed, mainly determined by genetic factors that do not change over time. Nevertheless, 
empirical evidence in psychology and psychiatry suggests that even though there is a 
strong genetic component in the determination of children’s ability, this can also be 
affected by other environmental factors, which include the activities in which children 
involve in (Makharia, et al., 2016; Sharkey & Elwert, 2011; Broberg, Wessels, Lamb, 
& Hwang, 1997). If the effect of children’s time allocation on cognitive ability is strong 
enough the regression coefficients obtained before could be biased and should not be 
interpreted in a strictly causal manner.  
                                                          
46 The odd result for girls in this case is not surprising, given the small number of observations used in the estimation. 
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In order to address the issue of reverse causality the author uses children’s height-for-
age z score as an instrument for IQ-for-age z score, making use of the close genetic 
relationship that exists between height and cognitive ability. The next subsections 
explain this in more detail. 
 
Instrumental variables using ‘height-for-age z score’ 
 
Alternatively, it is possible to solve the reverse causality issue by introducing a source 
of exogenous variation in cognitive ability through the use of an instrumental variable 
(IV). Ideally, the instrument should fulfil two conditions in order to be valid. First, it 
should be relevant in the explanation of the endogenous regressor, which in this case 
is children’s cognitive ability; and second, it must be exogenous in the sense that it 
should not be directly correlated with the dependent variable, that is, children’s time 
allocation patterns. In this case, children’s ‘height-for-age’ z score is selected as an 
instrument for their IQ z score. 
One of the conditions for a valid instrument is that it should introduce a source of 
exogenous variation in the endogenous regressor. In this context, one way to introduce 
exogenous variation is to isolate the portion of ability that is due to genetic factors 
using height, an anthropometric measure that is known to have a strong positive 
relationship with cognitive ability (Spears, 2012; Humphreys, Davey, & Park, 1985). 
Even though there is an environmental component to both height and cognition (Gale, 
2005), there is evidence suggesting that a significant portion of the strong correlation 
observed between these two variables can be attributable to common genetic sources. 
A twin study for the Norwegian case, for instance, found that 35 percent of the height-
intelligence association can be attributed to significant effects coming from correlated 
genes (Sundet, Tambs, Harris, Magnus, & Torjussen, 2005). A similar result has been 
found in a different study for Sweden, where researchers conclude there is a significant 
within-family correlation between height and intelligence, suggesting the presence of 
‘pleitropy’, a term that refers to the production by a single gene of two or more 
apparently unrelated effects (Beauchamp, Cesarini, Johannesson, Lindqvist, & 
Apicella, 2011). Additional evidence suggests that such a relationship could be 
attributed to the high correlation between body height and brain grey and white matter 
volume (Taki, et al., 2012). 
117 
 
 
In order for height to be a good instrument in this context, it should also be exogenous, 
meaning that it should not be directly correlated with the dependent variable in 
question, namely, children’s time allocation. Even though there is no reason to suspect 
the existence of a direct relationship between a child’s height and their participation 
in work, school or housework, it is possible that factors such as health status might 
be strongly correlated with both time allocation and height. However, as children’s 
health status has been already been considered in our baseline estimations47, it is not 
likely that the instrument’s variation could be contained in the error term of the 
structural regression.  
Also, it is important to mention that the suitability of the instrumental variable chosen 
for the analysis (‘height-for-age’) is subject to a number of assumptions that may not 
always hold. For instance, we need to assume that the child’s height alone does not 
have a direct effect on the way the child’s time is allocated; however, if taller children 
are perceived as more mature or ‘look more like grown-ups’ and that has an influence 
on their probability of them working, then the exogeneity of height as an instrumental 
variable would be compromised. Similarly, if taller children are assigned more 
housework because they are perceived as being physically stronger or simply because 
they can reach high places in the household, height could not be considered as a good 
instrument. Nevertheless, since the definition of housework in the survey has to do 
with activities for which height does not offer any significant advantage, (such as 
sweeping/mopping, dusting, washing dishes or washing clothes) and given that most 
of the child jobs in Mexico do not actually require children to ‘look like grown ups’ (as 
it involves basic chores such as packing groceries in supermarkets or delivering 
messages, where these jobs are traditionally expected to be done by kids), it is not 
likely that height will be correlated with time allocation. In other words, the 
assumption that I am implicitly making that height does not directly affect children’s 
time allocation is not likely to be broken. 
Since the sample under analysis consists of children whose physical development is 
not complete yet, our measure of height should consider how tall or short a child is in 
reference to other children of the same age and gender. Differently from the IQ-for-age 
z scores, for which a reference population was not available, the height-for-age z scores 
                                                          
47 Children’s health status is included in the set of controls “Child’s characteristics’ in Tables 4.1 to 4.4. Health status is proxied 
by the parents’ subjective assessment of the child’s health and a couple of dummy variables indicating whether the child suffers 
from a disability or has a visible health problem. 
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were built using the WHO child growth standards of 2006 (for preschool children, 
based on a sample of developing countries) and 2007 (for children aged over 6 years 
old, based on a sample from the United States). The z scores were obtained by 
subtracting each child’s value of height minus the mean height on a reference 
population of the same age and gender, divided by the standard deviation of height in 
such reference population. 
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a) Instrumental variables estimation using pooled sample. 
 
Table 4.4 shows the IV regression results from using children’s height-for-age z-score 
as an instrument for IQ-for-age z-score in the explanation of their time allocation 
between work, school and housework48. For each regression, Table 4.4 presents the 
regression coefficients and general diagnostics associated with both stages of the IV 
methodology, those related to the structural equation and the ones referring to the 
relevance of the instrument and the general suitability of the IV approach.  
Regarding children’s participation in paid work, employing an IV methodology does not 
seem to change the main results obtained under previous methodologies, as the 
coefficient associated with cognitive ability is generally small and not significant (except 
for the last two specifications where the instrument does not prove to be valid due to 
lack of relevance). This outcome is in line with the small statistics associated with the 
Wald test of exogeneity, suggesting that there is not enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of no endogeneity. In other words, reverse causality might not be an issue 
in this particular case, implying that participation in work is not likely to have an effect 
on children’s ability. Hence, there is no reason to believe our previous results under a 
pooled sample framework were necessarily biased. 
Results are very different regarding children’s enrolment in school. Now that an IV 
approach is followed the positive regression coefficient for IQ-for-age becomes even 
stronger in significance with respect to their equivalent results under pooled sample 
methodologies. This outcome is consistent with the high values obtained for the Wald 
test statistics, which allow us to reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity across 
specifications. Not surprisingly, being enrolled in school does have a significant effect 
on children’s ability, thus measuring the relationship between these two variables using 
a simple pooled sample approach might not be ideal. However, in this case, it can be 
concluded that even when the analysis partials out the potential reverse effect that 
school enrolment might have on children’s ability, on average, more able children also 
tend to be more likely to go to school.  
Out of the three activities being studied, it is participation in housework the one for 
which the use of an IV methodology seems to modify results the most. Once height is 
                                                          
48 Similarly, the interaction term between ability and gender (male=1) has been instrumented by the interaction between height 
and gender. 
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used as an instrument for ability, the previously negative relationship found under the 
pooled sample framework turns positive and stronger in terms of statistical significance. 
This result, along with the relatively high values obtained for the Wald test statistic, 
might be suggesting the presence of reverse causality from participation in housework 
to cognitive ability. It is possible that participation in housework might have a negative 
effect on children’s cognitive ability by decreasing their engagement in intellectually 
stimulating activities at home. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that for in-
school children housework take time away from studies (Reich, et al., 2013), which in 
turn might slow down their cognitive development in comparison with children who do 
not participate in it. Once the endogenous variation in ability is removed from the 
estimation, the relationship becomes positive, implying that on average, more able 
children also tend to be more prone to participate in housework (a similar result as the 
one obtained under a fixed effects approach). This result might be representing parents’ 
choice to delegate housework responsibilities to children who might be perceived as 
relatively more ‘trustworthy’ to get chores done properly. 
Just as in the case of participation, the number of hours children dedicate to work does 
not seem to be significantly related to their cognitive ability, a result that is similar to 
what the pooled sample estimation shows. Once again, the Wald test of exogeneity does 
not provide evidence to believe cognitive ability is endogenous in this case. On the other 
hand, the number of hours spent at school seems to have a significant positive 
correlation with children’s IQ-for-age z-score, the regression coefficients being 
considerably stronger in size under an IV approach compared to those obtained using 
a pooled sample framework. This suggests that, even controlling from the potential 
reverse causality coming from school attendance to cognitive ability, the latter still 
shows a significant effect on the former. Finally, results are not as clear regarding the 
number of hours spent doing housework since the relationship between cognitive ability 
and the number of hours spent doing housework loses its statistical significance once 
the analysis controls for the child’s characteristics and family income. 
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Table 4.4: Instrumental variables analysis for children's participation and number of hours spent on each activity; 
using IV probit and IV Tobit regressions, respectively. 
    Controls 
     (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
    
    None 
Child's 
characteristic
s  
(I) + 
Family 
Income 
(II) + 
Parental 
education
/work 
status 
(III) + 
Other 
controls  
Participation Work IQ z-score -0.128 0.465 0.650 1.261*** 1.289*** 
  IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -0.625 -0.669 -0.721* -0.825**  
  Wald Chi-Square 0.813 165.700 220.656 989.051 1099.618    
  N. of cases 13163 5080 5080 2033 2033   
  Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.114*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.028 0.033    
   Height z-score*Male   0.027 0.026 0.019 0.022    
  Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score   -0.003** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.007    
   Height z-score*Male   0.094*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
  
Wald Test of 
Exogeneity  0.37 1.66 2.6 68.27 73.75 
 School IQ z-score 0.880*** 1.096*** 1.004** -1.135*** -0.797    
  IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -0.411 -0.279 0.684 0.689    
  Wald Chi-Square 287.765 288.446 229.764 456.982 262.932    
  N. of cases 13139 5076 5076 2022 2022    
  Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.114*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.031 0.036    
   Height z-score*Male   0.027 0.025 0.014 0.018    
  Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score  -0.003** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.007    
   Height z-score*Male   0.094*** 0.093*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
   
Wald Test of 
Exogeneity  47.72 18.10 8.30 44.42 2.02 
 Housework IQ z-score 0.141* 0.717*** 0.764*** 1.112*** 1.116*** 
 
 IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -0.429 -0.425 -0.475 -0.518    
  Wald Chi-Square 3.297 907.526 999.701 947.583 975.810    
 
 N. of cases 13148 5080 5080 2033 2033    
 
 Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.114*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.028 0.033    
   Height z-score*Male   0.027 0.026 0.019 0.022    
  Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score   -0.003** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.007    
 
  Height z-score*Male   0.094*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
   
Wald Test of 
Exogeneity  3.37 12.18 11.59 20.56 21.25 
Number of 
hours 
Work IQ z-score -12.361 33.336 47.366 251.033 255.828    
 IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -57.416 -61.519 -174.223 -191.251    
 Wald Chi-Square 0.882 488.377 110.044 41.878 57.396    
  N. of cases 13114 5064 5064 2025 2025    
  Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.114*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.027 0.033    
   Height z-score*Male   0.026 0.025 0.016 0.019    
  Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score   0.026 0.025 0.016 0.019    
   Height z-score*Male   0.093*** 0.092*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
   
Wald Test of 
Exogeneity  0.56 1.53 1.65 43.67 51.46 
 School IQ z-score 2.071*** 3.242** 3.341* 4.453 4.663    
 
 IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -0.867 -0.868 -2.946 -2.497    
  Wald Chi-Square 23.284 129.965 132.098 69.721 80.349    
 
 N. of cases 11898 4630 4630 1848 1848    
 
 Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.122*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.018 0.026    
 
  Height z-score*Male   0.026 0.025 0.033 0.038    
 
 Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score   -0.004** -0.009*** -0.016*** -0.008    
   Height z-score*Male   0.096*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 
 
  
Wald Test of 
Exogeneity   12.71 9.38 7.19 0.96 2.79 
 Housework IQ z-score -1.188* 3.079 3.287 11.932 11.516    
  IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -1.867 -1.722 -5.115 -6.023    
 
 Wald Chi-Square 3.026 477.036 478.804 94.732 106.115    
 
 N. of cases 11131 4233 4233 1746 1746    
 
 Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.113*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.027 0.034    
 
  Height z-score*Male   0.032 0.028 0.019 0.023    
 
 Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score   -0.003** -0.007*** -0.017*** -0.010    
   Height z-score*Male   0.096*** 0.094*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
 
  
Wald Test of 
Exogeneity   2.29 2.58 2.32 7.39 8.13 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), using 
clustered standard errors by household. Child's characteristics in column (I)  include: age, gender, birth order and health  and disability status. Other 
controls  in column (IV) include household size,  proportion of male children, as well as region and time fixed effects. 
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b) Instrumental variables estimation using household fixed effects 
Finally, instrumental variables regressions are estimated with household fixed effects 
using the Stata module “xtivreg2”49. From the previous fixed effects results from Table 
4.2, the analysis found that once the estimation focuses only on the intrahousehold 
variation, there still seems to be evidence of a strong relationship between ability and 
children’s attendance to school for boys, meaning that for any particular household a 
more able boy with respect to their siblings is more likely to go to school. However, this 
result was not accounting for the presence of reverse causality. Hence, the next question 
one should ask is whether the strong and significant correlation previously found 
between ability and school attendance still holds when the estimation introduces a 
source of exogenous variation, namely, height.  
Once instrumental variables regressions are used to study intrahousehold variations 
the ability-school attendance relationship becomes non-significant and even switches 
in sign (see Table C31 in Appendix C). Although this result might be suggesting the 
presence of reverse causality in the previous estimations, the lack of significance of 
these new coefficients should be interpreted with caution. When using instrumental 
variables in a pooled sample, the instrument (in this case height-for-age z-score) helped 
extract some exogenous variation out of our endogenous regressor: cognitive ability. 
However, when dealing with pure intrahousehold variations, height-for-age might not 
introduce enough exogeneity to the estimation, and in that case, it could not be a good 
instrument for ability (as shown in Table C31 in Appendix C, height is not significant in 
most of the first stage regressions, thus results are not reported here). In other words, 
differences in children’s height-for-age among siblings in the same household at the 
same point in time might not be large enough to explain intrahousehold variations in 
cognitive ability. In order to overcome this limitation, one ideally should introduce a new 
source of exogenous variation that actually “varies” across children in the same 
household, such as unique and specific habits or behaviours that could be also 
correlated with ability. Unfortunately, the data set used in this study does not cover 
such specific information.   
 
                                                          
49 Mark E Schaffer, 2005. "XTIVREG2: Stata module to perform extended IV/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class 
regression for panel data models," Statistical Software Components S456501, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 
22 Feb 2015. Even though this methodology does not support the use of Tobit or probit models, results still capture the direction 
and statistical strength of the ability-time allocation relationship. 
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Overall, results from following an IV approach seem to suggest that even though 
cognitive ability does not affect children’s participation or number of hours spent on 
work, it does have a significant relationship with participation in housework and school 
enrolment, as well as the number of hours spent at school. Specifically, more able 
children are more likely to be enrolled in school, participate in housework and to spend 
more time at school. However, none of these results hold when studying intrahousehold 
variations, suggesting that parents do not actually allocate their children’s time based 
on their relative levels of ability with respect to other children in the household. 
Nonetheless, results from following this methodology should be interpreted with 
caution, since height does not seem to be an appropriate instrument for ability in this 
particular case. 
 
4.7  Conclusions 
 
This paper analyses panel data from the Mexican Family Life Survey using fixed effects 
and instrumental variables methodologies in order to study the relationship between 
children’s cognitive ability and time allocation among three activities: work, school and 
housework. Overall, results suggest that cognitive ability does not have a significant 
relationship on children’s participation or time allocated to work; however, it does seem 
to have a strong correlation with school enrolment, number of hours spent at school 
and participation in housework, some of these effects being significantly different for 
boys and girls. 
Even though the estimated correlation between ability and work-related outcomes is not 
significant under any of the methodologies, some of the results regarding school and 
housework differ slightly across specifications. For instance, when using a simple pooled 
sample approach, results suggest that, overall, more able children are more likely to be 
enrolled in school. However, once the estimations focus only on the intrahousehold 
variation, the analysis finds that such a strong positive relationship is only significant 
for boys. These differences might be suggesting that even though, in general, more able 
children are more likely to go to school, when it comes to the intrahousehold decision 
of what child to send to school (out of all children in the same family), the reinforcement 
selection process is stronger for boys.  
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Not surprisingly, the study finds strong evidence of the presence of reverse causality 
between school outcomes and ability. Once the issue is solved using height as an 
instrument for ability, the positive relationship between the latter and school enrolment 
becomes stronger in size and significance.  Similarly, there is evidence of reverse 
causality issues regarding children’s participation in housework, which might have a 
negative effect on ability since the coefficients associated with cognitive ability obtained 
under the IV specifications are now positive, meaning that more able children tend to 
be more likely to participate on housework. Finally, when applying household fixed 
effects on the instrumental variable regressions, the analysis finds no evidence of ability 
playing a role in the intrahousehold allocation of time among children; however, this 
result should be interpreted with caution due to the low explanatory power of height on 
the intrahousehold variation in ability.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
 
 
5.1 Discussion of key findings and concluding remarks 
 
The main objective of this thesis has been to examine three specific socioeconomic 
issues from an intrahousehold perspective using data from the Mexican Family Life 
Survey (MxFLS), a nationally representative longitudinal data set. Matters such as 
the intergenerational persistence of obesity, women’s participation in decision-
making and children’s time allocation between work and school are all particularly 
relevant for Mexico’s public agenda, their study being essential for the design of 
appropriate policy. Chapter 5 is organised as follows: in the first section the main 
results from each empirical chapter are briefly summarised and discussed, while the 
second section presents the limitations of the analyses and a few suggestions for 
future research. 
 
The first empirical chapter of this thesis (Chapter 2) analysed the intergenerational 
transmission of obesity from parents to children by quantifying the relationship 
between the Body Mass Index (BMI) of both groups. After using different 
methodologies (including fixed effects at the individual and household level), it is 
possible to confirm the existence of a strong association between the anthropometric 
status of parents and children, this being particularly significant for the father-child 
relationship. Whilst the mother-child link seems to be mainly composed by time-
invariant aspects (such as genetics and shared time-invariant environmental 
conditions), the father-child relationship seems to be driven in a higher proportion 
by factors that do show some change over time, such as variable habits and 
behaviours. Furthermore, the size of the parent-child transmission varies across the 
distribution of the child’s age, the family’s income, parental occupation and 
employment status and the anthropometric status of the parents. Specifically, the 
study finds evidence suggesting that as children grow up their BMI tends to be more 
similar to the one of the parents and that the father-child anthropometric 
transmission tends to be stronger in the higher end of the income distribution. 
Results also suggest that fathers with jobs in which they hold a position of power 
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(managers or business owners) tend to transmit more of their own anthropometric 
status to their children; similarly, children of mothers who work tend to experience 
a higher level of maternal transmission. Finally, the study finds evidence of an 
intergenerational vicious cycle in which obese parents are more likely to transmit 
their own condition to their children, with respect to normal weight individuals.  
The presence of an intergenerational transmission process in the BMI has multiple 
implications in terms of public health policy. Specifically, the fact that at least 20 
and 40 per cent of the maternal and paternal transmission, respectively, cannot be 
explained by genetic factors suggests that a child being obese or overweight is not 
an inevitable consequence of the genetic endowment provided by the parents, and 
therefore there is still room for external interventions that exploit the 
intergenerational nature of the problem. The recently published Mexican National 
Strategy for the Prevention and Control of Overweight and Diabetes50, considers a 
set of policies in terms of public health, medical care and sanitary regulations, which 
are expected to promote a healthy lifestyle that includes a balanced diet and regular 
exercise. For the case of children, most of these policies focus on the availability of 
junk food in schools and the discouragement of its consumption by restricting junk 
food advertising during children’s television programs. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that the quality of food that children consume is not only a function of 
their own preferences and the influences they receive at school or through the media, 
but also has to do with their parents’ habits and information. In this regard, it is 
likely that restricting the contents of sugar and fat of the snacks and drinks sold at 
school or increasing the availability of natural water in public spaces will not have 
very strong effects in child obesity reduction if children still have access to high-
calorie snacks and sugary drinks provided by the parents at home. Likewise, 
restricting junk food advertising during children’s television programs is not likely 
to be very effective if the parents are exposed to the advertising and end up getting 
unhealthy food that soon becomes available for everyone in the household. Following 
this reasoning, it is reasonable to conclude that the best policies against child obesity 
and overweight are those that also attempt to modify the parents’ behaviours and 
preferences. 
                                                          
50 Mexico’s ‘National Strategy to the Prevention and Control of Overweight, Obesity and Diabetes’(2013). Available at: 
https://www.gob.mx/cms/uploads/attachment/file/276108/estrategia_sobrepeso_diabetes_obesidad.pdf 
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In the second empirical section (Chapter 3), this thesis focuses on one of the 
secondary results derived from the previous analyses which suggests that mothers 
who work outside the household tend to transmit more of their own anthropometric 
status to their children, in comparison with women who do not work. This outcome 
is particularly interesting as it might be signalling the effects that female employment 
has on their influence on domestic decisions and more importantly, the 
intrahousehold balance of power overall. In line with this notion, findings from 
Chapter 3 confirm the presence of a strong impact of women’s education and 
employment on their level of decision-making power regarding several aspects of 
family life, the magnitude of this effect being heterogenous across decisions and 
levels of decision-making power.  
Results from Chapter 3 offer a deeper understanding on the effect of education on 
women’s power, which seems to be more complex than a mere linear positive 
relationship. First of all, education shows to have a highly desirable impact on most 
aspects of decision-making, which not always means providing women with the 
maximum level of power. For instance, more educated women are more likely to 
share their power with other family members (as opposed to having exclusive control) 
when it comes to children’s wellbeing or large household expenditures, which can be 
perceived as a desirable outcome since it implies a more equal share of the 
responsibilities that come along with decision-making power. At the same time, 
education tends to provide women with additional potential to become exclusive 
decision-makers regarding other specific issues such as their own working status or 
cash transfers to women’s relatives, making them more able to be completely in 
charge of their own career decisions and the economic contributions they wish to 
make towards other family members outside the household. Secondly, education has 
the potential to affect the intrahousehold balance of power between spouses. As the 
fixed effects analysis shows, even though acquiring an additional year of education 
does not necessarily increase women’s power, increasing the woman’s advantage in 
years of education with respect to her spouse does provide her with additional 
decision-making power; a result that also reassures the importance of studying the 
relative position of women in the household, instead of limiting the analysis to 
absolute measures.  Thirdly, the effect of education on women’s intrahousehold 
decision-making power seems to have also a social dimension, where the strength of 
the positive effect of education is conditioned by women’s social environment. Most 
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likely because of unwritten social norms and conventions, women who have a higher 
level of education than the community average do not benefit as much from it. One 
explanation for this result could be that highly educated women might be perceived 
as ‘successful’ outside the household, which contradicts the social norm establishing 
the man as the main breadwinner and supporter of the family. Hence, these women 
might choose to relinquish their power and adopt submissive attitudes at home as a 
way to restore the expected balance of power that the social norm dictates, an effect 
that has been previously identified in other studies51. Even though this result does 
not seem very promising, it also highlights the presence of a positive externality that 
can be exploited. As more women get educated, it becomes easier for other women 
in the community to benefit from their own education, the empowering effect of the 
latter becoming stronger and more effective.  
Employment has also an important positive effect on women’s decision-making 
power. In fact, results suggest that employed women are more likely to share power 
and even become exclusive decision-makers for most aspects of family life. Similarly, 
the event of getting a job (namely, passing from unemployment to employment) has 
a strong positive effect on women’s level of power regarding large expenditures, one 
of the most transcendental aspects of decision-making in the domestic sphere. 
Nevertheless, policies attempting to use employment alone as an empowering tool 
might not be effective in some households where women are not even allowed to 
decide whether they can work or not; regardless of how good the job market 
conditions for women get, some of them will not benefit from it. Education, on the 
other hand, can make women more likely to participate in the decision-making 
process regarding their employment status, which in turn reinforces the empowering 
effect. Therefore, the best empowering policies might be the ones that tackle both: 
women’s access to education and participation in paid employment.  
Finally, in Chapter 4 this thesis analyses one particular intrahousehold decision-
making process: children’s time allocation between school and work. Specifically, 
the main objective of this chapter has been to determine whether children’s cognitive 
endowment plays a role in the manner they distribute their time between work, 
housework and school, and if such relationship exists, whether it can be associated 
with a reinforcement or a compensation effect. Even though results from quantitative 
                                                          
51 Please refer to the literature review in Chapter 3. 
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analyses in Chapter 4 do not offer enough evidence to suggest the presence of a 
significant relationship between children’s cognitive ability and their likelihood of 
participating in paid employment under any of the methodologies, they do seem to 
show a link between children’s IQ measures and school enrolment, as well as the 
number of hours they spend in it. Likewise, there seems to be a significant 
relationship between children’s ability and their participation in housework.  
One noteworthy finding is the great variation of results across methodologies, 
highlighting the importance of considering both pooled OLS and fixed effects 
regressions in order to offer a better understanding of the relationship under study. 
Pooled OLS results suggest, for instance, that children with a higher level of cognitive 
ability are more likely to be enrolled in school, which confirms the presence of a 
reinforcement strategy where children who are more likely to succeed at school are 
actually more likely to be sent to it. However, once household-year fixed effects are 
considered in the estimation, controlling for all the factors that remain constant for 
all siblings living in the same household in the same years, the study finds that such 
a reinforcement strategy only remains for boys, not for girls. In order to make sense 
of these apparently contradictory results, it is important to keep in mind that the 
pooled OLS and the fixed effects regressions are both valid in their own context and 
are answering the same question, only through different perspectives. Pooled OLS 
results confirm that, on average, more able children are more likely to be enrolled in 
school, but do not provide much information on the intrahousehold decision-making 
process taking place within each individual family. On the other hand, fixed effects 
results suggest that within any particular household, more able boys tend to be more 
likely to go to school, this effect being non-existent for girls. The presence of a 
reinforcement pattern that is only valid for boys is also an interesting finding itself 
and might be mirroring the particular gender-stratified nature of the cultural 
environment where the sample was extracted. Since boys are expected to grow up to 
become future household heads and breadwinners, parents might be more cautious 
when making investment decisions regarding their education. More able boys are 
more likely to be sent to school, because they are more likely to retrieve the benefits 
of such investment in the future. On the other hand, if most girls are traditionally 
expected to become housewives and stay at home, the decision of whether they are 
sent to school or not will have little to do with their cognitive endowment and their 
134 
 
 
future potential income, but will be likely to be determined by a different set of 
factors. 
A major challenge in the measurement of the effect of children’s ability on their time 
allocation patterns is the possible presence of reverse causality. Since children’s 
cognitive ability is continuously developing, it is quite possible that the way they 
allocate their time has an effect on it; for instance, children who go to school are 
likely to have, on average, a higher level of cognitive ability with respect to other 
children. In this case, height-for-age is used as an instrumental variable for 
children’s IQ measures in an attempt to eliminate the endogenous variation in the 
latter. As a result from following this approach, the positive relationship between 
children’s cognitive ability and their probability to be enrolled in school now seems 
to be stronger and more significant. Similarly, introducing an exogenous source of 
variation in cognitive ability makes the relationship between the latter and 
participation in housework positive and highly significant, meaning that more able 
children also tend to be more likely to participate in housework. These changes in 
size, magnitude and in some cases even the sign of the regression coefficients from 
the pooled OLS estimations to the instrumental variables can be interpreted as an 
indicator of the presence of endogeneity in the former. Therefore, it is essential that 
any attempt to identify a causal relationship between children’s cognitive ability and 
time allocation consider the use of techniques that remove the endogenous portion 
of the variation in the former. Following this idea, the estimations in Chapter 4 also 
use instrumental variables under a fixed effects framework in order to remove 
possible endogeneity from the intrahousehold analysis. Even though the link 
between cognitive ability and time allocation does not show to be significant under 
any specifications, it is not possible to conclude that there is no meaningful 
relationship between children’s ability and their time allocation within each 
particular household, since the instrument used (height-for-age) does not actually 
provide enough intrahousehold variation to explain the differences in cognitive 
ability among siblings.  The selection of an appropriate instrument is generally a 
considerably complex process, which becomes particularly challenging when 
working with intrahousehold variations. In this case, any candidate for a good 
instrument should not only be strongly related to the endogenous variable but most 
also show a high degree of intrahousehold variation, a combination of characteristics 
that is not easily found in the typical household survey.  
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Overall, results from Chapter 4 do suggest the presence of a reinforcement pattern 
where more able children tend to be more likely to be sent to school, this effect being 
especially strong for boys. Even though this strategy might make sense at the 
household level since it is likely to maximise the present value of total earnings, it 
also highlights the presence of a negative cycle where less able children, who are 
also more likely to have low income in the future as it is, are getting limited access 
to education. This outcome is particularly worrisome in terms of social policy, as it 
might be indicating an important source of economic inequality in the near future. 
Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that social projects aimed to maximise children’s 
school enrolment and attendance consider the intrahousehold selection processes 
that take place when a family makes the decision of whether a child will be sent to 
school or not, paying special attention to those children in conditions of 
disadvantage.  
 
5.2  Limitations and suggestions for future research 
 
Even though the main objectives set in the three empirical chapters of this thesis 
were tackled in the most appropriate manner according to the author’s best 
knowledge and ability, it is pertinent to mention some of the limitations restricting 
the quantitative analyses and areas of opportunity that might be worth exploring in 
future research.  
 
Most of the limitations of this thesis have to do with the unavailability of data. One 
important challenge of working with the MxFLS is that although it covers a 10-year 
period, the information is only collected in three waves. This means that for every 
subject there are only a maximum of three observations to study intrahousehold and 
within-individual variations. Having an observation per year would probably improve 
the quality of the fixed-effects estimations. Also, having a longer period of time 
covered in the survey would make it possible to widen the scope of some of the 
research questions. In Chapter 2, for instance, this thesis aims to study the 
intergenerational transmission of obesity by analysing the Body Mass Index (BMI) of 
parents and children contained in the sample; however, results do not provide much 
information on the persistence of the intergenerational link, which would ideally 
require data on more than two generations. If a Mexican data set which such 
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characteristics becomes available in the near future, a study of persistence of the 
BMI intergenerational link would offer a good contribution to the literature.  
Similarly, the analysis in Chapter 3 could benefit from the inclusion of information 
regarding the nature of the intrahousehold allocation of resources, specifically, 
whether husband and wife pool their resources or not. Unfortunately, the MxFLS 
does not include any information on this matter. The questionnaire asks individuals 
about their income, and then this variable is aggregated for the household, but the 
survey does not actually deepen the analysis into a differentiation between pooled 
and non-pooled income. An alternative approach would be to analyse information on 
savings and on whether husband and wife have separate saving devices, however 
saving information is only available at the household level and does not include any 
details about individual saving accounts. The nature of the questions asked in the 
MxFLS seems to implicitly assume resource pooling. 
Also, even though the MxFLS does gather information on a wide variety of aspects of 
family life, some of the analyses in this thesis could benefit from the use of more 
variables at the community level, which unfortunately are not included in the survey. 
For example, the absence of some variables beyond the household level prevents the 
analysis in Chapter 3 to include factors such as the level of political participation of 
women in the community as an additional control in the estimations. 
The measurement of the relationships under study in Chapter 4 face a few challenges 
that have to do with the nature of the dependent variables. For instance, the 
dependent variable indicating whether the child works is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the child worked in the last 12 months. Although choosing 
such a long span of time makes sense in terms of representativeness across time 
(asking if the child worked last week would not necessarily represent the child’s 
general situation), it raises the question on whether it actually captures the true 
essence of the child labour issue, since this variable will also be capturing summer 
jobs and part-time employment that do not necessarily compromise the child’s time 
allocated to school or other academic activities. Similarly, it is possible that 
children’s involvement in housework has little to do with cognitive ability and 
substitution with respect to school attendance, but simply representing the parents’ 
wish to educate their children in values related to cooperation and discipline at 
home.  
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One important challenge of studying the research question in Chapter 4 is the choice 
of a measurement for children’s cognitive ability. Although the result of a Raven test 
might not be a perfect proxy for it, it is the only variable available in the data set that 
would capture at least some portion of the variation in cognitive ability, and there is 
no reason to believe that using any other index or method of measurement would 
significantly alter the results. Another limitation of the empirical analysis in Chapter 
4 is that even though the instrument ‘height-for-age’ does seem to work well under 
pooled OLS schemes, it does not show enough variability to explain intrahousehold 
variations in cognitive ability. As commented earlier in this chapter, finding an 
instrument that complies with both relevance and exogeneity in this particular case 
becomes a difficult, if not impossible task. However, it is the author’s belief that this 
does not undermine the chapter’s general conclusions regarding the relationship 
under study. 
Finally, just as in the previous chapters, it is important to recognise that the analysis 
in Chapter 4 could also significantly benefit from the inclusion of additional variables 
that unfortunately are not available in the data set. Factors such as single-parenting, 
extreme poverty, domestic violence, etc, could potentially have an influence on both: 
children’s cognitive ability and the parents’ choice to allocate children’s time in a 
certain manner. If that is the case, the large data set analysis with marginal effects 
at the means would be inappropriate.   
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1. Number of observations per year. 
Year Observations Per cent Cumulative 
    
Total number of children in the sample   
2002 10,523 34.83 34.83 
2005 9,744 32.26 67.09 
2009 9,942 32.91 100 
Total 30,209 100  
    
Mother-child pairs    
2002 9,061 40.61 40.61 
2005 6,347 28.44 69.05 
2009 6,906 30.95 100 
Total 22,314 100  
    
Father-child pairs    
2002 6,275 40.87 40.87 
2005 4,340 28.27 69.14 
2009 4,739 30.86 100 
Total 15,354 100  
    
Mother-father-child sets   
2002 5,996 42.32 42.32 
2005 4,047 28.56 70.88 
2009 4,126 29.12 100 
Total 14,169 100  
Table A2. Number of times each observation appears in the panel. 
Number of waves Observations Per cent Cum. 
1 8,622 28.54 28.54 
2 11,066 36.63 65.17 
3 10,521 34.83 100 
Total 30,209 100  
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Table A3. Individual Fixed Effects (restricted sample: children whose both parents work). 
  (1) (2) (3)        
BMI z-score mother 0.121 0.073 0.046    
 (0.104) (0.125) (0.135)    
BMI z-score father 0.069 0.082 0.085    
 (0.078) (0.078) (0.082)    
Child´s age 0.037 0.000 -0.032    
 (0.079) (0.083) (0.078)    
Child's age squared -0.004 -0.003 -0.003    
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Gender (Male)*age 0.019 0.027 0.025    
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)    
Mother´s age -0.152 -0.216* -0.248**  
 (0.110) (0.113) (0.113)    
Father´s age 0.159 0.239** 0.219*   
 (0.107) (0.121) (0.116)    
Mother's age squared 0.002 0.003** 0.003**  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Father's age squared -0.002* -0.003** -0.002**  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
WHO 2007 reference 0.395 0.503** 0.487**  
 (0.240) (0.249) (0.246)    
Constant -0.235 -1.415 0.349    
  (1.742) (1.974) (2.713)    
Household socioeconomic level  Y Y 
Region dummies   Y 
Time dummies   Y 
Region*time interactions     Y 
R-squared 0.080 0.118 0.131    
N. of cases 2,749 2,589 2,589 
N. of groups 2,323 2,184 2,184 
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Table A4. Household Fixed Effects (restricted sample: children whose both parents work). 
  (1) (2) (3)        
BMI z-score mother 0.180* 0.162 0.139    
 (0.104) (0.116) (0.121)    
BMI z-score father 0.033 -0.003 -0.036    
 (0.073) (0.074) (0.081)    
Child's gender: Male 0.100 0.051 0.053    
 (0.137) (0.139) (0.139)    
Child´s age 0.010 0.013 0.014    
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.043)    
Child's age squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.002    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Gender (Male)*age -0.002 0.002 0.002    
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
Mother´s age -0.060 -0.106 -0.121    
 (0.092) (0.091) (0.092)    
Father´s age 0.067 0.128 0.136    
 (0.100) (0.104) (0.105)    
Mother's age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Father's age squared -0.001 -0.002 -0.002    
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
WHO 2007 reference 0.304** 0.310** 0.310**  
 (0.130) (0.133) (0.134)    
Constant    
        
Household socioeconomic level  Y Y 
Region dummies   Y 
Time dummies   Y 
Region*time interactions     Y 
R-squared 0.021 0.030 0.031    
N. of cases 2,749 2,589 2,589 
N. of groups 1,108 1,051 1,051 
 
 
Table A5. Quantile Regression for Children's BMI z-score        
  Quantile 
  0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 
Mother's BMI z-score 0.211 0.220 0.238 0.253 
0.27
0 
0.26
7 
0.26
4 
0.25
8 
0.22
3 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 0.020 0.016 0.014 0.015 
0.01
4 
0.01
4 
0.01
6 
0.01
4 
0.02
0 
Father's BMI z-score 0.188 0.174 0.163 0.179 
0.18
1 
0.19
1 
0.21
8 
0.24
3 
0.24
6 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 0.020 0.019 0.015 0.013 
0.01
3 
0.01
0 
0.01
4 
0.01
5 
0.01
5 
Household Income (per capita) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
0.00
0 
Mother's Education 0.002 
-
0.001 0.006 0.007 
0.00
8 
0.01
1 
0.01
5 
0.01
5 
0.01
8 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 
0.00
5 
0.00
6 
0.00
4 
0.00
5 
0.00
4 
Father's Education 
-
0.010 
-
0.002 
-
0.005 
-
0.003 
0.00
0 
0.00
5 
0.00
6 
0.00
9 
0.01
1 
Bootstrapped Standard Errors 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 
0.00
5 
0.00
6 
0.00
4 
0.00
5 
0.00
5 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Table B1: Number of observations per year   
    
Year Observations Percent Cumulative 
2002 6,132 33.29 33.29 
2005 5,963 32.37 65.67 
2009 6,324 34.33 100 
Total 18,419 100  
 
 
 
Table B2: Number of times each observation appears in the panel  
    
Number of waves Observations Percent Cumulative 
1 2,742 14.89 14.89 
2 3,405 18.49 33.37 
3 12,272 66.63 100 
Total 18,419 100  
 
 
 
Table B3(a): Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables. 
 2002 2005 2009 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Education (years) 6132 6.224 4.370 5963 6.489 4.377 6324 6.919 4.421 
Work (=1) 6127 0.241 0.428 5959 0.212 0.409 6313 0.242 0.428 
Age 6125 40.301 13.872 5938 41.667 14.530 6281 42.014 15.063 
Married (=1) 6114 0.828 0.377 5883 0.809 0.393 5939 0.767 0.423 
Age at marriage 6060 20.754 5.955 5802 21.026 6.121 6084 21.213 6.097 
Previous unions (=1) 6114 0.081 0.273 5963 0.069 0.253 6324 0.068 0.251 
Indigenous group (=1) 6131 0.123 0.328 5960 0.122 0.327 6324 0.128 0.334 
Number of children 4542 2.911 1.921 4553 2.730 1.950 5127 2.527 1.929 
Age of children 5230 12.819 8.865 4934 14.901 9.663 4798 16.656 10.238 
Proportion of male children 5232 0.503 0.366 4954 0.510 0.355 4803 0.514 0.360 
Couple's Difference in Age 6117 -3.410 5.728 5918 -3.263 5.698 6263 -3.330 5.367 
Couple's Difference in Education 
(years) 5114 -0.635 4.191 4917 -0.523 4.599 5110 -0.490 4.782 
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Table B4:  Brant Tests for Parallel Regression Assumption (P-values) 
  
Daily 
Life 
Children's wellbeing 
Economic decisions Autonomy 
  Food 
Children's 
Education 
Children's 
Health 
Care  
Large 
Expenditures 
Cash 
Transfers 
to Her 
Relatives 
If She 
Should 
Work 
Contraceptive 
Use 
Individual Level        
Education (years) 0.692 0.000 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Work 0.194 0.992 0.020 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.443 
Age 0.003 0.439 0.246 0.167 0.551 0.075 0.140 
Married 0.137 0.901 0.019 0.029 0.006 0.012 0.042 
Age at marriage 0.304 0.071 0.278 0.020 0.267 0.018 0.978 
Previous unions 0.012 0.000 0.003 0.021 0.629 0.001 0.173 
Indigenous group 0.185 0.122 0.220 0.218 0.939 0.973 0.001 
Number of children 0.869 0.259 0.163 0.976 0.323 0.889 0.116 
Age of children (mean) 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.977 0.710 0.711 0.091 
Proportion of male children 0.494 0.728 0.847 0.403 0.367 0.532 0.077 
Couple Level        
Difference in Age 0.234 0.345 0.966 0.764 0.126 0.976 0.005 
Difference in Education 0.417 0.000 0.011 0.290 0.810 0.985 0.068 
Household Level: Quantile of Net Income       
2nd 0.375 0.481 0.062 0.977 0.411 0.233 0.032 
3rd 0.832 0.454 0.172 0.312 0.714 0.063 0.116 
4th 0.353 0.822 0.638 0.102 0.192 0.004 0.255 
Community/Locality Level: Population (Base: Less than 2,500)     
Between 2,500 and 15,000 0.001 0.484 0.245 0.253 0.051 0.099 0.143 
Between 15,000 and 
100,000 0.442 0.775 0.934 0.077 0.196 0.612 0.957 
More than 100,000 0.620 0.185 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.732 0.002 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012.  
 
 
 
 
Table B3(b): Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables.     
 2002 2005 2009 
  Obs. Percentage Obs. Percentage Obs. Percentage 
Region       
North 1389 22.66 1316 22.07 1406 22.24 
Center-North 1958 31.95 1954 32.77 2034 32.18 
Center-North 1536 25.06 1498 25.13 1650 26.1 
South 1246 20.33 1194 20.03 1231 19.47 
  6129 100 5962 100 6321 100 
Community Size       
Less than 2500 2617 42.7 2425 40.67 2958 46.8 
Between 2,500 and 15,000 656 10.7 757 12.69 632 10 
Between 15,000 and 100,000 577 9.41 617 10.35 673 10.65 
More than 100,000 2279 37.18 2164 36.29 2058 32.56 
  6129 100 5963 100 6321 100 
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Table B5. Level of decision-making power by aspect of decision-making, using women's perception 
(frequencies in percentages). 
  Level of Decision-Making Power   
 1 2 3  
  
Does not participate 
in the decision-
making process 
Shares decision-
making process with 
at least one other 
family member 
Makes decision by 
herself 
Total 
(%) 
Food  10.41 35.64 53.94 100 
Children's education 23.76 67.95 8.29 100 
Health care and medicines for children 23.04 67.52 9.44 100 
Large expenditures 36.2 58.43 5.36 100 
Cash transfers to her parents/relatives 12.5 57.13 30.37 100 
If she should work 24.76 33.97 41.26 100 
Contraceptive use 6.36 87.12 6.52 100 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 
2009-2012.      
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APPENDIX C 
Section I: Complete regression results from Table 4.1 
Table C1: Work in the last 12 months, logit regression. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
IQ-for-age z score -0.088* -0.100** -0.110** -0.085 -0.171 -0.164 -0.167 -0.140 -0.145    
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) (0.068) (0.110) (0.111) (0.146) (0.149) (0.150)    
Age    -0.002 -0.006 -0.005 0.344 0.339 0.380 0.320 0.378    
  (0.245) (0.246) (0.246) (0.384) (0.385) (0.534) (0.533) (0.537)    
Age2  0.020 0.021 0.021 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.001    
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)    
Male (=1)   0.711 0.706 0.868 0.940 1.480 1.330 1.413    
   (0.500) (0.500) (0.869) (0.871) (1.163) (1.147) (1.180)    
Male*Age   -0.001 -0.001 -0.019 -0.027 -0.098 -0.082 -0.083    
   (0.048) (0.048) (0.082) (0.082) (0.112) (0.111) (0.112)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -0.038 0.172 0.184 0.128 0.090 0.086    
    (0.088) (0.153) (0.155) (0.218) (0.217) (0.224)    
First Born(=1)     -0.008 0.031 -0.120 -0.110 0.112    
     (0.230) (0.236) (0.385) (0.397) (0.383)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: "Very 
good"=1)          
Good      -0.231 -0.242 -0.557 -0.562 -0.650*   
     (0.234) (0.235) (0.374) (0.370) (0.380)    
Regular     0.277 0.221 -0.072 -0.072 -0.206    
     (0.260) (0.262) (0.413) (0.407) (0.425)    
Bad     0.425 0.448 0.209 0.326 0.204    
     (0.764) (0.748) (1.096) (1.083) (1.020)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     0.614 0.636 0.835 0.977 1.061    
     (0.761) (0.763) (1.059) (1.138) (1.052)    
Visible illness (=1)     0.509 0.541 0.585 0.593 0.491    
     (0.509) (0.516) (0.624) (0.649) (0.683)    
Income quantile: Q2      1.137*** 0.712* 0.724** 0.709*   
      (0.251) (0.365) (0.368) (0.369)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.501* 0.228 0.197 0.112    
      (0.266) (0.359) (0.359) (0.374)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.352 0.485 0.355 0.355    
      (0.274) (0.352) (0.375) (0.380)    
Mother's education 
(years)       -0.039 -0.051 -0.036    
       (0.032) (0.032) (0.034)    
Father's education (years)       -0.030 -0.034 -0.024    
       (0.043) (0.045) (0.047)    
Mother works (=1)        0.706** 0.679**  
        (0.305) (0.296)    
Household size         0.192*   
         (0.104)    
Proportion of male 
children         -0.120    
         (0.408)    
Region 2         0.371    
         (0.386)    
Region 3         0.471    
         (0.339)    
Region 4          -0.570    
         (0.499)    
2005         -0.022    
         (0.404)    
2009         -0.377    
         (0.300)    
Constant 
-
3.410*** 
-
5.298*** 
-
5.701*** 
-
5.699*** 
-
7.495*** 
-
8.023*** 
-
6.992*** 
-
6.745*** 
-
8.119*** 
 (0.050) (1.113) (1.149) (1.150) (1.850) (1.855) (2.468) (2.440) (2.721)    
          
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.067 0.079 0.079 0.095 0.112 0.096 0.107 0.129    
Wald Chi-Square 3.661 292.609 342.049 345.342 129.812 154.998 72.651 75.037 99.279    
N. of cases 16540 16146 16146 16146 5795 5794 2321 2308 2308    
145 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table C2:  School attendance in the current academic year, logit regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
IQ-for-age z score 
0.325**
* 0.348*** 0.350*** 0.274*** 0.286** 0.245* 0.259 0.316 0.411    
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.047) (0.069) (0.129) (0.128) (0.225) (0.231) (0.271)    
Age    2.602*** 2.641*** 2.640*** 3.043*** 3.047*** 5.163*** 5.201*** 5.310*** 
  (0.152) (0.148) (0.148) (0.311) (0.312) (0.696) (0.697) (0.751)    
Age2  
-
0.138*** 
-
0.137*** 
-
0.137*** 
-
0.161*** 
-
0.160*** -0.276*** -0.278*** -0.284*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.018) (0.040) (0.041) (0.044)    
Male (=1)   0.517** 0.539** 0.424 0.441 0.861 0.916 1.266    
   (0.260) (0.262) (0.519) (0.524) (0.849) (0.852) (0.941)    
Male*Age   -0.089** -0.086** -0.027 -0.028 -0.095 -0.096 -0.090    
   (0.035) (0.035) (0.067) (0.067) (0.109) (0.111) (0.118)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.142 0.133 0.140 0.199 0.163 0.239    
    (0.095) (0.199) (0.200) (0.368) (0.370) (0.426)    
First Born(=1)     0.043 -0.059 -0.101 -0.082 -0.119    
     (0.197) (0.201) (0.455) (0.453) (0.484)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: "Very 
good"=1)          
Good      -0.172 -0.100 -0.521 -0.514 -0.731    
     (0.271) (0.270) (0.514) (0.516) (0.519)    
Regular     -0.510* -0.390 -0.349 -0.354 -0.589    
     (0.303) (0.304) (0.602) (0.599) (0.644)    
Bad     -1.584** -1.356* -1.690 -1.614 -2.087*   
     (0.718) (0.750) (1.078) (1.104) (1.190)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -1.443** -1.496** 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (0.686) (0.662) (.) (.) (.)    
Visible illness (=1)     -0.982** -0.966** 0.027 -0.079 -0.614    
     (0.429) (0.416) (1.073) (1.090) (1.101)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.069 -0.417 -0.399 -0.537    
      (0.235) (0.416) (0.420) (0.417)    
Income quantile: Q3      -0.027 0.558 0.519 0.638    
      (0.238) (0.467) (0.469) (0.483)    
Income quantile: Q4      1.142*** 0.238 0.165 0.102    
      (0.285) (0.471) (0.472) (0.480)    
Mother's education 
(years)       0.181*** 0.178*** 0.210*** 
       (0.056) (0.056) (0.058)    
Father's education 
(years)       0.079 0.080 0.075    
       (0.055) (0.056) (0.059)    
Mother works (=1)        0.646 0.691    
        (0.453) (0.477)    
Household size         -0.115    
         (0.132)    
Proportion of male children        -0.847    
         (0.649)    
Region 2         1.257*** 
         (0.451)    
Region 3         1.461*** 
         (0.478)    
Region 4          1.761*** 
         (0.499)    
2005         0.170    
         (0.433)    
2009         1.155*   
         (0.676)    
Constant 
3.245**
* 
-
7.790*** 
-
8.034*** 
-
8.047*** 
-
9.097*** 
-
9.438*** 
-
18.720*** 
-
18.978*** 
-
19.620*** 
 (0.047) (0.569) (0.562) (0.563) (1.201) (1.229) (2.780) (2.768) (3.125)    
          
Pseudo R-squared 0.012 0.134 0.135 0.136 0.177 0.194 0.371 0.375 0.419    
Wald Chi-Square 57.125 681.747 692.774 697.434 257.891 272.488 155.742 158.155 183.169    
N. of cases 16433 16039 16039 16039 5764 5763 2299 2286 2286    
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Table C3:  Participation in housework last week, logit regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
IQ-for-age z score -0.007 -0.011 -0.001 -0.008 -0.084** -0.095** -0.086 -0.088 -0.079    
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.042) (0.043) (0.069) (0.070) (0.072)    
Age    0.583*** 0.627*** 0.627*** 0.572*** 0.571*** 0.684*** 0.650*** 0.678*** 
  (0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.103) (0.103) (0.161) (0.161) (0.162)    
Age2  
-
0.018*** 
-
0.015*** 
-
0.015*** -0.011* -0.011* -0.019** -0.017* -0.017*   
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)    
Male (=1)   0.719*** 0.719*** 0.750*** 0.775*** 0.524 0.574 0.662*   
   (0.138) (0.138) (0.234) (0.234) (0.369) (0.371) (0.376)    
Male*Age   
-
0.180*** 
-
0.180*** 
-
0.193*** 
-
0.196*** 
-
0.157*** 
-
0.162*** 
-
0.175*** 
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.015 0.105* 0.108* 0.049 0.052 0.034    
    (0.034) (0.058) (0.058) (0.093) (0.093) (0.096)    
First Born(=1)     -0.088 -0.100 0.009 0.001 -0.132    
     (0.066) (0.066) (0.109) (0.109) (0.114)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: "Very 
good"=1)          
Good      -0.056 -0.052 -0.229 -0.221 -0.235    
     (0.089) (0.089) (0.145) (0.145) (0.149)    
Regular     0.071 0.082 -0.173 -0.162 -0.273    
     (0.103) (0.104) (0.168) (0.168) (0.172)    
Bad     -0.486 -0.453 -0.582 -0.564 -0.627    
     (0.376) (0.376) (0.579) (0.568) (0.562)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -0.013 -0.026 -0.759 -0.712 -0.856    
     (0.476) (0.481) (0.884) (0.882) (0.943)    
Visible illness (=1)     0.260 0.271 0.255 0.282 0.180    
     (0.254) (0.250) (0.370) (0.386) (0.384)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.220** 0.047 0.058 0.130    
      (0.097) (0.164) (0.165) (0.169)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.094 0.104 0.094 0.152    
      (0.090) (0.146) (0.148) (0.152)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.267*** 0.170 0.125 0.140    
      (0.087) (0.147) (0.150) (0.153)    
Mother's education 
(years)       0.005 -0.002 0.002    
       (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)    
Father's education 
(years)       0.008 0.010 0.011    
       (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)    
Mother works (=1)        0.317*** 0.260**  
        (0.117) (0.121)    
Household size         
-
0.142*** 
         (0.041)    
Proportion of male 
children         0.053    
         (0.187)    
Region 2         0.553*** 
         (0.142)    
Region 3         0.771*** 
         (0.155)    
Region 4          0.321**  
         (0.155)    
2005         -0.128    
         (0.142)    
2009         0.155    
         (0.120)    
Constant 
-
0.078*** 
-
3.656*** 
-
3.872*** 
-
3.872*** 
-
3.540*** 
-
3.695*** 
-
3.920*** 
-
3.837*** 
-
3.779*** 
 (0.018) (0.254) (0.264) (0.264) (0.444) (0.448) (0.719) (0.720) (0.765)    
          
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.065 0.099 0.099 0.106 0.108 0.101 0.104 0.121    
Wald Chi-Square 
0.178 
1266.57
7 
1764.64
8 
1764.86
4 
704.290 709.586 267.006 273.233 292.462    
N. of cases 16511 16117 16117 16117 5794 5793 2321 2308 2308    
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Table C4: Average number of hours per week spent at work, Tobit regression. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
IQ-for-age z score -2.645 -3.071* -3.406* -2.310 -4.725 -4.774 -3.139 -3.052 -3.070    
 (1.909) (1.852) (1.836) (2.804) (4.661) (4.561) (5.698) (5.751) (5.623)    
Age    15.814* 13.925 13.992 13.167 15.158 7.836 6.675 8.138    
 
 (8.581) (8.622) (8.607) (14.251) (13.916) (17.540) (17.627) (17.408)    
Age2  0.018 0.032 0.029 0.075 -0.035 0.370 0.422 0.244    
 
 (0.453) (0.452) (0.451) (0.742) (0.728) (0.950) (0.956) (0.955)    
Male (=1)   0.739 0.556 6.283 9.678 30.230 27.788 22.599    
 
  (20.630) (20.621) (31.816) (31.343) (37.263) (37.207) (37.886)    
Male*Age   2.574 2.582 1.968 1.598 -1.018 -0.754 -0.150    
 
  (2.024) (2.023) (3.099) (3.051) (3.736) (3.738) (3.721)    
Male*IQ-for-age z 
score 
   -1.804 4.296 4.984 2.295 1.828 1.233    
 
   (3.567) (6.182) (6.102) (8.075) (8.123) (8.019)    
First Born(=1)     -1.333 -0.178 -7.209 -7.716 2.664    
 
    (8.854) (9.058) (13.716) (13.759) (11.609)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: 
"Very good"=1) 
         
Good      -3.645 -4.451 -8.513 -7.761 -11.488    
 
    (9.393) (9.367) (13.295) (13.137) (13.049)    
Regular     16.546 14.584 7.208 7.480 1.830    
 
    (10.606) (10.533) (15.048) (14.951) (14.851)    
Bad     25.578 24.590 7.831 10.681 3.541    
 
    (31.210) (31.054) (36.589) (36.248) (34.376)    
Very bad     -408.771 -430.975 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
    (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     20.376 19.996 27.249 30.594 32.514    
 
    (27.733) (27.508) (36.285) (37.249) (34.446)    
Visible illness (=1)     19.276 21.441 25.234 26.284 23.367    
 
    (19.769) (19.794) (23.423) (23.850) (24.286)    
Income quantile: Q2 
     49.705**
* 
31.647** 31.380** 29.447**  
 
     (10.085) (13.598) (13.670) (13.535)    
Income quantile: Q3      25.558** 14.887 13.723 10.567    
 
     (10.640) (13.966) (13.947) (14.048)    
Income quantile: Q4      20.565* 23.993* 21.729 20.825    
 
     (10.806) (13.524) (14.092) (13.996)    
Mother's education 
(years) 
      -1.190 -1.447 -0.884    
 
      (1.227) (1.244) (1.275)    
Father's education 
(years) 
      -1.040 -1.024 -0.841    
 
      (1.648) (1.676) (1.567)    
Mother works (=1)        13.947 13.623    
 
       (10.908) (10.509)    
Household size         7.121*   
 
        (3.656)    
Proportion of male 
children 
        0.376    
 
        (14.666)    
Region 2         8.771    
 
        (13.266)    
Region 3         13.150    
 
        (11.817)    
Region 4          -22.221    
 
        (17.978)    
2005         -4.190    
 
        (14.129)    
2009         -15.509    
 
        (10.522)    
Constant 
-
175.096*
** 
-
316.008*
** 
-
311.748*
** 
-
312.041*
** 
-
311.277*
** 
-
342.430*
** 
-
261.887*
** 
-
257.477*
** 
-
295.788*
** 
 (6.818) (41.153) (42.595) (42.497) (70.313) (69.003) (83.801) (84.084) (91.640)    
          
sigma                                 
Constant 
91.757**
* 
86.014**
* 
85.031**
* 
85.046**
* 
86.479**
* 
84.898**
* 
80.417**
* 
80.357**
* 
79.170**
* 
  (3.120) (3.014) (2.998) (2.997) (4.595) (4.633) (6.552) (6.560) (6.523)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.043 0.050 0.050 0.048 0.058 0.047 0.048 0.059    
F statistic 1.920 76.164 53.386 45.971 . . 4.420 4.272 3.913 
N. of cases 16471 16078 16078 16078 5777 5776 2313 2300 2300    
Table C5: Average number of hours per week spent at school, Tobit regression. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
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IQ-for-age z score 0.684*** 0.645*** 0.648*** 0.564*** 0.554*** 0.522*** 0.476** 0.476** 0.434**  
 (0.073) (0.067) (0.067) (0.089) (0.135) (0.135) (0.196) (0.196) (0.196)    
Age    
11.480**
* 
11.523**
* 
11.521**
* 8.962*** 8.928*** 8.682*** 8.776*** 8.638*** 
  (0.426) (0.428) (0.428) (0.704) (0.702) (1.119) (1.122) (1.110)    
Age2  
-
0.571*** 
-
0.571*** 
-
0.571*** 
-
0.432*** 
-
0.430*** 
-
0.417*** 
-
0.422*** 
-
0.412*** 
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.037) (0.036) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057)    
Male (=1)   0.584 0.586 0.516 0.611 0.205 -0.066 0.447    
   (0.746) (0.746) (1.154) (1.151) (1.797) (1.803) (1.821)    
Male*Age   -0.087 -0.087 -0.056 -0.065 -0.025 0.003 -0.010    
   (0.077) (0.077) (0.117) (0.117) (0.182) (0.182) (0.182)    
Male*IQ-for-age z 
score    0.171 -0.088 -0.087 0.105 0.111 0.123    
    (0.128) (0.192) (0.191) (0.285) (0.285) (0.282)    
First Born(=1)     -0.131 -0.183 -0.245 -0.267 -0.467    
     (0.206) (0.206) (0.303) (0.305) (0.315)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: 
"Very good"=1)          
Good      0.062 0.086 0.465 0.465 0.444    
     (0.255) (0.256) (0.372) (0.372) (0.371)    
Regular     0.267 0.335 0.942** 0.885** 0.670    
     (0.311) (0.312) (0.436) (0.437) (0.445)    
Bad     -1.645 -1.557 -5.019* -4.990 -5.142*   
     (1.638) (1.633) (3.038) (3.036) (3.077)    
Very bad     1.273** 1.515*** 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (0.520) (0.540) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -4.549** -4.487** -2.077 -1.949 -2.099    
     (1.902) (1.891) (1.540) (1.559) (1.590)    
Visible illness (=1)     -1.846** -1.805** -0.883 -1.150* -0.979    
     (0.781) (0.783) (0.716) (0.671) (0.694)    
Income quantile: Q2      -0.257 
-
1.401*** 
-
1.355*** 
-
1.373*** 
      (0.280) (0.435) (0.437) (0.432)    
Income quantile: Q3      -0.239 -0.374 -0.348 -0.334    
      (0.278) (0.368) (0.372) (0.366)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.467** -0.409 -0.438 -0.440    
      (0.235) (0.365) (0.376) (0.367)    
Mother's education 
(years)       0.077** 0.069* 0.079**  
       (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)    
Father's education 
(years)       0.078** 0.075** 0.069*   
       (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)    
Mother works (=1)        0.346 0.317    
        (0.288) (0.282)    
Household size         -0.231**  
         (0.112)    
Proportion of male children        -0.716    
         (0.477)    
Region 2         -0.382    
         (0.345)    
Region 3         1.074*** 
         (0.374)    
Region 4          0.641*   
         (0.375)    
2005         0.045    
         (0.360)    
2009         0.159    
         (0.315)    
Constant 
23.690*
** 
-
31.414**
* 
-
31.703**
* 
-
31.696**
* 
-
20.199**
* 
-
20.128**
* 
-
19.843**
* 
-
20.240**
* 
-
18.677**
* 
 (0.072) (1.978) (2.020) (2.020) (3.346) (3.338) (5.376) (5.391) (5.414)              
sigma                   
Constant 7.270*** 6.575*** 6.574*** 6.574*** 5.980*** 5.972*** 5.346*** 5.348*** 5.309*** 
  (0.123) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.166) (0.166) (0.180) (0.181) (0.179)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.039 0.039 0.042    
F statistic 86.988 359.025 216.476 180.636 27.531 23.047 11.577 11.117 8.268 
N. of cases 13580 13240 13240 13240 4811 4811 1933 1921 1921    
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Table C6: Average number of hours per week spent doing housework, Tobit regression. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
IQ-for-age z score -0.155* -0.175* -0.108 -0.184* -0.324* -0.355** -0.258 -0.277 -0.215    
 (0.092) (0.089) (0.086) (0.109) (0.166) (0.167) (0.266) (0.269) (0.270)    
Age    2.247*** 2.511*** 2.511*** 2.033*** 2.031*** 1.917*** 1.842*** 2.157*** 
 
 (0.299) (0.291) (0.290) (0.461) (0.460) (0.659) (0.662) (0.650)    
Age2 
 -
0.055*** 
-
0.051*** 
-
0.051*** 
-0.023 -0.023 -0.025 -0.021 -0.040    
 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)    
Male (=1)   3.134*** 3.135*** 3.568*** 3.725*** 3.802** 3.945** 2.961*   
 
  (0.670) (0.670) (1.093) (1.092) (1.690) (1.697) (1.649)    
Male*Age 
  -
0.798*** 
-
0.798*** 
-
0.836*** 
-
0.853*** 
-
0.818*** 
-
0.833*** 
-
0.768*** 
 
  (0.073) (0.073) (0.118) (0.118) (0.183) (0.184) (0.180)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.167 0.294 0.292 0.297 0.323 0.293    
 
   (0.159) (0.268) (0.267) (0.413) (0.415) (0.416)    
First Born(=1)     -0.676** -0.681** -0.117 -0.157 -0.331    
 
    (0.286) (0.285) (0.430) (0.433) (0.460)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: 
"Very good"=1) 
         
Good      0.856** 0.874** 0.373 0.383 0.261    
 
    (0.427) (0.425) (0.744) (0.746) (0.739)    
Regular     1.517*** 1.544*** 0.601 0.638 -0.089    
 
    (0.468) (0.467) (0.805) (0.808) (0.799)    
Bad     -1.740 -1.615 -1.209 -1.185 -1.946    
 
    (1.662) (1.649) (2.497) (2.476) (2.379)    
Very bad     -42.193 -42.555 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
    (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     0.664 0.550 -1.337 -1.212 0.275    
 
    (1.738) (1.735) (3.318) (3.322) (3.103)    
Visible illness (=1)     -0.006 0.030 0.120 0.232 -0.455    
 
    (1.130) (1.109) (1.488) (1.518) (1.552)    
Income quantile: Q2      1.255*** 0.249 0.264 -0.090    
 
     (0.428) (0.682) (0.688) (0.686)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.904** 0.921 0.892 0.767    
 
     (0.427) (0.674) (0.685) (0.685)    
Income quantile: Q4      1.258*** 0.680 0.610 0.257    
 
     (0.401) (0.655) (0.670) (0.671)    
Mother's education 
(years) 
      0.032 0.019 0.048    
 
      (0.065) (0.066) (0.068)    
Father's education 
(years) 
      -0.080 -0.073 -0.067    
 
      (0.062) (0.062) (0.063)    
Mother works (=1)        0.602 0.308    
 
       (0.495) (0.490)    
Household size         -0.283    
 
        (0.209)    
Proportion of male 
children 
        1.043    
 
        (0.811)    
Region 2         1.672*** 
 
        (0.628)    
Region 3         2.344*** 
 
        (0.660)    
Region 4          0.813    
 
        (0.702)    
2005         -0.312    
 
        (0.541)    
2009         -49.583    
 
        (.)    
Constant 
-
2.544**
* 
-
17.419**
* 
-
18.114**
* 
-
18.115**
* 
-
16.612**
* 
-
17.510**
* 
-
14.911**
* 
-
14.755**
* 
-
14.731**
* 
 (0.135) (1.280) (1.271) (1.271) (2.082) (2.088) (2.964) (2.972) (3.113)    
          
sigma                   
Constant 
8.538**
* 
8.078*** 7.778*** 7.777*** 7.400*** 7.386*** 7.409*** 7.426*** 7.085*** 
  (0.166) (0.173) (0.176) (0.176) (0.275) (0.275) (0.442) (0.445) (0.446)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.027 0.042 0.042 0.045 0.046 0.037 0.038 0.074    
F statistic 2.842 337.310 314.714 263.014 . . 13.792 13.125 . 
N. of cases 14145 13785 13785 13785 4877 4876 2016 2004 2004    
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Section II: Complete regression results from Table 4.2 
Table C7: Work in the last 12 months, logit regression with household fixed effects. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
IQ-for-age z score 0.070 -0.008 0.053 -0.037 0.145 0.145 
 (0.127) (0.176) (0.190) (0.238) (0.692) (0.692) 
Age    -0.783** -1.203*** -1.204*** -0.812 -0.812 
  (0.393) (0.439) (0.438) (1.432) (1.432) 
Age2  0.076*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.113 0.113 
  (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.084) (0.084) 
Male (=1)   -1.516 -1.572 0.017 0.017 
   (1.190) (1.200) (3.665) (3.665) 
Male*Age   0.278** 0.288** 0.209 0.209 
   (0.125) (0.127) (0.381) (0.381) 
Male*IQ-for-age z score   0.193 0.441 0.441 
    (0.308) (0.695) (0.695) 
First Born(=1)     -1.188 -1.188 
     (1.338) (1.338) 
Parental health assessment  
(Base: "Very good"=1) 
    -2.194* -2.194* 
Good      (1.285) (1.285) 
     -2.161 -2.161 
Regular     (1.486) (1.486) 
     -14.531 -14.531 
Bad     (3540.637) (3540.637) 
     0.000 0.000 
Very bad     (.) (.) 
     3.250 3.250 
Disability (=1)     (5.538) (5.538) 
     3.928 3.928 
Visible illness (=1)    (3.461) (3.461) 
      0.000 
Income quantile: Q2     (.) 
      0.000 
Income quantile: Q3     (.) 
      0.000 
Income quantile: Q4     (.) 
 
     (1.474) 
 
      
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.438 0.497 0.498 0.722 0.722 
Wald Chi-Square 0.307 149.815 170.245 170.637 87.398 87.398 
N. of cases 496 482 482 482 170 170 
N. of groups 191   186     186   186  66    66 
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Table C8: School attendance in the current academic year, logit regression with household fixed 
effects. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
IQ-for-age z score -0.073 0.048 0.025 -0.024 -1.102 -1.102    
 (0.087) (0.139) (0.142) (0.205) (0.740) (0.740)    
Age    4.238*** 4.357*** 4.340*** 8.305*** 8.305*** 
  (0.433) (0.450) (0.452) (2.176) (2.176)    
Age2  -0.223*** -0.229*** -0.228*** -0.447*** -0.447*** 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.121) (0.121)    
Male (=1)   -0.770 -0.769 -0.104 -0.104    
   (0.892) (0.892) (2.416) (2.416)    
Male*Age   0.007 0.010 0.119 0.119    
   (0.104) (0.105) (0.274) (0.274)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score   0.077 2.687** 2.687**  
    (0.230) (1.145) (1.145)    
First Born(=1)     -0.110 -0.110    
     (1.094) (1.094)    
Parental health 
assessment  (Base: "Very 
good"=1)       
Good      -2.448* -2.448*   
     (1.410) (1.410)    
Regular     -4.244** -4.244**  
     (2.057) (2.057)    
Bad     -22.332 -22.332    
     (2955.233) (2955.233)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -16.161 -16.161    
     (3714.446) (3714.446)    
Visible illness (=1)     -0.326 -0.326    
     (7.587) (7.587)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.000    
      (.)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.000    
      (.)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.000    
      (.)    
       
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.269 0.395 0.395 0.405 0.405    
Wald Chi-Square 0.058 653.159 960.153 960.259 359.342 359.342    
N. of cases 842 832 832 832 215 215    
N. of groups 304 301 301 301 82 82 
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Table C9:  Participation in housework last week, logit regression with household fixed effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
IQ-for-age z score -0.011 -0.025 0.011 0.030 0.168 0.168    
 (0.045) (0.056) (0.062) (0.083) (0.154) (0.154)    
Age    1.222*** 1.311*** 1.313*** 1.304*** 1.304*** 
  (0.152) (0.167) (0.167) (0.283) (0.283)    
Age2  -0.047*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.043*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016)    
Male (=1)   0.618 0.613 0.371 0.371    
   (0.405) (0.405) (0.687) (0.687)    
Male*Age   -0.242*** -0.242*** -0.223*** -0.223*** 
   (0.046) (0.046) (0.076) (0.076)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -0.031 -0.096 -0.096    
    (0.096) (0.171) (0.171)    
First Born(=1)     -0.251 -0.251    
     (0.247) (0.247)    
Parental health assessment  
(Base: "Very good"=1) 
      
Good      0.044 0.044    
     (0.348) (0.348)    
Regular     0.201 0.201    
     (0.424) (0.424)    
Bad     -0.485 -0.485    
     (1.411) (1.411)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -0.046 -0.046    
     (1.100) (1.100)    
Visible illness (=1)     -0.546 -0.546    
     (0.800) (0.800)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.000    
      (.)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.000    
      (.)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.000    
      (.)    
 
      
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.269 0.395 0.395 0.403 0.403    
Wald Chi-Square 0.058 653.159 960.153 960.259 335.927 335.927    
N. of cases 3475 3365 3365 3365 1162 1162    
N. of groups 1352 1311 1311 1311 469 469 
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Table C10:  Average number of hours spent at work, uncensored regression with household 
fixed effects     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
IQ-for-age z score 0.024 0.036 0.036 -0.002 0.274 0.274 0.368 0.366 0.366    
 (0.117) (0.119) (0.119) (0.147) (0.288) (0.288) (0.520) (0.520) (0.520)    
Age    -0.722** -0.968*** -0.971*** -0.404 -0.404 -0.261 -0.250 -0.250    
  (0.334) (0.341) (0.341) (0.551) (0.551) (0.967) (0.971) (0.971)    
Age2  0.067*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.030 0.030 0.026 0.025 0.025    
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.035) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062)    
Male (=1)   -3.526*** -3.529*** -4.065*** -4.065*** -3.356 -3.370 -3.370    
   (0.830) (0.831) (1.269) (1.269) (2.112) (2.116) (2.116)    
Male*Age   0.468*** 0.469*** 0.541*** 0.541*** 0.522** 0.523** 0.523**  
   (0.106) (0.106) (0.149) (0.149) (0.242) (0.242) (0.242)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score   0.070 -0.167 -0.167 -0.346 -0.347 -0.347    
    (0.172) (0.315) (0.315) (0.559) (0.559) (0.559)    
First Born(=1)     0.045 0.045 0.162 0.158 0.158    
     (0.397) (0.397) (0.821) (0.821) (0.821)    
Parental health 
assessment  (Base: 
"Very good"=1)          
Good      -1.061 -1.061 -0.800 -0.802 -0.802    
     (0.701) (0.701) (0.665) (0.666) (0.666)    
Regular     -0.502 -0.502 -0.351 -0.342 -0.342    
     (0.779) (0.779) (0.883) (0.887) (0.887)    
Bad     -1.561 -1.561 -0.611 -0.607 -0.607    
     (1.134) (1.134) (0.821) (0.822) (0.822)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -0.739 -0.739 3.408 3.408 3.408    
     (1.868) (1.868) (2.823) (2.822) (2.822)    
Visible illness (=1)    1.917 1.917 5.841 5.833 5.833    
     (2.623) (2.623) (4.696) (4.698) (4.698)    
Income quantile: Q2     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q3     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q4     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Mother's education (years)      0.114 0.117 0.117    
       (0.283) (0.284) (0.284)    
Father's education (years)      0.098 0.097 0.097    
       (0.238) (0.239) (0.239)    
Mother works (=1)       0.000 0.000    
        (.) (.)    
Household size        0.000    
         (.)    
Proportion of male children        0.000    
         (.)    
Region 2         0.000    
         (.)    
Region 3         0.000    
         (.)    
Region 4          0.000    
         (.)    
2005         0.000    
         (.)    
2009         0.000    
         (.)    
Constant 1.027*** 1.927 3.739*** 3.748*** 2.641 2.641 -0.430 -0.486 -0.486    
 (0.000) (1.274) (1.328) (1.330) (2.103) (2.104) (4.290) (4.316) (4.316)    
                   
R-squared 0.000 0.025 0.032 0.032 0.040 0.040 0.051 0.051 0.051    
F statistic 0.042 24.023 15.269 12.783 3.079 3.079 . . .    
N. of cases 16471 16078 16078 16078 5777 5776 2313 2300 2300    
N. of groups 11941 11683 11683 11683 4218 4217 1582 1571 1571 
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Table C11:  Average number of hours spent at school, uncensored regression 
with household fixed effects       
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
IQ-for-age z score 0.042 0.117 0.116 -0.034 -0.129 -0.129 0.242 0.247 0.247    
 (0.177) (0.149) (0.148) (0.183) (0.297) (0.297) (0.446) (0.446) (0.446)    
Age    
11.927**
* 
11.998**
* 
11.993**
* 
10.050**
* 
10.050**
* 
11.047**
* 
11.048**
* 
11.048**
* 
  (0.545) (0.546) (0.545) (0.961) (0.961) (1.381) (1.381) (1.381)    
Age2  
-
0.592*** 
-
0.592*** 
-
0.591*** 
-
0.479*** 
-
0.479*** 
-
0.529*** 
-
0.529*** 
-
0.529*** 
  (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.052) (0.052) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075)    
Male (=1)   1.129 1.137 0.859 0.859 3.927 3.930 3.930    
   (1.199) (1.198) (1.906) (1.906) (2.758) (2.758) (2.758)    
Male*Age   -0.150 -0.148 -0.114 -0.114 -0.408 -0.407 -0.407    
   (0.125) (0.125) (0.199) (0.199) (0.282) (0.282) (0.282)    
Male*IQ-for-age z 
score    0.279 0.208 0.208 -0.119 -0.117 -0.117    
    (0.210) (0.332) (0.332) (0.462) (0.462) (0.462)    
First Born(=1)     -0.606 -0.606 -0.341 -0.350 -0.350    
     (0.535) (0.535) (0.708) (0.709) (0.709)    
Parental health 
assessment  (Base: 
"Very good"=1)          
Good      0.963 0.963 -0.201 -0.199 -0.199    
     (0.725) (0.725) (1.058) (1.058) (1.058)    
Regular     1.300 1.300 0.015 -0.008 -0.008    
     (0.804) (0.804) (1.194) (1.196) (1.196)    
Bad     -4.294 -4.294 -7.494* -7.501* -7.501*   
     (3.071) (3.071) (4.055) (4.055) (4.055)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -6.322** -6.322** -2.042** -2.032** -2.032**  
     (3.081) (3.081) (0.890) (0.891) (0.891)    
Visible illness (=1)     -2.916** -2.916** -2.800* -2.786* -2.786*   
     (1.337) (1.337) (1.508) (1.509) (1.509)    
Income quantile: 
Q2      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: 
Q3      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: 
Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Mother's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000    
       (.) (.) (.)    
Father's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000    
       (.) (.) (.)    
Mother works (=1)        0.000 0.000    
        (.) (.)    
Household size         0.000    
         (.)    
Proportion of male children        0.000    
         (.)    
Region 2         0.000    
         (.)    
Region 3         0.000    
         (.)    
Region 4          0.000    
         (.)    
2005         0.000    
         (.)    
2009         0.000    
         (.)    
Constant 
23.791*
** 
-
33.600**
* 
-
34.148**
* 
-
34.144**
* 
-
26.338**
* 
-
26.338**
* 
-
30.294**
* 
-
30.315**
* 
-
30.315**
* 
 (0.001) (2.478) (2.534) (2.531) (4.515) (4.515) (6.572) (6.572) (6.572)              
R-squared 0.000 0.298 0.299 0.300 0.288 0.288 0.390 0.390 0.390    
F statistic 0.056 220.416 133.033 111.907 18.864 18.864 10.415 10.376 10.376    
N. of cases 13580 13240 13240 13240 4811 4811 1933 1921 1921    
N. of groups 10321 10087 10087 10087 3731 3731 1435 1424 1424 
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Table C12:  Average number of hours spent doing housework, uncensored regression with 
household fixed effects     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
IQ-for-age z score -0.042 -0.024 -0.009 -0.053 -0.010 -0.010 0.109 0.105 0.105    
 (0.090) (0.085) (0.082) (0.106) (0.183) (0.183) (0.274) (0.274) (0.274)    
Age    0.031 0.332* 0.329* -0.116 -0.116 -0.437 -0.433 -0.433    
  (0.202) (0.192) (0.193) -0.308 -0.308 -0.465 -0.466 -0.466 
Age2  0.030** 0.029** 0.030** 0.048** 0.048** 0.071** 
0.071*
* 
0.071*
*  
  (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)    
Male (=1)   3.431*** 3.427*** 2.605*** 2.605*** 2.901** 
2.894*
* 
2.894*
*  
   (0.476) (0.475) (0.731) (0.731) (1.145) (1.146) (1.146)    
Male*Age   -0.591*** -0.590*** -0.500*** -0.500*** -0.540*** 
-
0.541*
** 
-
0.541*
** 
   (0.055) (0.055) (0.085) (0.085) (0.138) (0.138) (0.138)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.084 0.233 0.233 0.370 0.367 0.367    
    (0.122) (0.180) (0.180) (0.274) (0.274) (0.274)    
First Born(=1)     0.039 0.039 -0.214 -0.210 -0.210    
     (0.244) (0.244) (0.327) (0.328) (0.328)    
Parental health assessment  
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      -0.281 -0.281 -0.562 -0.565 -0.565    
     (0.465) (0.465) (0.698) (0.698) (0.698)    
Regular     -0.223 -0.223 -0.681 -0.657 -0.657    
     (0.503) (0.503) (0.766) (0.768) (0.768)    
Bad     -1.671** -1.671** -2.587*** 
-
2.580*
** 
-
2.580*
** 
     (0.662) (0.662) (0.939) (0.940) (0.940)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -3.196** -3.196** -0.256 -0.259 -0.259    
     (1.542) (1.542) (1.363) (1.364) (1.364)    
Visible illness (=1)     -0.012 -0.012 1.044 1.030 1.030    
     (0.782) (0.782) (0.914) (0.911) (0.911)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Mother's education (years)      -0.014 -0.009 -0.009    
       (0.111) (0.111) (0.111)    
Father's education (years)       -0.504*** 
-
0.504*
** 
-
0.504*
** 
       (0.110) (0.110) (0.110)    
Mother works (=1)        0.000 0.000    
        (.) (.)    
Household size         0.000    
         (.)    
Proportion of male children        0.000    
         (.)    
Region 2         0.000    
         (.)    
Region 3         0.000    
         (.)    
Region 4          0.000    
         (.)    
2005         0.000    
         (.)    
2009         0.000    
         (.)    
Constant 2.200*** -0.383 -2.087*** -2.076*** 0.413 0.413 6.013*** 
5.957*
** 
5.957*
** 
 (0.000) (0.809) (0.784) (0.787) (1.354) (1.354) (2.057) (2.067) (2.067)              
R-squared 0.000 0.095 0.155 0.156 0.163 0.163 0.176 0.177 0.177    
F statistic 0.215 
125.10
4 117.239 99.367 22.852 22.852 . . .    
N. of cases 14145 13785 13785 13785 4877 4876 2016 2004 2004    
N. of groups 9595 9370 9370 9370 3308 3307 1282 1272 1272 
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Section III: Complete regression results from Table 4.3 
Table C13: Work in the last 12 months, logit regression using the lag of the IQ-for-age z-score. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
lag of IQ-for-age z score -0.093** -0.023 -0.036 -0.024 0.017 0.037 0.060 0.110 0.145    
 (0.046) (0.073) (0.073) (0.075) 
(0.112
) 
(0.108
) (0.197) (0.183) (0.185)    
Age    1.408* 1.374 1.315 0.096 0.028 -2.170 -2.352 -1.607    
  (0.839) (0.911) (0.923) 
(1.574
) 
(1.591
) (1.802) (1.854) (1.729)    
Age2  -0.045 -0.054 -0.051 0.013 0.016 0.111 0.118 0.083    
  (0.039) (0.043) (0.044) 
(0.073
) 
(0.074
) (0.086) (0.090) (0.085)    
Male (=1)   -3.806*** -3.735** -3.212 -3.234 -4.468 -5.037 -4.904    
   (1.452) (1.462) 
(2.285
) 
(2.294
) (3.000) (3.337) (3.753)    
Male*Age   0.402*** 0.395*** 0.339* 0.339* 0.438 0.498 0.439    
   (0.132) (0.133) 
(0.202
) 
(0.202
) (0.273) (0.306) (0.340)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -0.105 -0.096 -0.060 -0.335 -0.382 -0.449    
    (0.095) 
(0.175
) 
(0.174
) (0.289) (0.288) (0.328)    
First Born(=1)     -0.356 -0.337 -0.668 -0.651 -0.291    
     
(0.415
) 
(0.435
) (0.799) (0.861) (0.651)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: "Very 
good"=1)          
Good      -0.209 -0.199 -0.442 -0.460 -0.675    
     
(0.331
) 
(0.331
) (0.590) (0.604) (0.531)    
Regular     0.247 0.204 0.122 0.076 -0.206    
     
(0.382
) 
(0.381
) (0.647) (0.657) (0.615)    
Bad     0.890 0.923 3.505* 3.749** 3.531*   
     
(1.179
) 
(1.084
) (1.879) (1.782) (1.807)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     1.077 1.167 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     
(1.124
) 
(1.116
) (.) (.) (.)    
Visible illness (=1)     0.759 0.613 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     
(1.013
) 
(0.986
) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.622* -1.383* -1.227 
-
1.446*   
      
(0.337
) (0.781) (0.778) (0.815)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.015 -0.648 -0.658 -0.922    
      
(0.379
) (0.603) (0.581) (0.629)    
Income quantile: Q4      -0.136 -0.039 -0.338 -0.503    
      
(0.433
) (0.581) (0.723) (0.647)    
Mother's education (years)       
-
0.113** 
-
0.128** 
-
0.130*   
       (0.056) (0.058) (0.067)    
Father's education (years)       0.103 0.112 0.121    
       (0.069) (0.071) (0.075)    
Mother works (=1)        0.977 
1.263*
*  
        (0.651) (0.528)    
Household size         0.409*   
         (0.239)    
Proportion of male 
children         1.210    
         (0.766)    
Region 2         0.412    
         (0.715)    
Region 3         0.066    
         (0.633)    
Region 4          -0.315    
         (0.838)    
2005         0.477    
         (0.475)    
2009         0.000    
         (.)    
Constant -2.583*** 
-
12.982*** 
-
11.824** 
-
11.536** -5.647 -5.413 8.270 9.219 2.222    
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 (0.047) (4.522) (4.806) (4.850) 
(8.470
) 
(8.523
) (9.225) (9.449) (8.565)              
Pseudo R-squared 0.001 0.038 0.053 0.054 0.068 0.078 0.117 0.138 0.178    
Wald Chi-Square 4.105 44.738 69.806 72.449 
41.48
0 
43.29
2 32.079 40.961 44.650    
N. of cases 7933 4799 4799 4797 1864 1864 509 508 508    
Wooldrige's Serial 
Correlation F test in the 
original model 
10710.62
8 
0.755 0.766 0.707 0.170 0.465 0.495 2.144 5.094 
 
 
 
Table C14: School attendance in the current academic year, logit regression using the lag of the IQ-for-
age z-score. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
lag of IQ-for-age z score 0.452*** 0.352*** 0.357*** 0.302*** 0.353 0.328 0.349 0.283    
 (0.059) (0.113) (0.113) (0.115) (0.276) (0.267) (0.357) (0.415)    
Age    1.610* 1.590 1.824* 3.569*** 3.186** 10.918*** 11.031*** 
  (0.945) (0.969) (1.070) (1.170) (1.325) (4.020) (3.906)    
Age2  -0.092** -0.093** -0.105** 
-
0.189*** -0.169** -0.538*** -0.541*** 
  (0.044) (0.044) (0.051) (0.059) (0.067) (0.195) (0.191)    
Male (=1)   -1.318 -1.540 1.202 1.153 9.054 9.278    
   (1.879) (1.911) (3.831) (3.960) (8.341) (7.980)    
Male*Age   0.073 0.109 0.069 0.086 -0.434 -0.464    
   (0.173) (0.175) (0.321) (0.334) (0.560) (0.547)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.515*** 1.905*** 1.942*** 3.911** 3.947**  
    (0.141) (0.375) (0.404) (1.855) (1.803)    
First Born(=1)     0.455 0.245 -0.581 -0.676    
     (0.691) (0.710) (1.548) (1.505)    
Parental health assessment 
(Base: "Very good"=1) 
        
Good      1.300* 1.216 -1.592 -1.599    
     (0.744) (0.805) (3.542) (3.660)    
Regular     -0.178 -0.272 -4.493* -4.458*   
     (0.623) (0.706) (2.411) (2.517)    
Bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Visible illness (=1)     -2.355* -2.102 0.000 0.000    
     (1.274) (1.544) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q2      -0.155 -0.322 -0.369    
      (0.772) (2.774) (2.863)    
Income quantile: Q3      -1.097* -2.816* -2.877**  
      (0.663) (1.479) (1.443)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000    
      (.) (.) (.)    
Mother's education (years)       0.292 0.293    
       (0.356) (0.360)    
Father's education (years)       0.030 0.031    
       (0.094) (0.095)    
Mother works (=1)        -0.381    
        (0.883)    
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Constant 3.210*** -2.356 -1.695 -2.788 
-
12.350** -10.121 -45.361** -46.066**  
 (0.064) (5.020) (5.315) (5.668) (5.552) (6.298) (21.595) (20.854)    
         
Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.036 0.043 0.062 0.237 0.248 0.648 0.648    
Wald Chi-Square 59.551 30.111 35.392 48.872 50.354 72.802 56.052 57.344    
N. of cases 7869 4790 4790 4788 1846 1279 339 338    
Wooldrige's Serial Correlation 
F test in the original model 
322.301 256.433 256.380 255.881 165.266 95.512 0.989 0.881 
 
 
Table C15: Participation in housework last week, logit regression using the lag of the IQ-for-age z-
score.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
lag of IQ-for-age z score 
-
0.052** 
-
0.055* -0.051 -0.052* -0.034 -0.049 0.000 0.032 0.077    
 (0.024) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.052) (0.052) (0.098) (0.098) (0.105)    
Age    0.236 0.273 0.286 0.520 0.451 -0.347 -0.581 -1.208    
  (0.283) (0.293) (0.295) (0.502) (0.499) (1.057) (1.073) (1.109)    
Age2  -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.033 0.043 0.074    
  (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.025) (0.025) (0.052) (0.052) (0.054)    
Male (=1)   1.084** 1.067** 1.439* 1.493* 1.680 1.415 1.453    
   (0.470) (0.471) (0.827) (0.824) (1.562) (1.587) (1.630)    
Male*Age   
-
0.215*** 
-
0.213*** 
-
0.263*** 
-
0.270*** 
-
0.262* -0.236 -0.247    
   (0.046) (0.046) (0.079) (0.079) (0.148) (0.150) (0.154)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.020 0.081 0.079 0.067 0.030 -0.067    
    (0.043) (0.072) (0.072) (0.137) (0.141) (0.155)    
First Born(=1)     -0.267** -0.285** -0.294 -0.269 -0.360    
     (0.134) (0.134) (0.256) (0.254) (0.279)    
Parental health assessment 
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      0.107 0.118 -0.236 -0.246 -0.366    
     (0.146) (0.147) (0.263) (0.263) (0.288)    
Regular     0.328* 0.329* -0.480 -0.513 -0.626*   
     (0.178) (0.179) (0.327) (0.330) (0.352)    
Bad     0.588 0.570 -1.174 -1.062 -1.244    
     (0.681) (0.676) (1.074) (1.061) (1.002)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -0.229 -0.214 0.429 0.507 0.596    
     (0.914) (0.939) (1.551) (1.546) (2.084)    
Visible illness (=1)     1.599** 1.524** 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (0.726) (0.715) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.550*** 0.617* 0.716** 0.883**  
      (0.166) (0.327) (0.327) (0.345)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.272* 0.535* 0.543** 0.831*** 
      (0.153) (0.276) (0.277) (0.304)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.426*** 
0.624*
* 0.497* 0.654**  
      (0.146) (0.277) (0.286) (0.295)    
Mother's education (years)       -0.039 -0.051* -0.021    
       (0.029) (0.030) (0.033)    
Father's education (years)       0.020 0.019 0.024    
       (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)    
Mother works (=1)        
0.785**
* 0.716*** 
        (0.233) (0.243)    
Household size         -0.062    
         (0.084)    
Proportion of male children         0.221    
         (0.436)    
Region 2         1.021*** 
         (0.267)    
Region 3         1.097*** 
         (0.310)    
Region 4          1.791*** 
         (0.378)    
2005         
-
0.600*** 
         (0.225)    
2009         0.000    
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         (.)    
Constant 
0.408**
* -1.955 -2.248 -2.309 -3.797 -3.760 1.226 2.453 4.970    
 (0.025) (1.419) (1.473) (1.484) (2.514) (2.495) (5.324) (5.424) (5.705)              
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.013 0.069 0.069 0.095 0.101 0.070 0.088 0.148    
Wald Chi-Square 4.868 
87.10
5 394.320 393.042 211.459 225.056 40.744 51.371 87.044    
N. of cases 7867 4788 4788 4786 1864 1864 513 512 512    
Wooldrige's Serial Correlation 
F test in the original model 
1.706  3.166 3.766 3.658 0.711  0.660 11.384 7.954 1.655 
 
 
Table C16: Average number of hours per week spent at work, Tobit regression using the lag of the IQ-for-age 
z-score. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
lag of IQ-for-age z score -3.194 1.945 1.526 1.913 4.511 5.062 8.069 9.361 10.301    
 (2.191) (3.206) (3.206) (3.278) (4.771) (4.551) (7.003) (6.705) (6.404)    
Age    42.758 36.217 34.559 -21.780 -25.410 
-
112.158* 
-
124.178*
* 
-
106.206*
*  
  (34.341) (34.121) (34.489) (50.529) (51.054) (58.287) (55.797) (51.958)    
Age2  -1.192 -1.255 -1.169 1.564 1.726 5.331* 5.853** 4.948**  
  (1.593) (1.601) (1.625) (2.358) (2.387) (2.731) (2.630) (2.422)    
Male (=1)   
-
111.462*
* 
-
109.036* 
-
106.765 
-
107.169 
-
216.538*
* 
-
227.875*
* 
-
239.451*
*  
   (55.937) (56.133) (80.299) (79.771) (106.838) (111.377) (120.073)    
Male*Age   12.791** 12.555** 12.105* 12.013* 22.205** 23.450** 23.315**  
   (5.158) (5.180) (7.325) (7.267) (9.980) (10.467) (10.943)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -3.598 -4.650 -3.172 -12.920 -14.377 -12.756    
    (3.947) (6.648) (6.506) (9.501) (9.323) (9.696)    
First Born(=1)     -11.938 -12.211 -23.471 -24.124 -9.991    
     (16.936) (17.382) (24.033) (24.945) (19.670)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: 
"Very good"=1)          
Good      0.597 0.541 6.857 8.973 4.189    
     (14.255) (14.313) (19.760) (19.234) (17.498)    
Regular     19.629 17.825 20.855 21.516 17.843    
     (16.159) (16.170) (22.463) (22.206) (20.697)    
Bad     40.550 34.937 
133.075*
** 
140.979*
** 
132.862*
** 
     (43.660) (39.863) (50.705) (48.900) (51.287)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     42.809 45.520 -339.670 -360.368 -329.383    
     (43.231) (43.216) (.) (.) (.)    
Visible illness (=1)     31.081 22.902 -302.221 -328.069 -334.241    
     (40.902) (39.580) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q2      26.988* -43.325 -39.705 -41.820    
      (13.790) (29.521) (29.576) (29.023)    
Income quantile: Q3      2.077 -24.894 -27.365 -33.368    
      (15.696) (22.203) (21.871) (22.903)    
Income quantile: Q4      -1.624 -4.798 -10.927 -14.678    
      (17.284) (20.705) (23.512) (23.283)    
Mother's education 
(years)       -3.375 -3.777* -3.667    
       (2.051) (2.104) (2.289)    
Father's education 
(years)       4.137* 4.398* 4.041*   
       (2.357) (2.428) (2.213)    
Mother works (=1)        23.938 31.225*   
        (18.901) (17.984)    
Household size         11.781**  
         (5.969)    
Proportion of male 
children         32.084    
         (26.557)    
Region 2         2.421    
         (20.518)    
Region 3         -9.671    
         (22.372)    
Region 4          -7.620    
         (26.134)    
2005         5.118    
         (14.120)    
2009         0.000    
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         (.)    
Constant 
-
144.339**
* 
-
477.694**
* 
-
412.333*
* 
-
404.485*
* 
-
112.442 -95.780 457.704 518.225* 354.607    
 (5.473) (184.558) (182.257) (183.535) 
(269.79
8) 
(270.78
3) (300.996) (288.348) (272.845)    
          
sigma                   
Constant 92.306*** 88.970*** 87.464*** 87.449*** 
86.702*
** 
85.797*
** 72.992*** 72.963*** 72.395*** 
  (2.770) (4.640) (4.561) (4.566) (6.759) (6.794) (9.789) (9.812) (10.229)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.018 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.034 0.063 0.068 0.080 
F statistic 2.124 13.330 12.350 10.655 3.194 2.825 . . . 
N. of cases 7830 4772 4772 4770 1854 1854 515 514 514 
Wooldrige's Serial 
Correlation F test in the 
original model 
182.068  0.441 1.152 1.170  0.612  0.484 - - - 
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Table C17: Average number of hours per week spent at school, Tobit regression using the lag of the IQ-for-
age z-score. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
 
                        
lag of IQ-for-age z score 0.888*** 0.241*** 0.245*** 0.215*** 0.179 0.166 -0.013 -0.023 0.002    
 (0.098) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.119) (0.118) (0.206) (0.205) (0.201)    
Age    0.720 0.838 0.876 0.361 0.324 0.745 0.815 1.591    
 
 (0.861) (0.857) (0.879) (1.383) (1.384) (3.744) (3.767) (3.780)    
Age2  -0.029 -0.030 -0.033 -0.003 -0.001 -0.028 -0.031 -0.069    
 
 (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.069) (0.069) (0.184) (0.185) (0.185)    
Male (=1)   1.581 1.438 0.531 0.546 -0.893 -0.812 -0.384    
 
  (1.304) (1.303) (1.979) (1.969) (4.074) (4.050) (4.190)    
Male*Age   -0.188 -0.175 -0.057 -0.058 0.059 0.050 0.099    
 
  (0.129) (0.129) (0.195) (0.194) (0.399) (0.396) (0.397)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.415*** 0.363 0.343 1.201** 1.214** 1.243**  
 
   (0.137) (0.238) (0.240) (0.506) (0.505) (0.491)    
First Born(=1)     0.051 0.004 -0.353 -0.361 -0.236    
 
    (0.340) (0.340) (0.606) (0.608) (0.544)    
Parental health assessment (Base: 
"Very good"=1) 
         
Good      0.486 0.496 1.026* 1.029* 1.110*   
 
    (0.350) (0.350) (0.603) (0.605) (0.616)    
Regular     0.745 0.775 1.158 1.172 1.044    
 
    (0.473) (0.473) (0.840) (0.846) (0.881)    
Bad     3.866* 3.913* 5.802* 5.766* 5.815    
 
    (2.111) (2.114) (3.379) (3.370) (3.969)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
 
    (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -2.722* -2.551* -3.704 -3.718 -3.348    
 
    (1.416) (1.423) (2.306) (2.295) (2.169)    
Visible illness (=1)     -3.603* -3.557* -0.648 -0.593 -0.062    
 
    (1.908) (1.930) (1.110) (1.079) (0.935)    
Income quantile: Q2      -0.164 -0.765 -0.797 -0.985    
 
     (0.452) (0.814) (0.814) (0.770)    
Income quantile: Q3      -0.323 -0.521 -0.525 -0.999    
 
     (0.419) (0.648) (0.652) (0.652)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.219 -0.262 -0.217 -0.333    
 
     (0.345) (0.609) (0.633) (0.609)    
Mother's education (years)       0.084 0.088 0.100    
 
      (0.065) (0.066) (0.070)    
Father's education (years)       0.053 0.053 0.049    
 
      (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)    
Mother works (=1)        -0.242 -0.052    
 
       (0.514) (0.520)    
Household size         -0.103    
 
        (0.208)    
Proportion of male children 
        -
1.787**  
 
        (0.878)    
Region 2 
        
-
1.918**
* 
 
        (0.620)    
Region 3         0.249    
 
        (0.741)    
Region 4          -0.247    
 
        (0.681)    
2005         0.493    
 
        (0.507)    
2009         0.000    
 
        (.)    
Constant 
25.615*
** 
20.774*
** 
19.873*
** 
19.699*
** 
21.327*
** 
21.554*
** 
19.159 18.793 16.221    
 
(0.098) (4.278) (4.269) (4.362) (6.872) (6.846) 
(18.88
2) 
(19.01
5) 
(19.456)    
          
sigma                   
Constant 8.135*** 5.768*** 5.764*** 5.758*** 5.559*** 5.556*** 
5.074**
* 
5.078**
* 
4.970**
* 
  (0.172) (0.201) (0.200) (0.200) (0.332) (0.332) (0.381) (0.381) (0.376)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.017    
F statistic 82.638 4.213 3.496 4.373 2.668 2.269 1.825 1.734 2.084 
N. of cases 7794 4739 4739 4737 1844 1844 510 509 509 
Wooldrige's Serial Correlation F test 
in the original model 
113.757 34.331 34.229 34.157 140.471 121.318 . . . 
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Table C18: Average number of hours per week spent doing housework, Tobit regression using the lag of the 
IQ-for-age z-score. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)    
                         
lag of IQ-for-age z 
score -0.413*** -0.389** -0.327* -0.306* -0.036 -0.084 0.098 0.175 -0.233*** 
 (0.152) (0.175) (0.168) (0.170) (0.258) (0.255) (0.475) (0.478) (0.047)    
Age    -3.647** -3.209** -3.216** -4.496* -4.799* 
-
13.585** 
-
14.204** -9.909*** 
  (1.450) (1.425) (1.427) (2.500) (2.484) (6.665) (6.732) (0.038)    
Age2  0.216*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.288** 0.302** 0.704** 0.731** 0.529*** 
  (0.071) (0.069) (0.070) (0.121) (0.120) (0.319) (0.322) (0.003)    
Male (=1)   4.627* 4.672* 3.812 4.082 1.619 1.205 -6.116*** 
   (2.392) (2.394) (3.927) (3.868) (7.907) (7.890) (0.389)    
Male*Age   -0.986*** -0.990*** -0.891** -0.923** -0.602 -0.563 0.200*** 
   (0.231) (0.231) (0.369) (0.363) (0.752) (0.750) (0.037)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score   -0.213 -0.261 -0.255 0.263 0.175 -0.030    
    (0.260) (0.424) (0.422) (0.817) (0.815) (0.079)    
First Born(=1)     -1.476** -1.412** -1.747 -1.660 -1.845*** 
     (0.601) (0.591) (1.144) (1.137) (0.339)    
Parental health 
assessment (Base: 
"Very good"=1)          
Good      2.152*** 2.249*** 2.778* 2.706* 2.859*** 
     (0.726) (0.719) (1.530) (1.525) (0.349)    
Regular     2.637*** 2.617*** 1.015 0.983 0.125    
     (0.793) (0.783) (1.682) (1.673) (0.238)    
Bad     -0.398 -0.728 -43.032 -42.702 -41.347    
     (2.234) (2.059) (.) (.) (.)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -0.143 -0.416 3.720 3.919 5.409*** 
     (2.833) (2.967) (4.823) (4.736) (0.293)    
Visible illness (=1)     -0.510 -0.932 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (3.882) (3.806) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q2     3.108*** 3.524** 3.579** 1.998*** 
      (0.790) (1.749) (1.752) (0.286)    
Income quantile: Q3     2.407*** 3.424** 3.341** 3.171*** 
      (0.776) (1.590) (1.591) (0.296)    
Income quantile: Q4     2.049*** 1.731 1.477 0.821*** 
      (0.742) (1.589) (1.593) (0.283)    
Mother's education (years)      0.047 0.025 0.056    
       (0.176) (0.180) (0.038)    
Father's education (years)      -0.034 -0.037 -0.023    
       (0.167) (0.167) (0.034)    
Mother works (=1)        1.352 0.556**  
        (1.234) (0.260)    
Household size         -0.581*** 
         (0.071)    
Proportion of male children        0.912*   
         (0.518)    
Region 2         5.897*** 
         (0.283)    
Region 3         5.281*** 
         (0.257)    
Region 4          7.227*** 
         (0.255)    
2005         48.426*** 
         (0.399)    
2009         0.000    
         (.)    
Constant -1.478*** 12.300* 10.389 10.426 15.562 15.196 61.497* 64.952* -5.470*** 
 (0.199) (7.269) (7.278) (7.286) (12.876) (12.668) (34.257) (34.669) (0.399)    
          
sigma                   
Constant 9.394*** 8.691*** 8.257*** 8.254*** 7.552*** 7.481*** 7.752*** 7.740*** 6.647*** 
  (0.266) (0.317) (0.328) (0.327) (0.424) (0.423) (0.732) (0.735) (0.068)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.000 0.004 0.027 0.027 0.035 0.039 0.034 0.035 0.132 
F statistic 7.419 16.872 62.951 52.513 13.304 12.297 . . . 
N. of cases 5681 3584 3584 3584 1380 1380 330 330 330 
Wooldrige's Serial 
Correlation F test in 
the original model 
 11.520 13.818 13.534 13.522 66.808  58.788 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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Section IV: Complete regression results from Table 4.4 
Table C19: Work in the last 12 months, IV probit regression.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
IQ-for-age z score -0.128 0.028 0.052 0.417* 0.465 0.650 1.252*** 1.261*** 1.289*** 
 (0.142) (0.154) (0.154) (0.214) (0.549) (0.523) (0.208) (0.204) (0.197)    
Age    0.133 0.135 0.133 0.289 0.268 0.171 0.159 0.169    
  (0.125) (0.124) (0.118) (0.201) (0.199) (0.192) (0.189) (0.188)    
Age2  0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005    
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)    
Male (=1)   0.094 0.094 0.231 0.247 0.170 0.107 0.033    
   (0.252) (0.240) (0.394) (0.378) (0.327) (0.315) (0.327)    
Male*Age   0.020 0.019 0.011 0.007 -0.003 0.003 0.006    
   (0.025) (0.024) (0.038) (0.036) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -0.630** -0.625 -0.669 -0.694* -0.721* -0.825**  
    (0.271) (0.578) (0.530) (0.397) (0.391) (0.367)    
First Born(=1)     -0.048 -0.051 -0.146* -0.144 -0.085    
     (0.112) (0.108) (0.087) (0.089) (0.087)    
Parental health assesment  (Base: 
"Very good"=1)          
Good      -0.074 -0.063 -0.112 -0.103 -0.114    
     (0.119) (0.119) (0.116) (0.114) (0.120)    
Regular     0.135 0.128 0.006 0.020 0.011    
     (0.127) (0.120) (0.110) (0.109) (0.114)    
Bad     0.270 0.240 -0.274 -0.248 -0.289    
     (0.351) (0.335) (0.360) (0.366) (0.339)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     0.536 0.569 0.736 0.772 0.768    
     (0.372) (0.358) (0.524) (0.547) (0.546)    
Visible illness (=1)     0.321 0.347 0.310 0.318 0.311    
     (0.253) (0.251) (0.291) (0.302) (0.308)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.428*** 0.004 -0.005 -0.001    
      (0.155) (0.129) (0.133) (0.123)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.216* 0.035 0.017 0.005    
      (0.119) (0.100) (0.100) (0.098)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.051 -0.035 -0.073 -0.066    
      (0.164) (0.115) (0.114) (0.110)    
Mother's education (years)       -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.029*** 
       (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)    
Father's education (years)       -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.034*** 
       (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
Mother works (=1)        0.166 0.175    
        (0.111) (0.109)    
Household size         0.048    
         (0.035)    
Proportion of male children         0.155    
         (0.134)    
Region 2         0.094    
         (0.096)    
Region 3         0.061    
         (0.110)    
Region 4          -0.147    
         (0.125)    
2005         0.029    
         (0.091)    
2009         -0.047    
         (0.097)    
Constant -1.805*** -3.362*** -3.469*** -3.305*** -4.134*** -4.073*** -1.396 -1.332 -1.719    
 (0.032) (0.582) (0.587) (0.579) (1.175) (1.342) (1.501) (1.506) (1.566)    
                    
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:          
Height-for-age z-score 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.028 0.028 0.033    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score    -0.009 0.027 0.026 0.020 0.019 0.022    
    (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)    
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score    0.000 -0.003** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.007    
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score    0.110*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
    (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
Wald Test of Exogeneity 0.37 0.27 0.52 5.88 1.66 2.6 70.99 68.27 73.75           
Wald Chi-Square 0.813 229.680 275.332 346.597 165.700 220.656 989.095 989.051 1099.618    
N. of cases 13163 12867 12867 12867 5080 5080 2043 2033 2033   
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Table C20: School attendance in the current academic year, IV probit regression.    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
IQ-for-age z score 0.880*** 0.902*** 0.901*** 0.827*** 1.096*** 1.004** -1.140*** -1.135*** -0.797    
 (0.052) (0.048) (0.048) (0.135) (0.304) (0.399) (0.386) (0.388) (1.013)    
Age    0.709*** 0.723*** 0.722*** 0.691** 0.759** 1.021 0.997 1.784    
  (0.104) (0.105) (0.105) (0.289) (0.339) (0.891) (0.889) (1.627)    
Age2  -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.037** -0.040** -0.055 -0.054 -0.097    
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.015) (0.018) (0.049) (0.049) (0.089)    
Male (=1)   0.108 0.120 -0.046 -0.011 -0.007 0.002 -0.007    
   (0.148) (0.148) (0.283) (0.301) (0.391) (0.387) (0.666)    
Male*Age   -0.024 -0.023 0.012 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.051    
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.031) (0.033) (0.044) (0.043) (0.079)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.146 -0.411 -0.279 0.711 0.684 0.689    
    (0.249) (0.577) (0.666) (0.779) (0.784) (1.094)    
First Born(=1)     -0.130 -0.139 0.039 0.036 -0.006    
     (0.085) (0.091) (0.160) (0.157) (0.251)    
Parental health assesment  
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      0.127 0.126 -0.199 -0.195 -0.625    
     (0.109) (0.118) (0.238) (0.236) (0.665)    
Regular     0.009 -0.009 -0.252 -0.257 -0.833    
     (0.127) (0.139) (0.254) (0.252) (0.743)    
Bad     -0.469 -0.521 4.649 4.720 3.788    
     (0.390) (0.413) (.) (.) (.)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -0.298 -0.376 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (0.431) (0.489) (.) (.) (.)    
Visible illness (=1)     0.108 0.095 4.011 5.478 4.497    
     (0.314) (0.332) (.) (.) (.)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.111 -0.036 -0.019 -0.207    
      (0.130) (0.216) (0.212) (0.391)    
Income quantile: Q3      -0.143 -0.118 -0.101 -0.215    
      (0.097) (0.194) (0.191) (0.335)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.218 0.114 0.133 0.056    
      (0.211) (0.173) (0.169) (0.308)    
Mother's education (years)       0.061* 0.062* 0.126    
       (0.034) (0.034) (0.085)    
Father's education (years)       0.058** 0.057** 0.073**  
       (0.023) (0.023) (0.033)    
Mother works (=1)        -0.026 -0.073    
        (0.133) (0.229)    
Household size         -0.057    
         (0.068)    
Proportion of male children         -0.751    
         (0.496)    
Region 2         0.345    
         (0.428)    
Region 3         0.805    
         (0.651)    
Region 4          0.867    
         (0.731)    
2005         -0.309    
         (0.334)    
2009         -0.316    
         (0.333)    
Constant 1.397*** -1.725*** -1.783*** -1.786*** -1.576* -1.785 -3.796 -3.731 -5.796    
 (0.140) (0.371) (0.378) (0.378) (0.938) (1.096) (2.873) (2.870) (4.878)    
                    
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.032 0.031 0.036    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score    -0.009 0.027 0.025 0.015 0.014 0.018    
    (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)    
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score    0.000 -0.003** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.007    
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score    0.109*** 0.094*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
    (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
Wald Test of Exogeneity 47.72 51.64 51.2 160.91 18.10 8.30 41.88 44.42 2.02           
Wald Chi-Square 287.765 949.306 944.950 959.726 288.446 229.764 396.610 456.982 262.932    
N. of cases 13139 12843 12843 12843 5076 5076 2032 2022 2022    
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Table C21. Participation in housework last week, IV probit regression. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
IQ-for-age z score 0.141* 0.265*** 0.256*** 0.339*** 0.717*** 0.764*** 1.118*** 1.112*** 1.116*** 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.078) (0.107) (0.261) (0.279) (0.319) (0.330) (0.346)    
Age    0.356*** 0.383*** 0.382*** 0.233** 0.224** 0.163 0.151 0.165    
  (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.095) (0.098) (0.150) (0.147) (0.145)    
Age2  -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003    
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)    
Male (=1)   0.475*** 0.472*** 0.377** 0.364** 0.094 0.079 0.040    
   (0.107) (0.106) (0.166) (0.169) (0.253) (0.254) (0.267)    
Male*Age   -0.114*** -0.114*** -0.096*** -0.093*** -0.040 -0.039 -0.044    
   (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.024) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -0.171 -0.429 -0.425 -0.492 -0.475 -0.518    
    (0.157) (0.337) (0.335) (0.446) (0.460) (0.475)    
First Born(=1)     -0.167*** -0.163*** -0.118* -0.115* -0.148**  
     (0.043) (0.042) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062)    
Parental health assesment  
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      0.021 0.023 -0.094 -0.090 -0.089    
     (0.056) (0.056) (0.084) (0.084) (0.087)    
Regular     0.150** 0.143** -0.029 -0.021 -0.034    
     (0.066) (0.064) (0.092) (0.093) (0.104)    
Bad     -0.254 -0.258 -0.588 -0.584* -0.569    
     (0.222) (0.216) (0.360) (0.352) (0.360)    
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     0.310 0.317 0.510 0.541 0.500    
     (0.257) (0.249) (0.370) (0.369) (0.381)    
Visible illness (=1)     0.151 0.153 0.232 0.230 0.196    
     (0.166) (0.165) (0.284) (0.290) (0.293)    
Income quantile: Q2      0.106* -0.060 -0.066 -0.032    
      (0.064) (0.097) (0.099) (0.104)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.046 0.030 0.018 0.042    
      (0.057) (0.089) (0.090) (0.094)    
Income quantile: Q4      -0.031 -0.081 -0.113 -0.100    
      (0.081) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)    
Mother's education (years)       -0.018* -0.022** -0.021**  
       (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)    
Father's education (years)       -0.027** -0.027** -0.025**  
       (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)    
Mother works (=1)        0.145* 0.135*   
        (0.082) (0.075)    
Household size         -0.033    
         (0.036)    
Proportion of male children         0.182    
         (0.116)    
Region 2         0.197*   
         (0.116)    
Region 3         0.208    
         (0.160)    
Region 4          0.056    
         (0.105)    
2005         -0.019    
         (0.081)    
2009         0.075    
         (0.068)    
Constant 0.041*** -2.218*** -2.355*** -2.345*** -1.605*** -1.569*** -0.585 -0.532 -0.667    
 (0.012) (0.241) (0.248) (0.248) (0.450) (0.489) (0.838) (0.834) (0.773)    
                    
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.119*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.028 0.028 0.033    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   -0.009 0.027 0.026 0.020 0.019 0.022    
    (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)    
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score    0.000 -0.003** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.007    
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.110*** 0.094*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
    (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
Wald Test of Exogeneity 3.37 11.58 9.84 12.65 12.18 11.59 21.52 20.56 21.25           
Wald Chi-Square 3.297 891.189 1479.776 1487.654 907.526 999.701 933.696 947.583 975.810    
N. of cases 13148 12852 12852 12852 5080 5080 2043 2033 2033    
166 
 
 
Table C22: Average number of hours per week spent at work, IV Tobit regression.    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
IQ-for-age z score -12.361 1.130 3.636 40.863* 33.336 47.366 251.481 251.033 255.828    
 (13.165) (13.191) (13.098) (22.145) (63.983) (71.911) (236.229) (243.449) (231.688)    
Age    24.290** 23.667** 24.285** 37.174** 36.928** 43.598 42.147 43.580    
  (11.755) (11.601) (11.660) (18.238) (18.347) (31.650) (31.652) (32.175)    
Age2  -0.388 -0.433 -0.456 -1.075 -1.069 -1.443 -1.398 -1.591    
  (0.603) (0.598) (0.601) (0.919) (0.925) (1.656) (1.657) (1.697)    
Male (=1)   3.079 4.263 4.509 7.473 1.163 -5.589 -24.899    
   (23.326) (23.593) (38.988) (38.534) (63.023) (63.358) (67.229)    
Male*Age   2.323 2.240 2.828 2.467 3.669 4.296 5.006    
   (2.260) (2.291) (3.791) (3.764) (6.521) (6.572) (6.498)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -63.105** -57.416 -61.519 -172.809 -174.223 -191.251    
    (27.611) (67.064) (68.223) (150.547) (152.612) (159.251)    
First Born(=1)     -5.673 -5.925 -33.854 -33.243 -21.199    
     (11.266) (11.503) (28.162) (28.358) (25.400)    
Parental health assesment  
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      -3.959 -3.463 -9.283 -8.203 -10.828    
     (11.239) (11.528) (19.229) (19.034) (18.976)    
Regular     15.667 15.432 13.159 15.233 11.804    
     (13.050) (13.148) (22.600) (22.844) (23.744)    
Bad     36.414 35.841 -44.806 -40.861 -50.077    
     (33.380) (33.219) (97.225) (98.892) (91.717)    
Very bad     
-
565.507**
* -533.767 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (81.173) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     42.071 45.436 143.529 147.743 147.485    
     (35.472) (37.604) (139.013) (143.395) (138.107)    
Visible illness (=1)     28.924 32.547 70.603 71.001 68.491    
     (23.870) (24.641) (66.672) (67.414) (68.055)    
Income quantile: Q2      46.701*** 11.719 9.381 8.438    
      (10.844) (25.694) (27.425) (24.573)    
Income quantile: Q3      27.443** 19.278 15.799 12.677    
      (11.342) (20.084) (20.046) (19.965)    
Income quantile: Q4      13.817 2.961 -3.160 -3.371    
      (16.319) (27.219) (30.788) (27.943)    
Mother's education (years)       -5.168 -5.542 -5.011    
       (4.176) (4.456) (4.330)    
Father's education (years)       -6.529 -6.531 -6.155    
       (5.969) (6.163) (5.544)    
Mother works (=1)        23.141 24.470    
        (16.687) (16.643)    
Household size         9.053    
         (5.919)    
Proportion of male children         33.319    
         (45.190)    
Region 2         14.558    
         (19.667)    
Region 3         12.744    
         (18.521)    
Region 4          -30.127    
         (23.043)    
2005         -0.101    
         (18.680)    
2009         -15.070    
         (16.400)    
Constant 
-
168.767**
* 
-
357.819**
* 
-
359.795**
* 
-
363.187**
* 
-
435.359**
* 
-
454.971**
* 
-
366.962*
* 
-
359.010*
* 
-
420.318*
*  
 (6.988) (57.877) (57.704) (58.018) (94.456) (95.118) (168.748) (169.127) (167.302)    
                    
Instruments for IQ-for-age z 
score:          
Height-for-age z-score 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.119*** 0.061*** 0.050*** 0.028 0.027 0.033    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score    -0.010 0.026 0.025 0.017 0.016 0.019    
    (0.014) (0.023) (0.022) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)    
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score    0.000 -0.003** -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.006    
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score    0.109*** 0.093*** 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 
    (0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)    
Wald Test of Exogeneity 0.56 0.10 0.31 7.28 1.53 1.65 44.51 43.67 51.46           
Wald Chi-Square 0.882 182.985 217.434 220.331 488.377 110.044 40.650 41.878 57.396    
N. of cases 13114 12819 12819 12819 5064 5064 2035 2025 2025    
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Table C23: Average number of hours per week spent at school, IV Tobit 
regression.    
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
IQ-for-age z score 2.071*** 2.632*** 2.616*** 2.415*** 3.242** 3.341* 3.588 4.453 4.663    
 (0.429) (0.434) (0.432) (0.539) (1.553) (1.756) (6.236) (6.663) (3.699)    
Age    3.660*** 3.684*** 3.684*** 1.703*** 1.702*** -0.080 -0.128 -0.162    
  (0.420) (0.422) (0.421) (0.635) (0.637) (0.982) (1.010) (0.986)    
Age2  
-
0.170*** 
-
0.170*** 
-
0.170*** -0.060* -0.060* 0.026 0.028 0.032    
  (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033) (0.033) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052)    
Male (=1)   0.111 0.122 0.523 0.517 -0.748 -0.895 -0.846    
   (0.710) (0.709) (1.011) (1.015) (1.451) (1.520) (1.571)    
Male*Age   -0.050 -0.052 -0.063 -0.063 0.100 0.122 0.113    
   (0.074) (0.074) (0.106) (0.107) (0.156) (0.164) (0.164)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    0.418 -0.867 -0.868 -2.342 -2.946 -2.497    
    (0.772) (1.688) (1.724) (4.083) (4.433) (2.895)    
First Born(=1)     -0.441* -0.454* -0.328 -0.394 -0.584    
     (0.263) (0.271) (0.576) (0.595) (0.427)    
Parental health assesment  
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      0.379 0.387 0.584 0.579 0.503    
     (0.278) (0.285) (0.390) (0.414) (0.416)    
Regular     0.658* 0.657* 1.046** 1.041** 0.844*   
     (0.349) (0.353) (0.449) (0.481) (0.505)    
Bad     -0.266 -0.335 -1.455 -1.724 -1.962    
     (1.536) (1.564) (2.866) (2.947) (2.237)    
Very bad     5.719** 5.879** 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (2.468) (2.702) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     -4.047* -3.981 -0.672 -0.028 0.320    
     (2.396) (2.436) (4.331) (4.675) (3.271)    
Visible illness (=1)     -0.425 -0.424 0.021 0.210 0.427    
     (0.728) (0.739) (1.365) (1.497) (1.166)    
Income quantile: Q2      -0.136 -1.203 -1.278 -1.397**  
      (0.291) (0.744) (0.826) (0.603)    
Income quantile: Q3      -0.419 -0.440 -0.459 -0.543    
      (0.295) (0.414) (0.431) (0.434)    
Income quantile: Q4      -0.296 -0.616 -0.788 -0.892    
      (0.382) (0.654) (0.766) (0.552)    
Mother's education (years)       0.024 0.003 -0.007    
       (0.097) (0.107) (0.075)    
Father's education (years)       -0.005 -0.027 -0.050    
       (0.158) (0.167) (0.095)    
Mother works (=1)        0.465 0.482    
        (0.350) (0.337)    
Household size         -0.201    
         (0.125)    
Proportion of male children         -0.046    
         (0.738)    
Region 2         -0.657*   
         (0.385)    
Region 3         0.527    
         (0.443)    
Region 4          0.028    
         (0.495)    
2005         0.170    
         (0.412)    
2009         -0.198    
         (0.348)    
Constant 
24.313**
* 5.568*** 5.522*** 5.515*** 
13.822**
* 
14.043**
* 
22.863**
* 
23.356**
* 
24.954**
* 
 (0.065) (1.947) (1.991) (1.988) (3.006) (3.015) (5.369) (5.591) (4.871)    
           
Instruments for IQ-for-age z 
score:                   
Height-for-age z-score 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.128*** 0.064*** 0.052*** 0.019 0.018 0.026    
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score    -0.011 0.026 0.025 0.034 0.033 0.038    
    (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.039) (0.039) (0.036)    
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score    0.000 -0.004** 
-
0.009*** 
-
0.015*** 
-
0.016*** -0.008    
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score    0.117*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 
    (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)    
Wald Test of Exogeneity 12.71 23.72 23.51 29.91 9.38 7.19 0.61 0.96 2.79 
                   
Wald Chi-Square 23.284 235.445 239.713 239.852 129.965 132.098 75.481 69.721 80.349    
N. of cases 11898 11628 11628 11628 4630 4630 1858 1848 1848    
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Table C24:  Average number of hours per week spent doing housework, IV Tobit regression. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
IQ-for-age z score -1.188* -0.303 -0.379 0.047 3.079 3.287 11.952 11.932 11.516    
 (0.683) (0.689) (0.670) (0.788) (2.565) (2.900) (11.027) (11.375) (10.133)    
Age    1.657*** 1.865*** 1.859*** 0.609 0.604 0.314 0.265 0.556    
  (0.435) (0.421) (0.421) (0.679) (0.680) (1.485) (1.501) (1.446)    
Age2  -0.025 -0.017 -0.016 0.051 0.051 0.057 0.059 0.038    
  (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.037) (0.037) (0.081) (0.082) (0.079)    
Male (=1)   3.080*** 3.083*** 3.121** 3.139** 3.186 3.093 1.048    
   (0.844) (0.845) (1.341) (1.345) (3.052) (3.109) (3.155)    
Male*Age   -0.796*** -0.796*** -0.781*** -0.787*** -0.723** -0.724** -0.613**  
   (0.089) (0.089) (0.146) (0.147) (0.324) (0.329) (0.313)    
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -0.949 -1.867 -1.722 -5.422 -5.115 -6.023    
    (1.279) (2.909) (2.956) (7.495) (7.631) (7.736)    
First Born(=1)     -1.182*** -1.153*** -1.430 -1.420 -1.468    
     (0.426) (0.437) (1.320) (1.334) (1.246)    
Parental health 
assesment  (Base: "Very 
good"=1)          
Good      1.100** 1.108** 0.410 0.419 0.296    
     (0.509) (0.522) (1.086) (1.098) (1.088)    
Regular     1.994*** 1.983*** 0.998 1.075 0.318    
     (0.585) (0.592) (1.257) (1.290) (1.287)    
Bad     -2.028 -2.011 -4.574 -4.630 -5.281    
     (1.943) (1.959) (6.526) (6.599) (5.833)    
Very bad     -44.359 -43.937 0.000 0.000 0.000    
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)    
Disability (=1)     2.552 2.507 8.408 8.708 7.024    
     (2.130) (2.181) (7.520) (7.793) (6.785)    
Visible illness (=1)     -0.508 -0.426 0.963 0.893 0.084    
     (1.445) (1.478) (3.911) (3.969) (3.829)    
Income quantile: Q2      1.296*** -0.187 -0.299 -0.441    
      (0.471) (1.244) (1.307) (1.155)    
Income quantile: Q3      0.995** 1.005 0.868 0.845    
      (0.483) (1.085) (1.100) (1.045)    
Income quantile: Q4      0.426 -0.392 -0.658 -0.784    
      (0.666) (1.277) (1.407) (1.201)    
Mother's education 
(years)       -0.164 -0.191 -0.158    
       (0.201) (0.216) (0.195)    
Father's education (years)       -0.417 -0.419 -0.365    
       (0.321) (0.336) (0.274)    
Mother works (=1)        1.044 0.800    
        (0.890) (0.860)    
Household size         -0.261    
         (0.279)    
Proportion of male 
children         2.710    
         (2.053)    
Region 2         2.468**  
         (1.115)    
Region 3         2.434**  
         (0.997)    
Region 4          0.637    
         (1.026)    
2005         -0.107    
         (0.839)    
2009         
-
118.596    
         (.)    
Constant 
-
1.722*** 
-
14.562*** 
-
14.961*** 
-
14.934*** 
-
10.111*** 
-
10.718*** -3.418 -3.080 -4.115    
 (0.133) (1.937) (1.899) (1.901) (3.108) (3.126) (7.063) (7.123) (6.806)    
                    
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.116*** 0.058*** 0.049*** 0.028 0.027 0.034    
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018) (0.018) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   -0.006 0.032 0.028 0.020 0.019 0.023    
    (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)    
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z 
score:         
Height-for-age z-score    0.000 -0.003** -0.007*** 
-
0.017*** 
-
0.017*** -0.010    
    (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.109*** 0.096*** 0.094*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.088*** 
    (0.011) (0.017) (0.017) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)    
Wald Test of Exogeneity 2.29 0.02 0.16 0.94 2.58 2.32 7.67 7.39 8.13           
Wald Chi-Square 3.026 658.119 1244.673 1238.455 477.036 478.804 93.400 94.732 106.115    
N. of cases 11131 10854 10854 10854 4233 4233 1755 1746 1746    
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Section V: Complete regression results from Table 5 
Table C25: Work in the last 12 months, IV Fixed Effects regression.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
IQ-for-age z score 0.104 0.263 0.250 0.394 -0.031 -0.031 -0.528 -0.442 -0.442 
 (0.205) (0.311) (0.299) (0.485) (0.092) (0.092) (1.280) (0.943) (0.943) 
Age    -0.031 -0.040** -0.038* -0.055** -0.055** 0.005 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.192) (0.145) (0.145) 
Age2  0.003** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) 
Male (=1)   -0.146** -0.141* -0.067 -0.067 0.252 0.210 0.210 
   (0.066) (0.075) (0.058) (0.058) (0.649) (0.482) (0.482) 
Male*Age   0.017*** 0.014** 0.011* 0.011* -0.018 -0.015 -0.015 
   (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.057) (0.043) (0.043) 
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -0.183 -0.035 -0.035 0.082 0.059 0.059 
    (0.178) (0.091) (0.091) (0.452) (0.365) (0.365) 
First Born(=1)     0.005 0.005 0.044 0.035 0.035 
     (0.018) (0.018) (0.144) (0.109) (0.109) 
Parental health assesment  
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      -0.034 -0.034 -0.023 -0.026 -0.026 
     (0.021) (0.021) (0.069) (0.057) (0.057) 
Regular     -0.016 -0.016 0.051 0.041 0.041 
     (0.026) (0.026) (0.211) (0.166) (0.166) 
Bad     -0.050 -0.050 0.110 0.084 0.084 
     (0.051) (0.051) (0.433) (0.327) (0.327) 
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Disability (=1)     -0.020 -0.020 0.088 0.104 0.104 
     (0.095) (0.095) (0.348) (0.288) (0.288) 
Visible illness (=1)     0.101 0.101 0.028 0.055 0.055 
     (0.091) (0.091) (0.439) (0.335) (0.335) 
Income quantile: Q2      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q3      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Mother's education (years)      0.042 0.038 0.038 
       (0.093) (0.075) (0.075) 
Father's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000 
       (.) (.) (.) 
Mother works (=1)        0.000 0.000 
        (.) (.) 
Household size         0.000 
         (.) 
Proportion of male children        0.000 
         (.) 
Region 2         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 3         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 4          0.000 
         (.) 
2005         0.000 
         (.) 
2009         0.000 
         (.)           
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:                 
Height-for-age z-score 0.019 0.018 0.018 -0.005 -0.049 -0.049 -0.024 -0.028 -0.028 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.048** 0.020 0.020 0.032 0.033 0.033 
    (0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score    -0.060*** -0.031    -0.031    -0.018    -0.021    -0.021    
    (0.014)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.033)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.151*** 0.078**  0.078**  0.084*   0.085*   0.085*   
    (0.021)    (0.032)    (0.032)    (0.048)    (0.048)    (0.048)              
F statistic 0.259 13.596 9.779 7.348 3.260 3.260 0.621 0.735 0.735 
170 
 
 
 
N. of cases 5777 5611 5611 5611 2208 2208 1009 1007 1007 
 
Table C26. School attendance in the last 12 months, IV Fixed Effects regression.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
IQ-for-age z score -0.022 -0.049 -0.045 -0.040 -0.015 -0.015 -0.115 -0.102 -0.102 
 (0.182) (0.196) (0.194) (0.261) (0.104) (0.104) (0.388) (0.317) (0.317) 
Age    0.096*** 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.080 0.078 0.078 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.062) (0.054) (0.054) 
Age2  -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Male (=1)   0.023 0.023 0.011 0.011 0.067 0.061 0.061 
   (0.050) (0.048) (0.051) (0.051) (0.189) (0.156) (0.156) 
Male*Age   -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
   (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) 
Male*IQ-for-age z score   -0.006 0.020 0.020 0.064 0.060 0.060 
    (0.090) (0.058) (0.058) (0.137) (0.121) (0.121) 
First Born(=1)     -0.013 -0.013 0.005 0.004 0.004 
     (0.017) (0.017) (0.046) (0.039) (0.039) 
Parental health 
assesment  (Base: "Very 
good"=1)          
Good      0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 
     (0.016) (0.016) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) 
Regular     -0.009 -0.009 0.022 0.021 0.021 
     (0.018) (0.018) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057) 
Bad     -0.090 -0.090 0.044 0.040 0.040 
     (0.090) (0.090) (0.127) (0.106) (0.106) 
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Disability (=1)     -0.208 -0.208 0.005 0.008 0.008 
     (0.127) (0.127) (0.083) (0.071) (0.071) 
Visible illness (=1)     -0.011 -0.011 -0.047 -0.043 -0.043 
     (0.037) (0.037) (0.129) (0.107) (0.107) 
Income quantile: Q2      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q3      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Mother's education (years)      0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
       (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) 
Father's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000 
       (.) (.) (.) 
Mother works (=1)        0.000 0.000 
        (.) (.) 
Household size         0.000 
         (.) 
Proportion of male children        0.000 
         (.) 
Region 2         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 3         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 4          0.000 
         (.) 
2005         0.000 
         (.) 
2009         0.000 
         (.)           
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:                 
Height-for-age z-score 0.019 0.018 0.018 -0.005 -0.047 -0.047 -0.023 -0.028 -0.028 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.047** 0.017 0.017 0.033 0.035 0.035 
    (0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:        
Height-for-age z-score   -0.059*** -0.029    -0.029    -0.018    -0.020    -0.020    
    (0.014)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.033)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.150*** 0.076**  0.076**  0.085*   0.087*   0.087*   
    (0.021)    (0.032)    (0.032)    (0.048)    (0.048)    (0.048)              
F statistic 0.014 14.033 8.814 7.497 1.318 1.318 0.466 0.492 0.492 
N. of cases 5772 5606 5606 5606 2205 2205 1008 1006 1006 
171 
 
 
 
 
Table C27. Participation in housework in the last 12 months, IV Fixed Effects regression.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
IQ-for-age z score 0.600 0.658 0.735 1.149 -0.356 -0.356 -1.567 -1.273 -1.273 
 (0.687) (0.753) (0.792) (1.351) (0.440) (0.440) (3.553) (2.523) (2.523) 
Age    0.169*** 0.174*** 0.179*** 0.219** 0.219** 0.409 0.368 0.368 
  (0.051) (0.054) (0.064) (0.086) (0.086) (0.553) (0.407) (0.407) 
Age2  -0.006** -0.006* -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.018 -0.016 -0.016 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) 
Male (=1)   -0.031 -0.019 0.287 0.287 0.784 0.640 0.640 
   (0.187) (0.218) (0.236) (0.236) (1.818) (1.304) (1.304) 
Male*Age   -0.027 -0.033* -0.054** -0.054** -0.093 -0.081 -0.081 
   (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) (0.023) (0.161) (0.117) (0.117) 
Male*IQ-for-age z score   -0.522 -0.285 -0.285 0.383 0.303 0.303 
    (0.509) (0.346) (0.346) (1.291) (1.019) (1.019) 
First Born(=1)     0.005 0.005 0.154 0.126 0.126 
     (0.078) (0.078) (0.408) (0.299) (0.299) 
Parental health assesment  
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      0.029 0.029 0.105 0.096 0.096 
     (0.071) (0.071) (0.198) (0.160) (0.160) 
Regular     0.060 0.060 0.327 0.294 0.294 
     (0.085) (0.085) (0.586) (0.443) (0.443) 
Bad     0.136 0.136 0.575 0.485 0.485 
     (0.189) (0.189) (1.223) (0.902) (0.902) 
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Disability (=1)     -0.145 -0.145 -0.398 -0.345 -0.345 
     (0.305) (0.305) (0.933) (0.740) (0.740) 
Visible illness (=1)     -0.230 -0.230 -0.497 -0.405 -0.405 
     (0.195) (0.195) (1.242) (0.914) (0.914) 
Income quantile: Q2      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q3      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Mother's education (years)      0.016 0.003 0.003 
       (0.272) (0.213) (0.213) 
Father's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000 
       (.) (.) (.) 
Mother works (=1)        0.000 0.000 
        (.) (.) 
Household size         0.000 
         (.) 
Proportion of male children        0.000 
         (.) 
Region 2         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 3         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 4          0.000 
         (.) 
2005         0.000 
         (.) 
2009         0.000 
         (.)           
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:                 
Height-for-age z-score 0.019 0.018 0.018 -0.005 -0.049 -0.049 -0.024 -0.028 -0.028 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.048** 0.020 0.020 0.032 0.033 0.033 
    (0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:        
Height-for-age z-score   -0.060*** -0.031    -0.031    -0.018    -0.021    -0.021    
    (0.014)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.033)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.151*** 0.078**  0.078**  0.084*   0.085*   0.085*   
    (0.021)    (0.032)    (0.032)    (0.048)    (0.048)    (0.048)              
F statistic 0.765 41.712 44.910 23.547 10.244 10.244 5.558 7.739 7.739 
N. of cases 5775 5609 5609 5609 2208 2208 1009 1007 1007 
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Table C28. Average number of hours per week spent at work, IV Fixed Effects regression.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
IQ-for-age z score -4.110 -0.305 -0.992 -0.545 3.989 3.989 -13.189 -10.108 -10.108 
 (8.043) (7.949) (7.890) (10.107) (4.159) (4.159) (45.202) (29.791) (29.791) 
Age    -1.108** -1.393*** -1.388*** -1.731* -1.731* 0.634 0.183 0.183 
  (0.485) (0.507) (0.504) (0.987) (0.987) (6.890) (4.642) (4.642) 
Age2  0.086*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.098* 0.098* -0.019 0.005 0.005 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.056) (0.056) (0.352) (0.237) (0.237) 
Male (=1)   -4.107** -4.089** -5.329** -5.329** 5.526 3.972 3.972 
   (1.862) (1.788) (2.380) (2.380) (23.025) (15.202) (15.202) 
Male*Age   0.539*** 0.531*** 0.639*** 0.639*** -0.234 -0.105 -0.105 
   (0.182) (0.156) (0.236) (0.236) (1.984) (1.327) (1.327) 
Male*IQ-for-age z score    -0.589 0.210 0.210 -1.664 -2.091 -2.091 
    (3.149) (3.382) (3.382) (12.207) (9.889) (9.889) 
First Born(=1)     -0.475 -0.475 1.689 1.376 1.376 
     (0.894) (0.894) (5.045) (3.427) (3.427) 
Parental health assesment  
(Base: "Very good"=1)          
Good      -0.890 -0.890 -0.576 -0.677 -0.677 
     (1.027) (1.027) (2.221) (1.705) (1.705) 
Regular     -1.125 -1.125 1.640 1.165 1.165 
     (1.163) (1.163) (8.569) (5.947) (5.947) 
Bad     -3.152 -3.152 2.969 1.988 1.988 
     (2.246) (2.246) (15.315) (10.371) (10.371) 
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Disability (=1)     -0.570 -0.570 -1.348 -0.552 -0.552 
     (3.004) (3.004) (13.326) (9.413) (9.413) 
Visible illness (=1)     5.550 5.550 2.835 3.858 3.858 
     (3.932) (3.932) (16.532) (11.790) (11.790) 
Income quantile: Q2      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q3      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Mother's education (years)      1.959 1.715 1.715 
       (4.137) (2.852) (2.852) 
Father's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000 
       (.) (.) (.) 
Mother works (=1)        0.000 0.000 
        (.) (.) 
Household size         0.000 
         (.) 
Proportion of male children        0.000 
         (.) 
Region 2         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 3         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 4          0.000 
         (.) 
2005         0.000 
         (.) 
2009         0.000 
         (.)           
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:                 
Height-for-age z-score 0.019 0.018 0.018 -0.005 -0.046 -0.046 -0.018 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.046** 0.013 0.013 0.018 0.020 0.020 
    (0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:         
Height-for-age z-score    -0.060*** -0.032    -0.032    -0.021    -0.023    -0.023    
    (0.014)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.034)    (0.034)    (0.034)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.151*** 0.076**  0.076**  0.079    0.080*   0.080*   
    (0.021)    (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.049)    (0.049)    (0.049)              
F statistic 0.261 16.788 10.987 9.219 1.998 1.998 0.471 0.575 0.575 
N. of cases 5745 5579 5579 5579 2190 2190 1002 1000 1000 
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Table C29. Average number of hours per week spent at school, IV Fixed Effects regression.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
IQ-for-age z score -9.586 -3.410 -3.152 -3.141 3.017 3.017 2.672 0.562 0.562 
 (16.250) (9.184) (8.926) (12.879) (4.555) (4.555) (29.952) (18.508) (18.508) 
Age    4.428*** 4.522*** 4.521*** 1.967 1.967 1.406 1.766 1.766 
  (0.870) (0.881) (1.031) (1.275) (1.275) (5.452) (3.547) (3.547) 
Age2  -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.206*** -0.071 -0.071 -0.042 -0.058 -0.058 
  (0.045) (0.044) (0.051) (0.067) (0.067) (0.253) (0.168) (0.168) 
Male (=1)   1.667 1.667 -0.917 -0.917 0.435 1.362 1.362 
   (1.687) (1.779) (2.003) (2.003) (13.125) (8.189) (8.189) 
Male*Age   -0.209 -0.209 0.047 0.047 -0.069 -0.153 -0.153 
   (0.170) (0.159) (0.207) (0.207) (1.221) (0.770) (0.770) 
Male*IQ-for-age z score   -0.010 -0.750 -0.750 -1.098 -0.328 -0.328 
    (4.064) (2.109) (2.109) (10.876) (6.963) (6.963) 
First Born(=1)     -0.662 -0.662 -0.506 -0.399 -0.399 
     (0.692) (0.692) (1.733) (1.186) (1.186) 
Parental health 
assesment  (Base: "Very 
good"=1)          
Good      0.849 0.849 -0.080 -0.043 -0.043 
     (0.817) (0.817) (1.340) (1.225) (1.225) 
Regular     0.706 0.706 -0.203 0.038 0.038 
     (0.913) (0.913) (4.390) (3.097) (3.097) 
Bad     -1.692 -1.692 -0.637 -0.249 -0.249 
     (3.486) (3.486) (6.744) (4.867) (4.867) 
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Disability (=1)     -6.529 -6.529 -0.987 -1.295 -1.295 
     (4.738) (4.738) (4.692) (2.921) (2.921) 
Visible illness (=1)     -0.441 -0.441 -0.472 -1.248 -1.248 
     (1.767) (1.767) (11.339) (7.097) (7.097) 
Income quantile: Q2      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q3      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Mother's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000 
       (.) (.) (.) 
Father's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000 
       (.) (.) (.) 
Mother works (=1)        0.000 0.000 
        (.) (.) 
Household size         0.000 
         (.) 
Proportion of male children        0.000 
         (.) 
Region 2         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 3         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 4          0.000 
         (.) 
2005         0.000 
         (.) 
2009         0.000 
         (.)           
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:                 
Height-for-age z-score 0.013 0.015 0.015 -0.008 -0.057 -0.057 -0.015 -0.021 -0.021 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.047* 0.041 0.041 0.049 0.051 0.051 
    (0.024) (0.042) (0.042) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) 
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:        
Height-for-age z-score   -0.065*** -0.037    -0.037    -0.018    -0.022    -0.022    
    (0.015)    (0.026)    (0.026)    (0.037)    (0.037)    (0.037)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.164*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.123**  0.125**  0.125**  
    (0.023)    (0.037)    (0.037)    (0.054)    (0.054)    (0.054)              
F statistic 0.348 32.052 20.288 17.025 4.838 4.838 2.737 2.981 2.981 
N. of cases 4868 4719 4719 4719 1822 1822 834 832 832 
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Table C30. Average number of hours per week spent doing housework, IV Fixed Effects regression.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)           
IQ-for-age z score 2.268 3.495 4.381 6.803 -3.103 -3.103 -4.000 -3.135 -3.135 
 (5.019) (5.642) (5.956) (9.317) (3.769) (3.769) (14.622) (12.279) (12.279) 
Age    0.061 0.313 0.344 -0.143 -0.143 -0.764 -0.880 -0.880 
  (0.381) (0.408) (0.456) (0.681) (0.681) (2.175) (1.836) (1.836) 
Age2  0.029 0.030 0.030 0.048 0.048 0.084 0.090 0.090 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.038) (0.038) (0.114) (0.096) (0.096) 
Male (=1)   3.054** 3.122** 4.129** 4.129** 4.361 3.940 3.940 
   (1.360) (1.480) (2.097) (2.097) (7.727) (6.575) (6.575) 
Male*Age   -0.573*** -0.613*** -0.642*** -0.642*** -0.682 -0.647 -0.647 
   (0.129) (0.121) (0.209) (0.209) (0.708) (0.614) (0.614) 
Male*IQ-for-age z score   -3.054 -0.171 -0.171 3.837 3.616 3.616 
    (3.448) (2.711) (2.711) (5.704) (5.327) (5.327) 
First Born(=1)     0.617 0.617 0.413 0.326 0.326 
     (0.685) (0.685) (1.744) (1.499) (1.499) 
Parental health 
assesment  (Base: "Very 
good"=1)          
Good      -0.790 -0.790 -0.803 -0.829 -0.829 
     (0.754) (0.754) (1.128) (1.084) (1.084) 
Regular     -0.409 -0.409 -0.361 -0.463 -0.463 
     (0.774) (0.774) (2.458) (2.158) (2.158) 
Bad     -0.828 -0.828 -0.809 -1.076 -1.076 
     (1.392) (1.392) (4.680) (3.926) (3.926) 
Very bad     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
     (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Disability (=1)     -1.978 -1.978 0.560 0.726 0.726 
     (1.824) (1.824) (3.531) (3.061) (3.061) 
Visible illness (=1)     0.224 0.224 0.386 0.658 0.658 
     (1.452) (1.452) (5.086) (4.319) (4.319) 
Income quantile: Q2      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q3      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Income quantile: Q4      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      (.) (.) (.) (.) 
Mother's education (years)      -0.991 -1.032 -1.032 
       (1.150) (1.028) (1.028) 
Father's education (years)      0.000 0.000 0.000 
       (.) (.) (.) 
Mother works (=1)        0.000 0.000 
        (.) (.) 
Household size         0.000 
         (.) 
Proportion of male children        0.000 
         (.) 
Region 2         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 3         0.000 
         (.) 
Region 4          0.000 
         (.) 
2005         0.000 
         (.) 
2009         0.000 
         (.)           
Instruments for IQ-for-age z score:                 
Height-for-age z-score 0.019 0.018 0.018 -0.005 -0.049 -0.049 -0.025 -0.029 -0.029 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.033) (0.033) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) 
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.048** 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.032 0.032 
    (0.022) (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Instruments for Male*IQ-for-age z score:        
Height-for-age z-score   -0.060*** -0.031    -0.031    -0.019    -0.022    -0.022    
    (0.014)    (0.023)    (0.023)    (0.033)    (0.033)    (0.033)    
Male*Height-for-age z-score   0.151*** 0.077**  0.077**  0.083*   0.084*   0.084*   
    (0.021)    (0.032)    (0.032)    (0.048)    (0.048)    (0.048)              
F statistic 0.204 57.843 59.516 36.240 12.975 12.975 12.735 14.155 14.155 
N. of cases 5771 5605 5605 5605 2206 2206 1007 1005 1005 
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Table C31: Instrumental variables analysis with household fixed effects for children's participation and number of 
hours spent on each activity (intrahousehold variation at any fixed point in time) 
    Controls 
     (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
    
    None 
Child's 
characteristics  
(I) + 
Family 
Income 
(II) + Parental 
education/work 
status 
(III) + 
Other 
controls  
Participation Work IQ z-score 0.104 -0.031 -0.031 -0.442 -0.442 
  IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -0.035 -0.035 0.059 0.059 
  F statistic 0.259 3.260 3.260 0.735 0.735 
  N. of cases 5777 2208 2208 1007 1007 
  
Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.019 -0.049 -0.049 -0.028 -0.028 
   Height z-
score*Male  0.020 0.020 0.033 0.033 
  Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score   -0.031    -0.031    -0.021    -0.021    
  
 Height z-
score*Male  0.078**  0.078**  0.085*   0.085*   
 School IQ z-score   -0.022 -0.015 -0.015 -0.102 -0.102 
 
 IQ z-score*Male(=1)   0.020 0.020 0.060 0.060 
 
 F statistic  0.014 1.318 1.318 0.492 0.492 
  N. of cases   5772 2205 2205 1006 1006 
  
Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.019 -0.047 -0.047 -0.028 -0.028 
   Height z-
score*Male  0.017 0.017 0.035 0.035 
  Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score   -0.029    -0.029    -0.020    -0.020    
 
 
 Height z-
score*Male  0.076**  0.076**  0.087*   0.087*   
 Housework IQ z-score 0.600 -0.356 -0.356 -1.273 -1.273 
 
 IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -0.285 -0.285 0.303 0.303 
  F statistic 0.765 10.244 10.244 7.739 7.739 
  N. of cases 5775 2208 2208 1007 1007 
  
Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.019 -0.049 -0.049 -0.028 -0.028 
 
  Height z-
score*Male  0.020 0.020 0.033 0.033 
 
 Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score   -0.031    -0.031    -0.021    -0.021    
 
 
 Height z-
score*Male   0.078**  0.078**  0.085*   0.085*   
Number of 
hours 
Work IQ z-score -4.110 3.989 3.989 -10.108 -10.108 
 IQ z-score*Male(=1)   0.210 0.210 -2.091 -2.091 
  F statistic 0.261 1.998 1.998 0.575 0.575 
 
 N. of cases 5745 2190 2190 1000 1000 
 
 
Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.019 -0.046 -0.046 -0.022 -0.022 
   Height z-
score*Male   0.013 0.013 0.020 0.020 
  Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score  -0.032    -0.032    -0.023    -0.023    
 
 
 Height z-
score*Male   0.076**  0.076**  0.080*   0.080*   
 School IQ z-score -9.586 3.017 3.017 0.562 0.562 
 
 IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -0.750 -0.750 -0.328 -0.328 
 
 F statistic 0.348 4.838 4.838 2.981 2.981 
  N. of cases 4868 1822 1822 832 832 
  
Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.013 -0.057 -0.057 -0.021 -0.021 
   Height z-
score*Male   0.041 0.041 0.051 0.051 
  Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score  -0.037    -0.037    -0.022    -0.022    
  
 Height z-
score*Male   0.116*** 0.116*** 0.125**  0.125**  
 Housework IQ z-score 2.268 -3.103 -3.103 -3.135 -3.135 
  IQ z-score*Male(=1)   -0.171 -0.171 3.616 3.616 
 
 F statistic 0.204 12.975 12.975 14.155 14.155 
 
 N. of cases 5771 2206 2206 1005 1005 
 
 
Instruments 
for IQ z-score 
 Height z-score 0.019 -0.049 -0.049 -0.029 -0.029 
 
  Height z-
score*Male   0.020 0.020 0.032 0.032 
 
 Instruments 
for IQ z-
score*Male 
 Height z-score  -0.031    -0.031    -0.022    -0.022    
   
 Height z-
score*Male  0.077**  0.077**  0.084*   0.084*   
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), using 
clustered standard errors by household. Child's characteristics in column (I)  include: age, gender, birth order and health  and disability status. Other controls  
in column (IV) include household size,  proportion of male children, as well as region and time fixed effects. 
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APPENDIX D: Robustness Checks 
 
Section I. Robustness checks for Chapter 2 
a. Whole set of results done separately by age group (Group 1: 0-5 years old, Group 2: 
6-19 years old): 
AGES 0-5         
Table 2.2 (a) . Baseline model, OLS estimation (Ages 0-5 years old)     
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5)    (6) (7) (8)          
BMI z-score mother 0.188***  0.166*** 0.170*** 0.171*** 0.180*** 0.200*** 0.198*** 
 (0.023)  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
BMI z-score father  0.154*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.127*** 0.132*** 0.147*** 0.147*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.027) 
Child's gender: Male    0.137*** 0.125 0.128 0.083 0.108 
    (0.045) (0.115) (0.115) (0.130) (0.129) 
Child´s age    -0.074*** -0.594*** -0.589*** -0.669*** -0.723*** 
    (0.017) (0.077) (0.077) (0.086) (0.087) 
Child's age squared     0.088*** 0.089*** 0.101*** 0.110*** 
     (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Gender (Male)*age     0.002 0.000 0.006 -0.001 
     (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.037) 
Mother´s age      -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
      (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Father´s age      -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.143*** 0.214*** 0.025 0.180** 0.752*** 0.991*** -0.004 0.219 
  (0.041) (0.039) (0.048) (0.077) (0.128) (0.163) (1.583) (1.636) 
Household socioeconomic level       Y Y 
Region*time interactions               Y 
R-squared 0.027 0.016 0.036 0.046 0.066 0.068 0.090 0.099 
N. of cases 3066 3066 3066 3066 3066 3066 2476 2476 
Clusters (Households) 1909 1909  1909  1909 1909 1909 1604 1604          
          
AGES 6-19         
Table 2.2 (b) . Baseline model, OLS estimation (Ages 6-19 years old)     
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5)    (6) (7) (8)          
BMI z-score mother 0.290***  0.252*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.266*** 0.273*** 0.274*** 
 (0.016)     (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.018)    (0.018)    
BMI z-score father  0.282*** 0.239*** 0.243*** 0.244*** 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.236*** 
  (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.016)    (0.018)    (0.018)    
Child's gender: Male    0.034    0.198**  0.199**  0.262*** 0.267*** 
    (0.028)    (0.080)    (0.080)    (0.089)    (0.089)    
Child´s age    -0.026*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.109*** 0.111*** 
    (0.003)    (0.019)    (0.019)    (0.021)    (0.021)    
Child's age squared     -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
     (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Gender (Male)*age     -0.013**  -0.013**  -0.017**  -0.017*** 
     (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.007)    (0.007)    
Mother´s age      -0.000    0.000    0.000    
      (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.004)    
Father´s age      -0.005*   -0.006*   -0.006*   
      (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003)    
Constant 0.099*** 0.187*** -0.188*** 0.088*   -0.662*** -0.503*** -0.309    -0.358    
  (0.032)    (0.028)    (0.035)    (0.051)    (0.121)    (0.144)    (0.387)    (0.386)    
Household socioeconomic level       Y Y 
Region*time interactions               Y 
R-squared 0.062    0.055    0.101    0.108    0.111    0.112    0.130    0.132    
N. of cases 11103 11103 11103 11103.000    11103.000    11100.000    8589.000    8589.000    
Clusters (Households) 3474 3474 3474 3474 3474 3474 2862 2862 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered 
standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the household, 
bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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AGES 0 TO 5       
Table 2.3 (a): Intergenerational transmission of the BMI, fixed effects estimation  (Ages: 0 to 5 years old) 
  (a)    Household Fixed Effects (b)    Individual Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    
 
         
BMI z-score mother 0.125 0.036 0.040 -0.007 -0.068 -0.080 
 (0.090) (0.103) (0.104) (0.168) (0.197) (0.211) 
BMI z-score father 0.029 0.038 0.035 0.028 0.025 0.035 
 (0.065) (0.079) (0.078) (0.116) (0.178) (0.191) 
Child's gender: Male -0.068 -0.118 -0.138     
 (0.150) (0.167) (0.167)     
Child´s age -0.739*** -0.888*** -0.930*** -0.919*** -1.018*** -1.011*** 
 (0.101) (0.115) (0.120) (0.171) (0.186) (0.193) 
Child's age squared 0.111*** 0.138*** 0.144*** 0.149*** 0.186*** 0.179*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.032) (0.034) 
Gender (Male)*age 0.035 0.022 0.025 0.081 0.056 0.048 
 (0.042) (0.047) (0.047) (0.055) (0.061) (0.060) 
Mother´s age 0.048* 0.026 0.026 0.020 -0.017 -0.059 
 (0.029) (0.038) (0.038) (0.086) (0.110) (0.113) 
Father´s age -0.044 -0.039 -0.045 -0.083 -0.174** -0.243*** 
 (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.087) (0.078) (0.074) 
Constant 1.184*** 1.959*** 2.727*** 3.554* 7.026* 11.492*** 
  (0.342) (0.525) (0.880) (2.074) (3.590) (4.272) 
Household socioeconomic level   Y Y   Y Y 
Region*time interactions   Y    Y 
R-squared 0.065 0.099 0.108 0.136 0.249 0.270 
N. of cases 3066 2476 2476 3066 2476 2476 
N. of groups 1909 1604 1604 2771 2266 2266 
Clusters (Households) 1909 1604 1604 1909 1604 1604 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education.        
              
AGES  6-19       
        
Table 2.3 (b): Intergenerational transmission of the BMI, fixed effects estimation  (Ages: 6 to 19 years old) 
  (a)    Household Fixed Effects (b)    Individual Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    
 
         
BMI z-score mother 0.082**  0.070*   0.067    0.080**  0.081*   0.081*   
 (0.032)    (0.042)    (0.042)    (0.034)    (0.042)    (0.042)    
BMI z-score father 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 0.105*** 0.107*** 
 (0.030)    (0.034)    (0.034)    (0.034)    (0.037)    (0.038)    
Child's gender: Male 0.293*** 0.305*** 0.301***     
 (0.079)    (0.088)    (0.088)        
Child´s age 0.114*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.070*** 0.064**  -0.017    
 (0.018)    (0.021)    (0.021)    (0.025)    (0.031)    (0.035)    
Child's age squared -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
 (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)    
Gender (Male)*age -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.013*   -0.013*   -0.012    
 (0.006)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.008)    (0.008)    
Mother´s age 0.023*** 0.019**  0.011    0.044*** 0.045**  0.019    
 (0.007)    (0.009)    (0.010)    (0.013)    (0.018)    (0.017)    
Father´s age -0.010    -0.012    -0.015*   0.010    0.008    -0.001    
 (0.007)    (0.008)    (0.009)    (0.010)    (0.013)    (0.011)    
Constant -0.776*** -0.367    -0.052    -1.772*** -0.988*   1.817**  
  (0.175)    (0.301)    (0.439)    (0.445)    (0.572)    (0.861)    
Household socioeconomic level   Y Y   Y Y 
Region*time interactions     Y     Y 
R-squared 0.018    0.019    0.021    0.037    0.048    0.056    
N. of cases 11100 8589 8589 11100 8589 8589 
N. of groups 3474 2862 2862 7546 6082 6082 
Clusters (Households) 3474 2862 2862 3474 2862 2862 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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AGES 0 TO 5     
Table 2.4:  Variation in the size of the transmission elasticity. Child's age and gender 
  (1) (2)   
    
BMI z-score mother 0.238*** 0.246***  
 (0.068) (0.063)  
BMI z-score father 0.034 0.072  
 (0.071) (0.068)  
Child´s age -0.096** -0.725***  
 (0.041) (0.092) 
 
Child's age squared  0.109*** 
 
  (0.013) 
 
Child's gender: Male 0.103 0.086  
 (0.157) (0.15)  
Gender (Male)*Age  -0.002 -0.002  
 (0.039) (0.036) 
 
Interaction terms:       
Gender:       
BMI z-score mother* Child's gender (male) -0.040 -0.039   
  (0.046) (0.045)   
BMI z-score father* Child's gender (male) 0.061 0.059   
  (0.047) (0.047)   
Age as a continuous variable:       
        
BMI z-score mother * Child's age -0.007 -0.009   
  (0.018) (0.017)   
BMI z-score father * Child's age 0.024 0.015   
  (0.018) (0.017)   
        
Mother's age and father's age  Y Y  
Household socioeconomic level Y Y  
Region* time interaction dummies  Y Y   
R-squared 0.071 0.1   
N. of cases 2476 2476   
Clusters (Households) 1604 1604  
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of 
the household’s income, size of the household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
  
    
    
AGES  6 TO 19    
Table 2.4:  Variation in the size of the transmission elasticity. Child's age and gender 
  (1) (2)   
    
BMI z-score mother 0.317*** 0.293***  
 (0.051)    (0.051)     
BMI z-score father 0.214*** 0.206***  
 (0.050)    (0.050)     
Child´s age -0.012    0.109***  
 (0.009)    (0.022)    
 
Child's age squared  -0.005*** 
 
  (0.001)    
 
Child's gender: Male 0.284*** 0.280***  
 (0.104)    (0.103)     
Gender (Male)*Age  -0.017**  -0.017**   
 (0.007)    (0.007)    
 
Interaction terms:       
Gender:       
BMI z-score mother* Child's gender (male) -0.034    -0.034      
  (0.028)    (0.028)      
BMI z-score father* Child's gender (male) 0.023    0.025      
  (0.030)    (0.029)      
Age as a continuous variable:       
        
BMI z-score mother * Child's age -0.002    -0.000      
  (0.004)    (0.004)      
BMI z-score father * Child's age 0.001    0.001      
  (0.004)    (0.004)      
Mother's age and father's age  Y Y  
Household socioeconomic level Y Y  
Region* time interaction dummies  Y Y   
R-squared 0.129 0.132      
N. of cases 8589 8589   
Clusters (Households) 2862 2862  
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AGES 0 TO 5     
Table 2.5:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Quantile of Household Income 
  (1) (2) (3)    
    
BMI z-score mother 0.142** 0.198*** 0.145** 
 (0.058) (0.026) (0.058) 
BMI z-score father 0.147*** 0.118** 0.132** 
 (0.027) (0.052) (0.052) 
Quantile of Household Income    
2nd Quantile -0.109 -0.141 -0.134 
 (0.136) (0.112) (0.152) 
3rd Quantile -0.312** -0.175 -0.278* 
 (0.130) (0.117) (0.148) 
4th Quantile -0.303** -0.249** -0.374** 
 (0.133) (0.110) (0.146) 
Interaction terms:       
        
BMI z-score mother * 2nd Quantile  0.001   -0.003 
  (0.075)   (0.075) 
BMI z-score mother * 3rd Quantile  0.083   0.089 
  (0.069)   (0.070) 
BMI z-score mother *4th Quantile  0.121*   0.110 
  (0.072)   (0.073) 
        
BMI z-score father * 2nd Quantile    0.032 0.025 
    (0.073) (0.073) 
BMI z-score father * 3rd Quantile    -0.012 -0.033 
    (0.074) (0.074) 
BMI z-score father *4th Quantile    0.089 0.065 
    (0.067) (0.067) 
Child's age child's age squared, mother's age and father's age Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.101 0.1 0.102 
N. of cases 2476 2476 2476 
Clusters (Households)  1604  1604  1604 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes: size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
    
AGES  6 TO 19     
Table 2.5:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Quantile of Household Income 
  (1) (2) (3)        
BMI z-score mother 0.299*** 0.274*** 0.303*** 
 (0.034)    (0.018)    (0.034)    
BMI z-score father 0.236*** 0.209*** 0.204*** 
 (0.018)    (0.036)    (0.036)    
Quantile of Household Income    
2nd Quantile 0.086    0.029    0.096    
 (0.090)    (0.079)    (0.104)    
3rd Quantile 0.074    -0.013    0.025    
 (0.084)    (0.081)    (0.102)    
4th Quantile 0.178**  0.011    0.072    
 (0.090)    (0.084)    (0.106)    
Interaction terms:       
        
BMI z-score mother * 2nd Quantile  -0.046                    -0.045    
  (0.047)                    (0.047)    
BMI z-score mother * 3rd Quantile  -0.021                    -0.026    
  (0.042)                    (0.042)    
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of 
the household’s income, size of the household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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BMI z-score mother *4th Quantile  -0.030                    -0.041    
  (0.044)                    (0.045)    
        
BMI z-score father * 2nd Quantile    -0.019    -0.011    
    (0.047)    (0.047)    
BMI z-score father * 3rd Quantile    0.033    0.038    
    (0.045)    (0.046)    
BMI z-score father *4th Quantile    0.071    0.078*   
    (0.045)    (0.045)    
Child's age child's age squared, mother's age and father's age Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.132 0.132 0.133 
N. of cases 8589 8589 8589 
Clusters (Households) 2862 2862 2862 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes: size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
 
AGES 0 TO 5         
Table 2.6:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Mother's education and work status 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) 
        
BMI z-score mother 0.196*** 0.300*** 0.193*** 0.196*** 0.191*** 0.301*** 0.307*** 
 (0.026) (0.082) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.083) (0.086) 
BMI z-score father 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.152*** 0.141*** 0.127** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.062) 
Mother's education (Base category: High school):          
Less than high school -0.157* 0.005    0.008 -0.033 
 (0.085) (0.144)    (0.143) (0.152) 
More than high school 0.092 0.318    0.303 0.236 
 (0.138) (0.207)    (0.206) (0.275) 
Mother's work status:                
Mother works    0.167** 0.186 0.332** 0.133 0.285** 
   (0.065) (0.115) (0.132) (0.117) (0.139) 
Interaction terms : Mother's education               
                
BMI z-score mother * Less than high school -0.115       -0.115 -0.124 
    (0.086)       (0.085) (0.088) 
BMI z-score mother * More than high school -0.175       -0.182 -0.194 
    (0.127)       (0.127) (0.128) 
BMI z-score father * Less than high school           0.042 
              (0.067) 
BMI z-score father * More than high school           0.069 
              (0.139) 
Interaction terms : Mother's work status               
                
BMI z-score mother * Mother works       -0.014 0.003 -0.005 0.007 
        (0.061) (0.062) (0.063) (0.063) 
BMI z-score father * Mother works         -0.124**   -0.119* 
          (0.061)   (0.063) 
Child's age and age squared, mother's age and 
father's age, 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.095 0.097 0.09 0.09 0.092 0.098 0.1 
N. of cases 2476 2476 2633 2633 2633 2474 2474 
Clusters (Households)  1604  1604 1681 1681 1681 1602 1602 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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AGES  6-19         
Table 2.6:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Mother's education and work status 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) 
        
BMI z-score mother 0.274*** 0.269*** 0.260*** 0.246*** 0.247*** 0.250*** 0.242*** 
 (0.018)    (0.060)    (0.017)    (0.019)    (0.019)    (0.063)    (0.062)    
BMI z-score father 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.228*** 0.228*** 0.223*** 0.237*** 0.315*** 
 (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.017)    (0.017)    (0.019)    (0.018)    (0.065)    
Mother's education (Base category: High school):          
Less than high school -0.154**  -0.161       -0.169    -0.044    
 (0.066)    (0.123)       (0.123)    (0.162)    
More than high school -0.171*   -0.212       -0.207    -0.058    
 (0.097)    (0.181)       (0.180)    (0.230)    
Mother's work status:          
Mother works    0.066*   -0.038    -0.059    -0.035    -0.039    
   (0.036)    (0.070)    (0.082)    (0.073)    (0.091)    
Interaction terms : Mother's education               
                
BMI z-score mother * Less than high school 0.004          0.013    0.024    
    (0.063)          (0.063)    (0.063)    
BMI z-score mother * More than high school 0.027          0.015    0.026    
    (0.094)          (0.093)    (0.097)    
BMI z-score father * Less than high school           -0.084    
              (0.065)    
BMI z-score father * More than high school           -0.096    
              (0.111)    
Interaction terms : Mother's work status               
                
BMI z-score mother * Mother works       0.060*   0.057*   0.052    0.052    
        (0.034)    (0.034)    (0.036)    (0.036)    
BMI z-score father * Mother works         0.017      0.007    
          (0.033)      (0.037)    
Child's age and age squared, mother's age and 
father's age, 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.13 0.13 0.127    0.128 0.128 0.131 0.132 
N. of cases 8589 8589 9490 9490 9490 8589 8589 
Clusters (Households) 2862 2862 3081 3081 3081 2862 2862 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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AGES 0 TO 5     
Table 2.7:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Size of the 
household 
  (1) (2) (3)    
     
BMI z-score mother 0.182*** 0.197*** 0.168** 
 (0.067) (0.026) (0.067) 
BMI z-score father 0.147*** 0.257*** 0.261*** 
 (0.027) (0.065) (0.066)     
Size Household 0.004 0.030* 0.024 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.022) 
Interaction terms       
BMI z-score mother * Size household 0.003                 0.005 
  (0.011)                 (0.011) 
BMI z-score father * Size household   -0.019* -0.019* 
    (0.010) (0.010) 
Child's age and age squared, mother's age and father's 
age, 
Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.099 0.1 0.1 
N. of cases 2476 2476 2476 
Clusters (Households) 1604  1604  1604  
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate 
their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in 
parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, 
bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
     
AGES  6 TO 19     
Table 2.7:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Size of the 
household 
  (1) (2) (3)    
     
BMI z-score mother 0.240*** 0.275*** 0.215*** 
 (0.057)    (0.017)    (0.058)    
BMI z-score father 0.236*** 0.374*** 0.386*** 
 (0.018)    (0.061)    (0.061)        
Size Household -0.051**  -0.003    -0.018    
 (0.020)    (0.017)    (0.022)    
Interaction terms       
BMI z-score mother * Size household 0.006                    0.010    
  (0.010)                    (0.010)    
BMI z-score father * Size household   -0.024**  -0.026**  
    (0.010)    (0.010)    
Child's age and age squared, mother's age and father's 
age, 
Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.132 0.133    0.133 
N. of cases 8589 8589 8589 
Clusters (Households) 2862 2862 2862 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate 
their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in 
parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, 
bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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b. Using Mexican sample (MxFLS) to calculate the BMI z-scores. 
Table 2.2.  Baseline model, OLS estimation (USING MEXICAN SAMPLE AS REFERENCE)   
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5)    (6) (7) (8)          
BMI z-score mother 0.234***  0.204*** 0.205*** 0.205*** 0.207*** 0.210*** 0.209*** 
 (0.013)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)    
BMI z-score father  0.224*** 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.191*** 0.189*** 0.187*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)    
Child's gender: Male    -0.001 0.008 0.010 0.009 0.010    
    (0.020) (0.040) (0.040) (0.044) (0.044)    
Child´s age    -0.004** 0.002 0.003 0.009 0.009    
    (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)    
Child's age squared     -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001    
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Gender (Male)*age     -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000    
     (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)    
Mother´s age      0.004 0.004 0.004    
      (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
Father´s age      -0.004** -0.005* -0.005*   
      (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Constant -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.042* 0.017 0.041 0.030 0.045    
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.024) (0.038) (0.064) (0.233) (0.235)    
Household socioeconomic level       Y Y 
Region*time interactions               Y 
R-squared 0.055 0.05 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.092 0.103 0.106 
N. of cases 14166 14156 14153 14153 14153 14153 11056 11056 
Clusters (Households)  3928  3925 3925  3925  3925  3925  3281 3281 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, 
size of the household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
 
Table 2.3  Intergenerational transmission of the BMI, fixed effects estimation (USING MEXICAN SAMPLE AS 
REFERENCE). 
  (a)    Household Fixed Effects (b)    Individual Fixed Effects 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    
 
       
BMI z-score mother 0.036 0.019 0.019    0.028 0.016 0.013    
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.032)    (0.028) (0.034) (0.034)    
BMI z-score father 0.084*** 0.077** 0.077*** 0.107*** 0.091*** 0.098*** 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.030)    (0.028) (0.032) (0.031)    
Child's gender: Male -0.010 -0.032 -0.031        
 (0.043) (0.047) (0.047)        
Child´s age 0.007 0.014 0.014    -0.016 -0.011 -0.058*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)    (0.015) (0.019) (0.021)    
Child's age squared -0.000 -0.001* -0.001**  -0.001 -0.001** -0.001**  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Gender (Male)*age -0.002 0.001 0.001    0.008 0.011* 0.011*   
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)    
Mother´s age 0.016*** 0.015* 0.008    0.024** 0.027* 0.010    
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)    (0.011) (0.015) (0.016)    
Father´s age -0.007 -0.008 -0.008    0.007 0.007 -0.002    
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)    (0.008) (0.012) (0.011)    
Constant -0.318*** -0.276 0.170    -0.971*** -0.481 1.014    
  (0.110) (0.230) (0.307)    (0.358) (0.479) (0.726)    
Household socioeconomic level   Y Y   Y Y 
Region*time interactions     Y     Y 
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.01 0.014 0.018 0.026 
N. of cases 14153 11056 11056 14153 11056 11056 
N. of groups 3925 3281 3281 9116 7451 7451 
Clusters (Households) 3925 3281 3281 3925 3281 3281 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard 
errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the household, bedrooms per capita, father’s 
occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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Table 2.4:  Variation in the size of the transmission elasticity. Child's age and gender (USING MEXICAN SAMPLE 
AS REFERENCE). 
  (1) (2) (3)    
    
BMI z-score mother 0.152*** 0.149*** 0.154*** 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.025)    
BMI z-score father 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.130*** 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)    
Child´s age -0.025*** -0.009                 
 (0.005) (0.009)                 
Child's age squared  -0.001**                 
  (0.000)                 
Child's gender: Male 0.049 0.052 0.018    
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.053)    
Gender (Male)*Age  0.000 0.000                 
 (0.004) (0.004)                 
Child's age group: 6-11 years old   -0.220*** 
   (0.058)    
Child's age group: 12-14 years old   -0.320*** 
   (0.071)    
Child's age group: 15-19 years old   -0.329*** 
   (0.078)    
Gender (Male)*Child's age group: 6-11   0.050    
   (0.049)    
Gender (Male)* Child's age group: 12-14   0.094*   
   (0.056)    
Gender (Male)*Child's age group: 15-19   0.012    
   (0.055)    
Interaction terms:       
Gender:       
BMI z-score mother* Child's gender (male) -0.033 -0.033 -0.033    
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)    
BMI z-score father* Child's gender (male) 0.004 0.003 0.003    
  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)    
Age as a continuous variable:       
        
BMI z-score mother * Child's age 0.007*** 0.008***                 
  (0.002) (0.002)                 
BMI z-score father * Child's age 0.006*** 0.006***                 
  (0.002) (0.002)                 
Age in categories (Base category: 0-5 years)       
        
BMI z-score mother *  Child's age group: 6-11 years old     0.083*** 
      (0.024)    
BMI z-score mother * Child's age group: 12-14 years old     0.103*** 
      (0.029)    
BMI z-score mother *  Child's age group: 15-19 years old     0.095*** 
      (0.033)    
        
BMI z-score father *  Child's age group: 6-11 years old     0.067*** 
      (0.025)    
BMI z-score father * Child's age group: 12-14 years old     0.073**  
      (0.029)    
BMI z-score father *  Child's age group: 15-19 years old     0.088*** 
      (0.028)    
Mother's age and father's age  Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region* time interaction dummies  Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.109 0.109 0.11 
N. of cases 11056 11056 11056 
Clusters (Households) 3281 3281 3281  
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
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Table 2.5:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Quantile of Household Income (USING 
MEXICAN SAMPLE AS REFERENCE). 
  (1) (2) (3)    
    
BMI z-score mother 0.192*** 0.210*** 0.196*** 
 (0.026) (0.014)    (0.026) 
BMI z-score father 0.187*** 0.161*** 0.163*** 
 (0.014) (0.024)    (0.024) 
Quantile of Household Income    
2nd Quantile -0.019 -0.028    -0.022 
 (0.058) (0.048)    (0.064) 
3rd Quantile -0.070 -0.061    -0.091 
 (0.056) (0.052)    (0.065) 
4th Quantile -0.017 -0.052    -0.095 
 (0.059) (0.052)    (0.067) 
Interaction terms:       
        
BMI z-score mother * 2nd Quantile  -0.003                 -0.004 
  (0.032)                 (0.032) 
BMI z-score mother * 3rd Quantile  0.024                 0.022 
  (0.029)                 (0.029) 
BMI z-score mother *4th Quantile  0.038                 0.029 
  (0.031)                 (0.031) 
        
BMI z-score father * 2nd Quantile    0.002    0.002 
    (0.030)    (0.030) 
BMI z-score father * 3rd Quantile    0.022    0.018 
    (0.030)    (0.030) 
BMI z-score father *4th Quantile    0.066**  0.061** 
    (0.029)    (0.030) 
Child's age child's age squared, mother's age and father's age Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.106 0.107 0.107 
N. of cases 11056 11056 11056 
Clusters (Households)  3284 3284 3284 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes: size of the household, bedrooms per capita, father’s 
occupation and mother’s level of education. 
 
Table 2.6:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Mother's education and work status 
(USING MEXICAN SAMPLE AS REFERENCE). 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6)    (7) 
        
BMI z-score mother 0.209*** 0.192*** 0.200*** 0.192*** 0.192*** 0.182*** 0.180*** 
 (0.014) (0.038) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.039) (0.040)    
BMI z-score father 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.187*** 0.207*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.033)    
Mother's education (Base category: High school):          
Less than high school 
-
0.126*** -0.155**    -0.153** -0.122    
 (0.047) (0.066)    (0.066) (0.079)    
More than high school -0.073 -0.115    -0.108 -0.039    
 (0.072) (0.105)    (0.106) (0.139)    
Mother's work status:                
Mother works    0.075*** 0.011 0.011 -0.006 -0.002    
   (0.028) (0.051) (0.062) (0.052) (0.065)    
Interaction terms : Mother's education               
                
BMI z-score mother * Less than high school 0.018       0.020 0.022    
    (0.036)       (0.036) (0.037)    
BMI z-score mother * More than high school 0.027       0.014 0.020    
    (0.060)       (0.061) (0.063)    
BMI z-score father * Less than high school           -0.021    
              (0.032)    
BMI z-score father * More than high school           -0.049    
              (0.071)    
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Interaction terms : Mother's work status               
                
BMI z-score mother * Mother works       0.038 0.038 0.040 0.040    
        (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)    
BMI z-score father * Mother works         -0.001   -0.002    
          (0.025)   (0.028)    
Child's age and age squared, mother's age and 
father's age, 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.106 0.106 
N. of cases 11056 11056 12114 12114 12114 11054 11054 
Clusters (Households) 3281 3281 3499 3499 3499 3281 3281 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, size of the 
household, bedrooms per capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
 
  
Table 2.7:  Variation in the size of the parental transmission. Size of the household (USING MEXICAN SAMPLE AS 
REFERENCE). 
  (1) (2) (3)    
     
BMI z-score mother 0.187*** 0.210*** 0.175*** 
 (0.032) (0.014)    (0.031) 
BMI z-score father 0.187*** 0.253*** 0.258*** 
 (0.014) (0.030)    (0.030)     
Size Household -0.027*** -0.004    -0.012 
 (0.009) (0.008)    (0.010) 
Interaction terms       
BMI z-score mother * Size household 0.004                 0.006 
  (0.005)                 (0.005) 
BMI z-score father * Size household   -0.012**  -0.013*** 
    (0.005)    (0.005) 
Child's age and age squared, mother's age and father's age, Y Y Y 
Household socioeconomic level Y Y Y 
Region*time interaction dummies Y Y Y 
Constant and WHO 2007 reference dummy Y Y Y 
R-squared 0.106 0.107 0.107 
N. of cases 11056 11056 11056 
Clusters (Households) 3281 3281 3281 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), 
clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis. Household socioeconomic level includes the quantile of the household’s income, bedrooms per 
capita, father’s occupation and mother’s level of education. 
 
  
187 
 
 
 
Section II. Robustness checks for Chapter 3 
Ordered Logit Estimates,  including woman’s contribution to the couple’s income. 
Table DII-3.2a . Ordered Logit estimates, based on women's opinion (INCLUDING WOMEN'S PROPORTION OF COUPLE'S 
INCOME) 
  Daily Life Children's wellbeing Economic decisions Autonomy 
  Food 
Children's 
Education 
Children's 
Health Care  
Large 
Expenditures 
Cash 
Transfers to 
Her Relatives 
If She 
Should 
Work 
Contraceptiv
e Use 
Individual Level        
Education (years) -0.011 -0.010 0.001 0.011 0.034*** 0.058*** 0.042*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011)    
Work -0.087 0.133 0.061 0.385*** 0.122 0.328*** 0.096    
 (0.075) (0.087) (0.082) (0.074) (0.082) (0.066) (0.114)    
Age 0.041*** -0.007 -0.003 0.007 0.014* 0.029*** 0.012    
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.011)    
Married 0.244*** -0.038 -0.011 -0.035 -0.074 -0.114* -0.099    
 (0.068) (0.077) (0.075) (0.070) (0.080) (0.066) (0.109)    
Age at marriage -0.020*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.021*** -0.004 -0.027**  
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)    
Previous unions 0.207* 0.444*** 0.444*** 0.130 0.348*** 0.277** 0.144    
 (0.116) (0.155) (0.138) (0.112) (0.128) (0.111) (0.181)    
Indigenous group -0.265*** -0.044 -0.075 -0.000 0.070 -0.061 -0.421*** 
 (0.078) (0.092) (0.088) (0.078) (0.090) (0.075) (0.134)    
Number of children 0.023 0.091*** 0.075*** 0.038** -0.005 -0.012 0.002    
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) (0.030)    
Age of children (mean) -0.005 -0.097*** -0.065*** 0.001 0.008 0.008 -0.016    
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.012)    
Proportion of male children  -0.021 -0.090 -0.122 -0.123* -0.205*** -0.029 0.074    
 (0.071) (0.078) (0.076) (0.068) (0.077) (0.065) (0.106)    
Couple Level        
Difference in Age -0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.014*   
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)    
Difference in Education 0.003 0.019*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.003 -0.003 0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)    
Woman's contribution to couple's 
income (proportion) -0.391*** 0.327* 0.561*** 1.037*** 0.749*** 0.688*** 0.387    
 (0.148) (0.188) (0.173) (0.160) (0.171) (0.137) (0.244)    
Household Level: Quantile of Net 
Income 
       
2nd 0.030 -0.075 -0.066 -0.038 0.034 -0.003 0.027    
 (0.075) (0.084) (0.079) (0.075) (0.083) (0.069) (0.117)    
3rd 0.029 -0.071 -0.026 -0.080 0.151* 0.093 -0.025    
 (0.072) (0.082) (0.080) (0.073) (0.080) (0.067) (0.112)    
4th 0.117 -0.151 -0.106 0.010 0.123 0.143* -0.019    
 (0.080) (0.093) (0.090) (0.079) (0.088) (0.073) (0.123)    
Community/Locality Level: Population (Base: Less than 
2,500) 
      
Between 2,500 and 15,000 0.112 -0.030 0.075 0.054 0.154* 0.094 0.123    
 (0.088) (0.092) (0.088) (0.079) (0.089) (0.075) (0.118)    
Between 15,000 and 100,000 0.144* -0.030 0.026 0.011 -0.010 0.093 0.006    
 (0.086) (0.099) (0.092) (0.083) (0.091) (0.079) (0.117)    
More than 100,000 0.068 -0.036 0.101 -0.020 0.163** 0.280*** 0.214**  
 (0.062) (0.070) (0.069) (0.061) (0.069) (0.056) (0.092)    
Region (Base: North)        
Center-North 0.124 -0.217* -0.156 -0.259** 0.054 -0.057 -0.034    
 (0.109) (0.119) (0.114) (0.106) (0.113) (0.095) (0.171)    
Center 0.169 -0.137 -0.284** -0.248** 0.254** 0.069 -0.140    
 (0.114) (0.126) (0.120) (0.114) (0.124) (0.103) (0.175)    
South -0.073 -0.191 -0.398*** -0.181 -0.156 0.217** -0.314*   
 (0.116) (0.125) (0.124) (0.112) (0.117) (0.101) (0.178)    
Year (Base: 2002)        
2005 -0.220* -0.301** -0.566*** 0.180 0.408*** 0.198** -0.271*   
 (0.115) (0.125) (0.123) (0.111) (0.114) (0.096) (0.153)    
2009 0.135 0.048 0.064 0.059 0.635*** 0.580*** 0.299    
  (0.134) (0.175) (0.159) (0.134) (0.142) (0.124) (0.204)    
τ1 -1.686*** -3.658*** -3.098*** -0.366* -1.420*** 0.643*** -3.058*** 
 (0.197) (0.224) (0.210) (0.187) (0.208) (0.180) (0.322)    
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τ2 0.672*** 0.704*** 0.844*** 3.024*** 1.568*** 2.454*** 2.219*** 
 (0.191) (0.218) (0.205) (0.192) (0.207) (0.181) (0.313)    
Pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.051 0.029 0.027 0.025 0.044 0.018    
Wald Chi-Square 251.334 412.583 261.534 349.075 273.249 656.417 108.244    
N. of cases 7494 7369 7412 7477 5702 7476 6207    
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered 
standard errors by household in parenthesis. The estimation also includes interaction terms between region and year. 
 
 
The Das and Van Soest two-step estimator 
Table DII- 3.4: Fixed Effects Ordered Logit estimates (Van and Soest estimator) 
  Daily Life Economic decisions Autonomy 
  Food 
Large 
Expenditures 
Cash 
Transfers 
to Her 
Relatives 
If She 
Should 
Work 
Individual Level     
Education (years) 0.011    0.015    -0.027    -0.017    
 (0.027)    (0.024)    (0.029)    (0.024)    
Work -0.032    0.036    0.169    0.272*** 
 (0.101)    (0.098)    (0.120)    (0.091)    
Age 0.053*** 0.029    0.106*** 0.074*** 
 (0.018)    (0.018)    (0.024)    (0.019)    
Married 6.640*** 0.701    6.358*** -0.497    
 (0.575)    (0.639)    (0.669)    (0.634)    
Age at marriage -0.003    0.004    -0.205*** -0.075**  
 (0.035)    (0.037)    (0.044)    (0.033)    
Previous unions 14.475*** -13.478*** -4.690*** -8.783*** 
 (1.055)    (0.798)    (1.404)    (0.807)    
Number of children 0.121    0.036    -0.414    0.081    
 (0.189)    (0.152)    (0.282)    (0.150)    
Age of children (mean) -0.004    0.002    0.002    0.044**  
 (0.018)    (0.020)    (0.027)    (0.021)    
Proportion of male children -0.007    -0.111    -0.117    0.060    
 (0.279)    (0.280)    (0.349)    (0.268)    
Couple Level     
Difference in Age 0.002    -0.029    0.027    -0.004    
 (0.022)    (0.023)    (0.028)    (0.024)    
Difference in Education 0.000    0.009    0.026**  0.012    
 (0.011)    (0.010)    (0.012)    (0.010)    
Household Level: Quantile of Net Income    
2nd -0.021    0.013    0.026    -0.041    
 (0.099)    (0.093)    (0.125)    (0.088)    
3rd 0.006    -0.066    0.115    0.036    
 (0.105)    (0.099)    (0.130)    (0.092)    
4th 0.267**  0.100    0.078    0.014    
 (0.117)    (0.111)    (0.146)    (0.104)    
Community/Locality Level: Population (Base: Less than 2,500)   
Between 2,500 and 15,000 0.324    -0.463**  0.191    0.026    
 (0.254)    (0.228)    (0.316)    (0.232)    
Between 15,000 and 100,000 -0.004    1.110*** -0.169    -0.093    
 (0.310)    (0.286)    (0.396)    (0.280)    
More than 100,000 -0.260    0.351    -0.045    -0.148    
  (0.250)    (0.234)    (0.420)    (0.227)    
N. of cases 3981    4544    2939    5429    
N. of groups 1528 1744 1214 2089 
Note: MxFLS 2002,2005-2006, and 2009-2012. Dependent variable: women’s perception of their own 
power as an ordered measure (“0”, “1” or “2”). The stars in the estimated coefficients indicate their 
significance (***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10), clustered standard errors by household in parenthesis 
(since the analysis should recognise the fact that observations within one household are not 
independent and they might show similar variations over time). The estimation originally includes 
region, time and their interaction terms, however they were automatically omitted for some of the 
columns, due to lack of within-variation. 
 
